“Regarding the method of HT which you specifically referred to in your question, I first came in contact with HT members from Jordan in the early nineties and found them to be argumentative but well-mannered and polite. My first understanding of the Hizb was from them and they were core members of the group. HT has played an important role in raising the awareness of the ummah to the matter of khilafa.” ((Though its a very nice depiction of what HT is doing, but it could be thought of as incomplete. Maybe you are aware of the work, and its just the brevity of your words, but let me still clarify. Its not just the ‘matter of khilafah’ which HT is raising the ummah’s awareness in, rather HT is the first and only group to my knowledge who is reviving the concept of Islam being a complete, viable and practical way of life, specially covering the domains of politics, society, judiciary, ruling, economics, foreign policy and education. This has given the youth like me the confidence back, which very few of us enjoyed in Islam beyond mere rituals. Morever, all this is done with concise daleel while keeping all practical aspects in mind as well. So it should be seen as the work which the group of Muhammad (saw), the Sahabah (ra) were doing together with him (saw) in Makkah in the initial years of the revelation.))

“They also played a role in countering the false idea that politics and political awareness have nothing to do with Islam. However the method of HT to re-establish khilfah is simply not going to work.” ((Whether the method works or not, is mere speculation, as no method so far has worked for the Muslims, with the exception to the method employed by Rasoolallah (saw), which is none but the same that HT is following. I would have liked to hear an answer from you which is well grounded in the daleel of Quran and sunnah and not merely speculative.))

“To wait for nusrah until it arrives is to wait for a miracle.” ((This sentence is quite misleading and therefore should have been left out. There is no waiting, rather HT is pursuing this goal very proactively, risking the lives of its best shabab and working the very same way as Rasoolallah (saw) together with Abubakar and Ali (ra) was doing in Makkah.))

“Tribes or military generals that are supposed to give nusrah and establish the religion of Allah are not going to be won over simply by discussions. They will only be won over when they see a group of believers living by what they say and sacrifice all that they own for the sake of Allah. This is what will inspire others to join.” ((I agree with you that if it is discussions only, it won’t work. But this is surely not the method. Rather its more comprehensive than that and needs to be put in proper context. One prong, if I may say so, of HT is working on creating public opinion for Islam as a solution provider and challenging and refuting all other solutions. Given the fact that the vast majority among the Ummah is already rejecting the Western notions of freedom, democracy, secularism, interest-based economics, liberal societies, it is evident that there is a void which needs to be filled in. Politicians and Army generals alike are aware of this fact, and the best evidence is the very very turbulent times politics is going through in Muslims lands, very recent examples being that of Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon and Syria. The Western powers have to alternate between Military rule, and different political parties, including the more Islamic ones, in order to keep people’s hope with the ailing system alive. It is that after creating such scenarios that the youth of HT go and talk to the people in Nasr, and they do so from a position of strenght, because of the visibility of the party among the masses with leaflets, demonstrations and bayanat, among the media with pictures and news, among the politicians with one to one discussions, among intellectuals with debates and so on. And all this is not just done in one city, in one country, or the whole of the Muslim world, its going on in all major cities of the Muslim world and even most major cities of the Western world. It has forced most famous think tanks of the world to issue reports on HT and it becoming a topic of floors of parliament the world over. So there is every reason to believe that any sincere general would find all those elements he would look for while giving his support for the sake of Islam. as for taking inspiration from the sacrifices of a group, I would suggest that in case of HT, all its members, from top till bottom are equally exposed to the risk, with those working in Nasr being even more sought after. This is a differentiating factor from others, where you have those who undertake the ‘verbal’ part and those who get invovled in the real ‘action’.))

“The two success stories of powerful people giving nusrah to the religion are some of the former officers of the Iraqi baath regime who joined the insurgency and the former president of Chechnya, Dudayev, who was a high ranking officer in the Soviet army. Both these successful examples of nusra were not won over through debates, demonstrations and pamphlets but by them seeing a living example of men struggling in the path of Allah.” ((Again, in HT’s case, they don’t only see men struggling in the path of Allah, but a whole group, with all the templates ready to run a modern state. Also, they see the example of so many shabab being boiled alive and tortured to death. Farhad Usmanov and the death of the founding sheikh are just two to mention.))

“This leads me to the fourth method of re-establishing khilafa and that is through Jihad fi sabilillah. The argument that you presented against this is that the only similar situation to our situation now is that of Rasulullah establishing an Islamic state first and then fighting Jihad. You are neglecting a serious difference and that is when Rasulullah established Madina there was no Islamic land that was invaded. Isn’t this a serious and major difference?” ((Of course it is a serious difference, but that should only mean that there are two tasks now, one is to get rid of the occupiers (with or without Khilafah would be the pressing questions) and the other task, which still remains, to establish the institution of Khilafah itself. Why should this change reality (occupation of Muslims lands) suddenly change the method of re-establishing the Islamic way of life? Seconldy, not all lands of Muslims are occupied. In Rasoolallah’s (saw) time, in a way, all land was occupied land, and still he didnt resort to arms!!))

“Today the Muslim world is under occupation and the statements of our scholars are clear that it becomes fardh ayn on every able Muslim to fight to free the Muslim land. When something is fardh ayn it is fardh ayn. You cannot theorize or hypothesize otherwise. The ruling is clear and the implications of it are clear. So even if you do not believe Jihad to be the way to establish khilafah you must agree that Jihad is fardh ayn and that is not where HT stands. Also the jihad which is fardh ayn and is Jihad al dafa (defensive Jihad) does not require the one who wants to participate to seek the permission of the Imam, parents, husband, slave owner, or lender.” ((Beautiful! As you correclty point out, there is no need for a Fard-Ayn to be sanctioned or granted permission by any Imam, or Amir just like the Salah or the Saum (fasting), why should HT do so? HT doesn’t hypothesize on this, rather it just is convinced that this is not the method to establish the sate, so it doesn’t employ it for that matter. Otherwise, members of HT struggle in the occupied lands against the occupation exaclty the same was as they fast and pray, without any special notification from the party. Or would you also hold the party responsible for not issuing leaflets ordering the members to fast every Ramadhan?))

“Also why should we argue on this point when we see the evidence of it in the real world. The two most successful examples, even though far from perfect, of Islamic rule in this past decade were the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic courts in Somalia. In both countries only these Muslim fighters brought peace, security and rule of law in both countries. Both movements reached to power not through elections or debates but through war. They did not fall because they were failures but they fell because the ummah failed them”. ((Even if we forget how ISI was behind the Taliban and even if we forget that Afghanistan didn’t have any indigenous industry to produce arms (complete external dependence), how can we neglect the fact which Imam himself admits, that they were failed by the ummah. Why? Why is it that tough the ummah is full of sincere people, and even the armies have lots of sincere figthers, some of whom even went there to fight and got martyred, their government fell apart within days not months? Isn’t this evidence and advice in itself that its not about just toppling the regime, rather its about 1. Having local support i.e. public opinion for Islam, 2. Having a viable piece of land, i.e. one where once the state is announced, it can be defended against internal as well as external aggressors? 3. Those working to bring about such change have to think across borders in advance, i.e. global presence, so that its not a stagnant or regressive state, rather one which would unite the Muslims lands from its very inception.))

“However, even though a battle here and there were lost but the war is not over. If you follow the current events and look at them with an attentive eye you would realize that it is the enemy who is bleeding to death not the Muslim fighters. Pretty soon the scales will tip.Because confusion usually surrounds what is meant by Jihad whether it is the Jihad al Nafs or Jihad of the sword I do not exclusively mean one or the other and I do not exclude one or the other. What I mean by Jihad here is not just picking up a gun and fighting. Jihad is broader than that. What is meant by Jihad in this context is a total effort by the ummah to fight and defeat its enemy. Rasulullah says: Fight the disbelievers with your self, your wealth and your tongues. It is what Clausewitz would refer to as “total war” but with the Islamic rules of engagement. It is a battle in the battlefield and a battle for the hearts and minds of the people.” ((Alhamdolillah, as you recognize that, it clarifies why some of our shabab even in occupied lands prefer not to pick up arms, and rather use their tongues and pens to give bayanaat and distribute leaflets which would motivate the Arab and other Muslim armies to change the direction fo their guns from their own people towards the occupiers.))

((In conclusion, I really feel sad that though HT is one of the most well documented group, its members very eloquent in their message and its presence is global, its method is either misunderstood or confused even by very learned people like you. I would really love to see your comments on mine. Again, please don’t be offended by anything, we both have the very same opinion on the objective, its just the method which needs a bit more of deliberation on our part, and Allah knows the best.)) jazakallah khayr for your patience and reply.

A shab of HT

Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim

1. Introduction

The Muslim world is in a state of political flux, with decades of mismanagement, repression and political stagnation being opposed by more assertive populations and political movements. The US has responded to these changes by calling for greater freedom and democratic reforms. These calls, along with the failed military interventions, have catalysed the unprecedented vocalisation for the implementation of the Sharia, unification of the Muslim lands and resistance to western cultural, military and political hegemony in the Muslim world, encapsulated in the call for the Caliphate[1]. The vanguard of change is led by the Islamicists, from Morocco to Indonesia, emboldened by an ideological interpretation of the Islamic faith by a leading number of twentieth century thinkers and writers [2]. Increasingly at the forefront of these movements is Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an international Islamic political party, with its call for a world-wide Caliphate.

Attempts by Western governments at containment and oppression have failed to date leading to considerations of engagement with the Islamists, always however on one premise, as stated by the former British Home Minister Charles Clarke in 2005, “…there can be no negotiation about the re-creation of the Caliphate; there can be no negotiation about the imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law”[3]. The focus on engagement is now focusing on the refutation of Islamist ideas in an attempt to diffuse the increasingly vehement calls for change.

The UK has seen an increase in Islamic activism over recent years, fuelled by unethical government foreign policy. The government has responded with a number of initiatives to combat this providing funding for the training of local leaders (imams, chaplains etc), Islamic websites, road shows and informers. Terrorism legislation has been introduced reducing civil rights and introducing heavy sentences for those “advocating” or “glorifying” terrorism[4]. Collaboration has begun in earnest with academics, scholars and ex-Islamists through engagement and refutation of Islamic political ideas[5]. The interest in ex-members of these movements, including Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher and Hassan Butt[6], especially by the intelligence community, provides the context and background for this critique.

Maajid Nawaz, an ex-member of HT, recently announced his resignation of the party and following his predecessors, has began publicly challenging the ideas of HT, with the first of his series of announced articles comprising “Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir’s Theo-Political Stance”[7]. This paper is a detailed critique and response to these challenges.

2. What is the Argument?

Maajid introduces his article by saying, “I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis, …merely to serve narrow political agendas”, a theme that is and remains central to his new enterprise.

His article continues to argue that HT through a “political ijtihad” creates a theory whereby non-decisive definitions of the terms Dar al-Kufr (lands of non-Islam) are adopted and applied to the current Muslim lands, to “advocate the theological illegitimacy of contemporary Muslim regimes”[8]. The argument then proceeds to demand the current systems/regimes need to be transformed into the Caliphate (Islamic system of governance) and forcefully merged into a unitary state through HT’s Islamic methodology. Maajid contends there is a difference of opinion (ijtihad) on these definitions amongst classical jurists, and as such, HT cannot (Islamically) enforce its view on anyone else and must obey the current rulers whose view is final on the matter due to them being legitimate. He says, “If it can be demonstrated that the Party’s theory is nothing but a legal opinion (Ijtihâd), then the argument that opposing views are based on Kufr becomes unsustainable.”[9]

He further states he will demonstrate how the party’s own theological, intellectual and legal principles when applied to their “political conclusions” result in the invalidity of the HT stance. He maintains HT even acknowledges these are contested ideas but at the same time rejects the alternative views and acts as if the position is definitive. As such, in his view, HT’s position is contradictory and invalid.

His article centres on proving the following three points:

· The non-scriptural and contested nature of the technical terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam

· The indecisive nature of scriptural citations used to arrive at them

· The acknowledgement in a HT book that the scholars differed in their views as to how Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr

3. Issues with the Argument

There are a number of problems with Maajid’s article. These are summarised below and addressed in this paper:

a) Assuming an Islamic counter-reformation and political reformation are mutually exclusive

b) Assuming usage of indecisive technical terminology cannot be used to describe decisive concepts

c) Believing decisive concepts (implementation of the Islamic creed in political life) are contested

d) Misquoting and misrepresenting the classical scholars

e) Misrepresentation of HT’s adoptions and analysis

f) Concealment of an underlying political agenda

4. The Modern Muslim World – Dar al-Islam (Lands of Islam)?

Maajid’s crusade against HT in particular, and Islamists in general, is premised on the fact that HT has somehow politicised Islam; HT misunderstands the governance of the Muslim world (which happens to be Islamic, similar to the Caliphates of the past) and through its call for a Caliphate is causing and the cause of the West’s antagonism towards Islam. Furthermore he believes that a counter-reformation and political reformation are mutually exclusive with the latter being unneccessary. He states, “I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis”.

For an ex-member of a political party, he presents an unusually simplistic understanding of the complex causes of decline and flux in the Muslim world, its historic relationship with the West (colonial Europe) and the current crisis it faces. Jean-François Mayer, in his earlier cited paper, states, “Reading Hizb ut-Tahrir’s literature could indeed fuel resentment against the West, since the latter is constantly presented as oppressing the Muslim world and conspiring against it. One should add that here Hizb ut-Tahrir only builds on feelings that are already widespread in Muslim communities (including communities established in the West)”[10].

How did these feelings and the politicisation of Islam become so entrenched in Muslims globally? The answer to this lies in the experiences of the Muslim world during the European colonialist period, eventually becoming institutionalised at all levels. This is a vast subject beyond the scope of a paper such as this. However an overview highlighting some of the exogenous influences on the politics, society and governance of the Muslim world should demonstrate this. Furthermore it will highlight the error in assuming the Muslim world continues in its historical pre-colonial trajectory and that HT and present day Islamists are politicizing Islam for their new political ends.

Background

Colonialism had a major role and influence in shaping the institutional foundations and parameters of the politics of the postcolonial states. Having ruthlessly replaced centuries old institutions, traditions and structures in the Muslim world, the colonising powers disrupted a historic continuum creating fault lines and tensions that reverberate today. Independence ended the sovereignty of European powers over their territories; however it did not produce states afresh. Despite the rhetoric of planting of new seeds, the new states were nothing more than new branches based on a trunk that was planted during the colonial days.

Colonial institutions, policies and attitudes towards governance determined the trajectory of the post-colonial nation states, developing in the European intellectual, legal and cultural legacy. The machinery of the colonial state was inherited and to varying degrees the model of the colonial state was followed with ideological continuities easily visible despite the rhetoric of the new leaders. The preponderance of colonial power ensured that all discourse be both hegemonic over and repressive of the Islamic world. It was not a dialogue between equals nor a conversation, but an attempt to reconstitute Islam and Muslims both at the level of consciousness and at the social level. The impact of this historical experience is not difficult to discern and has been highlighted by numerous researchers.

Nation States

The colonization of Muslim lands started with India, the scramble for Africa and the division of Ottoman lands following the First World War. The era ended after the Second World War when Britain and France withdrew from most of their territories. Islam received harsh criticism from the colonialists and their scholars instilling a sense of inferiority in the local elites and rising bureaucrats including even those who opposed colonialism.

Colonial territories made little effort to unify their peoples to create national societies or national cultures. Their focus was in defending their territories against other colonial powers or reducing the burden of ruling. The former led them to promoting the sanctity of their boundaries which led to the permanent borders and divisions visible today. The latter prevented the creation of lasting identities seen in the diverseness and tensions in states including Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia and Nigeria.

The deliberate manipulation of diversities to strengthen their rule created increasingly fractured societies. Along with poorly thought out border definitions meant that tensions and wars were inevitable. Civil wars in Sudan, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Chad are but a few. Territorial disputes involved: Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon Palestine, Malaysia and Singapore.

Education

The colonizers encouraged and invested in education and educational institutions to educate those who would eventually run the machinery of state. Over time they influenced generations of Muslim leaders and intellectual developments in the Muslim lands. Famous institutions included University of Punjab, University of Malaya, and Atchison College in Lahore[11]. Many sons of the elite were sent to schools in Eton Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge in England or in Paris and Amsterdam. Muhammad Iqbal studied at Cambridge and Heidelberg Universities as well as Lincoln’s Inn where Jinnah received his law degree. Many of the North African liberation movement leaders were students in North African French schools and Paris Universities.

Amongst the militaries officers would be trained at places such as Sandhurst and Saint Cyr or officer schools modelled on their European counter parts such as Quetta Staff College in Pakistan.

The pervasive impact of education introduced the Muslim world to western literature and philosophy. Figures such as J S Mill and Rousseau and over time, Sartre and Camus, became models for dissenting intellectuals just as Lenin, Castro, Mao and Che Guevara captured the imagination of activists [12].

State Institutions

The colonialists generally focused on domination to ensure legitimacy and security. Institutions were devised to organize relations between the state and society and the paradigm that governs politics, maintained in the workings of successor states. The colonial state was highly centralised utilising institutions with a European flavour; the police, judiciary, military and bureaucracy being key repositories of its authority. The institutions were not designed for society – for instance, the bureaucracy was designed not to maintain order but to ensure the smooth running of government and economy.

This structure allowed a European minority to rule vast territories, managing the economic flow of resources and goods between the parent state and its territories. These institutions, embedded in subsequent states determined the basis of the state, its character and its relationship with society and other states. States such as Pakistan replicated the colonial state in set up and function as well as how they envision their own roles, with Jinnah the first governor-general and the India Act of 1935 being law of the land until 1956. In Turkey, the law was secularized based on the Napoleonic Code, the Muslim calender abandoned, the script latinized, polygamy prohibited and in 1928 the constitution was even amended to remove the statement that Turkey was an Islamic state.

Military and Police Forces

The military, intelligence and police forces were trained to provide support to their colonial masters. The training ensured soldiers, and more importantly the officer corp., internalized the military ideas and political values of the colonial administration, resulting in an over-preoccupation with order and impatience with politics of the masses[13]. Militaries were trained not for external war but for preservation of internal order, giving them a perceived right to interfere in politics to restore order. The size of the militaries was usually based on the interests of the colonisers and Muslim states inherited omnipotent militaries, too large for their population sizes and economic strengths. The colonial policy of recruiting amongst minorities was due to them being more closely allied with the colonial order and their willingness to help suppress the dominant community as well as being less likely to respond to religious calls like Jihad. The legacy of the Great Mutiny of 1857 shaped thinking resulting in Alawis dominating the Syrian army and Punjabis the Pakistani army.

The forces having fought with their senior colonial officers up to independence developed and institutionalised attitudes of mistrust and cynicism of those who fought for independence. Indonesian generals remained wary of Sukarno, removing him when they were provided with the pretext of Communism and the same may be said of those who lead coups in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Sudan. Even the left-leaning junior officers who overthrew their senior officers of the old school to join the anti-imperialist struggles did not resolve the tensions between military and civilian orders, leading to military takeovers in Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

The pervasive nature of the intelligence services (mukhabaraat) is wideley felt throughout the Arab world, stifling discussion, controlling political movements and quashing critcism. It needs little comment as the experiences of those who have had the ill-fate of experiencing this institution are wideley known and reported. Unprecedented in Muslim history is the restructuring and organisation of “official” scholars, compromising the independance the Muslim Jurists have had since the early centuries of Islam, “scholars for dollars” being a phrase often heard in relation to this new breed. Across the Islamic world Muslims are found referring to texts dating back centuries, if not over a millenium, mistrusting the views of these figures.

Bureaucracy

Like the military, the bureaucracy was moulded in the ethos of colonial culture, sharing the same political outlook as their European rulers. Due to their power over the state machinery, politicians would have little control over them lest they disrupt the workings of state. As such, they had major input into state formation, ensuring continuities in the ethos and mode of operation of the state before and after independence. In Pakistan the bureaucracy eclipsed the political elite in managing the country, replacing Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan after 1951 by senior bureaucrats Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza, both having risen through the bureaucracy under the British.

The quality of the bureaucracy was generally determined by the investment the colonial power made in its administration, the Indian Civil Service being exemplary, whilst the bureaucracies of the Arab Near East and Libya being underdeveloped. Over time, many lost their independence and their pre-eminence declined resulting in the diminishment of their political role and contribution to socioeconomic change.

Judiciary

The British colonies generally had a system of justice modelled after that of Britain, with some degree of autonomy, its independence from the executive branch becoming embedded in the structure of the postcolonial state. As such, colonial subjects usually had a strong degree of respect for it. In Pakistan, the judiciary has regularly defied the executive branch; with examples including opposition to Ayub Khan’s banning of Jamaati Islam in 1964, ruling against Ghulam Khan’s dismissing of the government in 1993 and most recently the stand-off against Musharraf. The Malaysian judiciary has a similar history[14] as do most post-colonial British territories.

The judiciary had the interesting effect of instituting particular patterns of political activity in the body politic of the pre and post-colonial society, allowing courts to become avenues for political activism.

Governance – Politics of Identity

Colonial rule was often only possible through the manipulation of divisions in society, ethnic, linguistic and religious [15]. By accentuating social differences, they institutionalised them; treating communities differently in the eyes of the law, at polling booths, in how resources were allocated and in recognition of religious rights etc. This encouraged the politics of identity at the cost of development of uniform civil societies. In India, this resulted in the emergence of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 that lobbied for separate electorates for Muslims and Hindus with similar reactions in Malaysia, Nigeria and Palestine.

In essence elections in colonial rule provided a critical political framework that shaped the conception of communities of their relation to power at the centre as well as their own identity and self-definition. The subsequent state leaders (usually from the colonial military or bureaucracy), would continue manipulating social divisions even as they spoke of national unity – Iraq being a case in question.

The importance of certain geographic locations to colonising powers (e.g., North West India to the British for supply of troops) or where the colonisers arrived late (e.g., the French agricultural relationships with Syria) meant that they developed patronage networks, which have left indelible marks in future state-society relationships. The state emerged as paternalistic and society came to see patronage as a function of state (this contributed to Malays remaining aloof from commercial activities expecting the state to guarantee economic and social standing).

Authority

Though the aim and general structure of colonial authority was usually similar, variations of how the colonial administrators ruled their vassal populations accounted for the different experiences in state formations post-colonialism. In Algeria and Libya colonial rule was direct while in Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia, Java and India local elites were used. The Dutch in Java, utilised the local elites to resolve labour shortages, entrenching their socio-political positions, creating dependencies between the peasantry and elite (the Dutch permitting exploitation and impoverishment for their own ends). The British carefully controlled 250 princes in India to control a third of the Indian population – they controlled the rest of the population by manipulating landowners, local chiefs and grandees[16].

Symbiotic relationships resulted, entrenching the positions of these local elites, who favoured compartmentalisation of policy in favour of a uniform national political arena. This allowed them to control segments of the polity and negotiate with the centre. In Pakistan this trend is still visible today with the landowning class wielding significant power, controlling politics at all levels, and resisting land reforms. The power of the monarchy in the Gulf States and Brunei and the characteristics of tribal chiefs in East Africa and Nigeria is reflective of these British policies. The Algerian experience with direct French rule to ensure integration into France and exploitation through commercial gain for their settlers resulted in centralised rule – local elites and leaders were seen with hostility, a reflection of the post-colonial Algerian landscape.[17]

Conclusions

Its structural expressions in the Islamic environment continue to reproduce themselves in a fashion that perpetuates this power relationship. Elites in most Islamic countries are largely products of superimposed constitutive educational and political structures. In this lies the essence of the polarization and bifurcation between elites and masses in the Muslim world. Muslim and Arab intellectuals, imbued with the Western discourse of rationality, entered political life as natural allies to the local traditional elites and the colonial West. The broad mass base, on the other hand, had no choice but to fall back upon the traditional values of their own society to protect themselves from the excesses of the new class – a class which sought and seeks to pattern its life and values along Western lines. Commitment to traditional (Islamic) values thus reflects a defensive posture aimed at rejuvenating the spirit of internal cohesion and self-identification against the disintegrative effects brought in by patterns of modern life.

In the absence of social cohesion, it becomes almost impossible for the State to deal adequately with strains, penetrate society, regulate social relationships and extract resources. In the absence of an overarching consciousness that unites and merges its subjects at all levels of the social scale in a commonly accepted meaning and criteria of validity, there can be neither strong societies nor strong states.

HT go to some lengths to detail the reality of the colonial division of the Ottoman state, introduction of foreign creeds, the installation of agents and groomed elites, and the removal of Islam from politics and societal life leaving at best remnants intact (usually to pacify the masses/ullema), with control over succession of power to those who would perpetuate their interests and hegemony. The institutionalization of secularism and the proactive marginalization of Islamic thoughts/institutions from political life have been resisted by societies in each and every Muslim country[18]. A review of scholarly writings that address the 20th century colonialist experience across the Muslim world and the response of the Muslim intellectuals speak for themselves and need no elaboration as per Abdul Qadeem Zalloom’s quote Maajid refers to.

Against this complex, multi-dimensional, historically evolving reality, Maajid’s analysis is little more than a parochial one-dimensional view of the situation. His view the current regimes as being simply “Muslims” does not take into consideration the institutionalized colonial values, foreign ideologies, systems, agendas and outlooks, visible today across the organs of the modern states, their constitutions, policies, administration and organizations along with the resulting tensions. As such, his conclusions are fundamentally flawed.

5. Decisive Texts are Indecisive?

HT’s discourse is concerned with the implementation of non-Islamic systems across the Muslim world since the division of the Ottoman state by colonial powers, a situation unparalleled in Muslim history. This situation is sensed and understood by all Muslims, thinkers, politicians, movements and the masses – as such it is a decisive and categorical reality which HT term as non-Islamic (kufr), and one that is acknowledged by all as needing change.

To understand HT’s argument, that the implementation of non-Islamic creeds in Muslim lands is decisively and categorically prohibited and utilisation of any other ideology or system is kufr (non-Islamic), the notion of certainty must first be addressed as this appears a confused premise embedded in his article.

There are a number of discussions in philosophy that attempt to argue a relativist position on matters of epistemology [19]. Although the oft-quoted view in Western Philosophy is that the quest for certainty is a failed enterprise, this is primarily due to an erroneous attempt at defining certainty to unnecessarily exclude skepticism [20]. However, without this requirement, the term is definable and arguable. Certainty comprises the state of an individual (or a society) on a matter where there is no realistic doubt. This is supported by the usage of this term (yaqin) by Allah (swt) in a number of verses[21] supporting the existence and necessity of the notion of certainty[22].

Maajid has a flawed assumption in his understanding upon which his entire reasoning is built – namely, if some people (or scholars) disagree on a matter it is zanni (indecisive) and by implication if there is no dispute the matter is qati (decisive). Thus he should believe prior to historical ikhtilaf (dispute) on matters of jurisprudence, all matters were qati as no dispute existed. Likewise, he should believe that the Quran is zanni as there are scholars who dispute parts of it and even what constitutes something being mutawatir. This understanding of his is obviously wrong.

Certainty can be gained and expressed despite the existence of people disputing an issue, as in cases of religious certainty that exists in matters of faith. As disagreement exists on every matter, even those that all Muslims would acknowledge as definite and decisive, (existence of God, Quran being the word of God, Islam being the truth (haqq), obligation of prayer (salat) etc ) would that mean there is no such thing as certainty?

The existence of a disagreement is not important and does not mean the matter is certain or uncertain – the substance of the disagreement must be evaluated to determine if it is a valid disagreement. In scriptural analysis, if there is propensity for an alternative view or consideration, the matter is not deemed to be certain – if however there is no possibility of an alternative consideration, the matter is deemed certain. An obvious point, but one which regularly is violated by Maajid’s analysis is that new concepts need to coexist with existing concepts that have been accepted (verified) so there are no discrepencies or anomalies between them. If one puts a criteria of certainty down, one should not just evaluate one’s dispute with someone using that criteria – it should be consistent with the one’s other ideas – throughout this paper examples will be used to demonstrate this issue.

This understanding is acknowledged by HT as per Maajid’s quotation from “Shaksiyyah Islamiyya” (The Islamic Personality) in relation to shubhat al-daleel (semblance of evidence) for determining the validity of an alternative view. However the associated conditions are as follows, without which there is no shubhat al-daleel[23]:

a) Definite general evidences comprise Quran, Sunnah, Ijma al-Sahabah and Qiyas.

b) Speculative general evidences include: istihsan (juristic preference), al-masalih al mursala (unqualified interests) etc.

c) The angle of deductive reasoning (istidlal) regarding these evidences must have been on studies of the Arabic language and studies of sections of the Quran and Sunnah.

For example, to demonstrate how this would apply in practice, a Quranic verse states: “Cut the hand of the thief, male or female”[24]. It may be said the cutting is to prevent him from stealing and this may be done through any means, e.g., imprisonment, exhortation etc. Or it may be said the word “qata’a” (to cut) is an ambivalent term (lafz al-mujmal) meaning either separating the limb (amputation) or scarring and both cases are allowed. However, neither view has a shubhat al-daleel. This is because the deductive reasoning in this manner does not accord with the Arabic language or other divine texts. Linguistically, one does not use the metaphorical meaning (majazi) except when the real meaning is not possible. The ambivalent meaning has been transformed into a fixed meaning by the explanation of texts and one does not refer to a meaning contradicting it. Abu Hurairah (ra) narrated a thief who had stolen a turban was brought to the Messenger who ordered his hand be cut and the wound be sealed by boiling oil. Subsequent Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, followed this understanding without any objection from any of the companions. Punishing the thief with anything other than cutting of the hand has no evidence or semblance of evidence[25].

Furthermore, shubhat daleel does not mean one does not follow in action the opinion one has come to. Respect for shubhat daleel in terms of recognising it as an Islamic opinion is a general and traditional principle[26]. As for respect in actions, this is an ikhtilafi (disputed) matter and depends on the particular hukm (rule) at hand. In some issues one does not impose one’s opinion and in others one does. Therefore to state shubhat daleel means respect in all actions is a misrepresentation of HT’s and the traditional understanding of shubhat daleel.

To demonstrate and clarify this, a spectrum of fiqh examples are given below:

a) If someone abandons prayer he is a Kafir according to Hanbalis but a sinful Muslim for the rest. Everyone respects this opinion but in action one would pray behind this man and consider giving a daughter in marriage to him, but the Hanbali would not as for him he is kafir. So the different views of the depiction of a reality command respect as Islamic opinions but not necessarily respect in actions such one abandons an opinion and follows the other opinion.

b) If a Shafii combines his salah (prayer), the Hanafi would respect this as an Islamic opinion but not follow him in his action.

c) If a man pronounces divorce three times in one sitting and he follows that it is irrevocable, it does not matter what opinion the woman follows. The opinion of the woman that 3 in one sitting is not valid does not mean respect of her opinion.

d) If a ruler usurps authority and he follows that this is allowed. People who follow the opinion that mutasallit has to be removed are entitled to fight even though the ruler follows a different opinion. For example those who historically fought Yazid and Hajjaj bin Yusuf.

e) If a wali (governor) declares himself Khalifah and says he has shubhat daleel, the real Khalifah should still fight him and bring him under his authority.

The pronouncement of kufr on views (takfeer) is something that is rarely used or evoked (historically it was pronounced on some wayward philosophers in one of its rare applications in over a thousand years of Islamic history) and is not relevant to the discussion. Islam encourages the notions of inquiry rather than limit them. HT is not in the business of pronouncing takfeer. It does not state alternative views are kufr regardless of how weak they are so long they are built on the Islamic creed – rather, it believes kufr creeds are still being used as reference points since the colonialists left the Muslim lands, a matter that is prohibited categorically.

The argument Maajid uses that “Amr imam yarfa ul-khilaf” (the imam resolves the disputes) assumes that the ruler is legitimate and adopts according to Islam. The society should then follow what the ruler has adopted since he resolves the disputes according to the above principle.

Maajid justifies the current regimes as being Imams by equating ideologically differing terminologies. His justification being that HT do not see an issue in using differing terms for the Imam, Islam not having fixed this term. HT however does have a problem when idiomatic terms are used, discussing the issue in their first book for students “Nizaam al-Islam” (The System of Islam), or one equates a reality which violates Islam to an Islamic notion, as in this case. HT do not see the current regimes as Imams nor believe they have any legitimacy (as already explained) and therefore the above principle does not apply.

Furthermore, even if there was a legitimate Imam, he does not resolve every dispute. There are some matters which are outside his remit. For example, matters relating to his legitimacy. If he is a usurper and he believes this is acceptable, this does not oblige those who believe the usurper needs to be removed. The scholars never gave this principle for such things – rather they said you should avoid fighting due to bloodshed.

Despite the fact that many political positions can be Islamically justified given the non-prescriptive nature of Islamic law on political matters, Maajid fails to cite or reference any countries that have made the Islamic creed the sole reference in managing their societies and security being in the hands of Muslims – the fact that a law appears similar to one that may exist in Islamic law does not mean it was derived from Islam otherwise the whole world would be seen as ruling by Sharia (and also Dar al-Islam (Islamic states) according to his view of requiring Muslims to simply reside there).

Returning to the matter at hand, one can look at this matter from two perspectives – the original divine texts that HT quote with their textual meanings and what the Jurists views were.

The texts which HT quotes are not open to difference of opinion – they comprise texts that are fundamental and unambiguous. They are decisive in that the right of law/rule (hukm) is for Allah and revelation must be used when judging and ruling.

a) “The right of rule is solely for Allah”[27].

b) “Have you not seen those who declare they believe in the revelation that has come to you and to those before you? Their (real) wish is to resort together for judgement (in their disputes) to taghout”[28]

c) “…and whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed then such are the kafireen (disbelievers)”[29].

d) “Judge between them by that which Allah has revealed and do not follow their desires and beware of them lest they seduce you from some part of that which Allah has revealed to you”[30].

e) “Allah will never allow the disbelievers to have authority over the believers”[31].

When one reviews the classical jurists on this matter, they were emphatically decisive – some quotes are listed below to demonstrate the point:

Al-Razi states in his tafsir that this and the associated ayaat are general in their meaning and application requiring Muslims to implement Islam.

Ibn Abbas (ra) on this verse stated that anybody who denies a definitive judgement of Allah (swt) contained in the Sharia is a Kafir. He went on to say that anyone who says that the Rule of Allah (swt) does not have to be established or the rule of man is better than the Rule of Allah (swt) or the rules of man are just as good as the Rule of Allah (swt) is a Kafir. He also said that the one who does not deny Allah’s (swt) Hukm, but believes that it is allowed to rule by other than what Allah (swt) has revealed, he is also a Kafir because he is denying that the right of Rule is solely for Allah (swt). This is the case even if he says that the rule of Allah (swt) is better than the rule implemented by man.

Ibn al-Qayyim said, “The correct view is that ruling according to something other than that which Allah has revealed includes both major and minor Kufr, depending on the position of the judge. If he believes that it is obligatory to rule according to what Allah has revealed in this case, but he turns away from that out of disobedience, whilst acknowledging that he is deserving of punishment, then this is lesser Kufr. But if he believes that it is not obligatory and that the choice is his even though he is certain that this is the ruling of Allah, then this is major Kufr.”[32]

Ibn Abeel-’Izz said, “Judging by other than what Allah has revealed could be kufr that expels one from the religion and could be a sin either a major sin or a minor one and it could be a symbolic kufr or minor kufr based on the two sayings and this all depends on the situation of the judge: So if he believes that judging by what Allah has revealed is not obligatory or that he has the option in this or if he dishonours it while being certain that it is the judgement of Allah then this is major kufr and if he believes in the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed in this instance but turns away from it while recognizing that he deserves to be punished then he is a sinner and is to be referred to as a disbeliever symbolically or upon minor disbelief”[33].

Ibn Taymiyyah said, “Undoubtedly, whoever does not believe that it is obligatory to rule according to that which Allah has revealed to His Messenger is a Kafir, and whoever thinks it is permissible to rule among people according to his own opinions, turning away and not following which Allah has revealed is also a Kafir…So in matters which are common to the Ummah as a whole, it is not permissible to rule or judge according to anything except the Quran and Sunnah. No one has the right to make the people follow the words of a scholar or Ameer or shaykh or king. Whoever believes that he can judge between people according to any such thing, and does not judge between them according to revelation is a Kafir.”[34]

Ibn Katheer made reference to the Tartars at his time, “…who put together for them a law book extracted from different laws of the Jews, the Christians and the Deen of Islam. It also contained many rules taken only from their own opinion and desires that later became a system of law followed by the people and given precedence over the Book of Allah (swt) and the Sunnah of his Messenger (saw) so the ruler who does that is a Kafir.”[35]

Al-Shawkani said in one of his essays:

“a) That referring for judgement to Taghoot (i.e. non Islam) constitutes major Kufr.

b) That referring for judgement to Taghoot is just one of a number of actions of Kufr, each of which in its own is sufficient to condemn the one who does it as a Kafir.

c) He gives examples of Kufr, such as people agreeing to deny women their rights of inheritance and their persisting in co-operating in that, and he states that is major kufr”[36].

If Maajid has an alternative position to this, he has not documented it in his article nor has he addressed or refuted these fundamental points aside from his passing comment “The two passages (Ayât) from the Qur’ân that are referred to, though in themselves forming a theologically definitive source for proof (Qati’i al-Thubût), their link to this particular subject matter as conditions (Shart) for the validity of a land (Dâr) is inconclusive (Zanni)”.

This statement is meaningless – what does the term valid mean? And what does it mean when he conjuncts it to land, “a valid land”? Legal to trade with, legitimate to conclude treaties, permitted for living in, forbidden to fight with, acceptable for practicing Islamic rituals therein, nor requiring migration etc. And here lies the crux of the confusion in Maajid’s article and thought. His discussion of a Dar (land) is so vague and the term so broad, containing so many different issues, the discourse becomes convoluted and he fails to prove anything. It appears he wishes to avoid having to respond to HT’s actual argument that looks at one decisive aspect – the requirement of the implementation of Allah’s Sharia[38] – and the responsibility of Muslims to initiate this process as the Messenger did before them and call the world to Islam without compromising, selling-out or trying to coexist with philosophies, ideologies and religions of disbelief (kufr).

6. HT Concepts and the Adoption Process

HT emphasizes the importance and significance of its intellectual culture, verifying any and every idea rigorously before adopting it. It cites revival movements that failed historically due to the lack of thought and clarity in the intellect culture adopted, particularly in the aims and methodologies[39]. Moreover, it is often a matter of confusion what constitutes the ideas and values a movement stands for and advocates, as opposed to personal thoughts and views of its adherents along with the continuous changes exhibited due to underlying pragmatic attitudes. HT concepts must undergo the process of adoption (tabanni), to adopt the strongest views and avoid disputes regarding what is and what is not the HT official view on a matter[40]. Furthermore, it ensures conformity with existing adoption through a process of intense intellectual scrutiny and critique. The adopted books comprise:

1) System of Islam

2) Party Structure

3) Concepts of Hizb al-Tahrir

4) The Islamic state

5) The Ruling System in Islam

6) The Economic System in Islam

7) The Social System in Islam

8) The Islamic Personality (3 Volumes)

9) Funds of the Khilafah state

10) Political Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir

11) Political views of Hizb ut-Tahrir

12) Muqadimat al-Dastoor (Introduction to the constitution)

13) Al-Dausiah

14) Essential Elements of the Islamic Nafsiyyah (Disposition)

15) Organisations of the Khilafah state – in ruling and admin.

Maajid quotes the famous Wahabbite rebellion against the Ottoman state from Abdul Qadeem Zalloom’s book, “How the Khilafah was Destroyed”. From this he questions why HT criticizes this rebellion if it is permitted for one to enact their ijtihad as per the HT methodology.

This attempt to refute HT adopted thought by using material the party has never adopted[41] is unusual. Why would someone who had studied with HT for so long, failed to understand this basic idea?

Firstly, it is one that is not taught when studying the early books of the party so it is possible Maajid did not study or hear of it. However, he quotes a partial definition in one of the footnotes in his article, illustrating he is aware of the idea but maybe not the centrality of the adoption process to the definition of HT as an entity. “Adopted Party books are those books that are obligatory for a member to believe in and propagate. Members must not openly criticize adopted books even if they disagree with them…”[42]

Secondly, HT thought has inspired a range of literature to be produced by individuals influenced by their thought. To ensure this thought is not understood to be HT thought, the party only puts its name to material that it has adopted – the book “How the Khilafah was Destroyed”, cited by Maajid is not an adopted book, the name Hizb ut-Tahrir does not appear on it.

Finally, the position articulated in the book is in fact consistent with the HT adopted views and not at variance as Maajid alleges. HT prohibits the enactment of any diverse view when the Imam or Khalif has adopted on a matter and there is no dispute that the Ottomans were valid Khalifs, a fact which the Wahabbites accepted, along with the jurists of the time. As such, the Wahabis were obliged to obey and submit to the rulers and not commit treason by colluding with the British to rebel against them.

The reality post-Khilafah is one where the legitimacy of installed rulers and agents is disputed as are the ideologies and creeds they implement. Thus there is no comparison between the two scenarios.

7. What are the Discussions of Dar al-Islam/Kufr about?

Maajid states his first and “most obvious” way of showing HT’s stance to be inconclusive, and “the theological illegitimacy of enforcing their view that others are on Kufr”, is by showing “Definitions of Dār al-Kufr and Dār al-Islām are not to be found in any verse of the Qur’ān or any Ĥadīth (prophetic traditions). One or two prophetic traditions (Aĥadīth), argued by many to be of weak authenticity, refer to the term Dār al-Ĥarb and another refers to Dār al-Kufr, but all fail to offer any definition of these terms. It is primarily due to this reason that the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture (see below)”[43].

The terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam have been derived from Quran and Sunnah, with all jurists agreeing to their core meanings, namely Islam must be applied and security cannot be with non-Muslims, and some ancillary aspects being disputed. A search through the major works of jurisprudence through Muslim history confirms this[44].

Maajid does not reference where HT state “…that others are on Kufr” as this is something that he contradicts himself when he cites HT’s view on difference of opinion and their tolerant views in relation to different views.

By stating that neither terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam are not to be found in any verse of Quran or any Hadith and thereby trying to argue the resulting notions are indecisive, Maajid is exhibiting an understanding that would only be expected of a beginner studying Sharia. Whether technical terms appear in texts or not is irrelevant – what is required is that the content of definitions of such terms should embody, reflect or concur with divine texts. Nomenclature is not central to the Sharia witnessed by the absence of majority of technical definitions from divine texts and by the famous principle, “There is no objection to definitions in that they do not contradict the Sharia – for importance is not attached to the words but the meanings” – لا مشاحة في الاصطلاح ما لم يخالف الشرع؛ لذلك فليست العبرة بالمباني إنما بالمعاني

If one wished to refute using his style of argument one would state the terms Dar, Islam and Kufr do appear in a number of texts as do their synonyms Balad, Ard and Qarya. The conjunction of these and other terms in principle is also seen in the texts. Therefore the terms Dar al-Islam/al-Kufr appear and are sanctioned by the texts. Numerous examples of Islam and Kufr appear throughout the texts so no illustration is necessary – examples of Dar from authentic and non-daeef sources include:

· That abode of utter desolation (Quran 14:28) وَأَحَلُّواْ قَوْمَهُمْ دَارَ الْبَوَارِ

· And God invites unto the abode of peace, and guides him that wills onto a straight way (Quran 10:25) وَاللّهُ يَدْعُو إِلَى دَارِ السَّلاَمِ وَيَهْدِي

· Theirs shall be an abode of peace with their Sustainer (Quran 6:127) لَهُمْ دَارُ السَّلاَمِ عِندَ رَبِّهِمْ وَهُوَ وَلِيُّهُمْ بِمَا كَانُواْ يَعْمَلُونَ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen” [Sahih Muslim 4294/Nisai/Darimi ]

· The Prophet (saw) said: “I have been shown the land of your hijra” [Sahih Bukhari 12:202] أُرِيتُ دَارَ هِجْرَتِكُمْ

· The Propet (saw) said: “Peace be upon you abode of the believers” [Sahih Muslim 2:53] فَقَالَ السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ دَارَ قَوْمٍ مُؤْمِنِينَ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Medina is the land of hijra and sunna” [Ahmed 1:372] الْمَدِينَةَ فَإِنَّهَا دَارُ الْهِجْرَةِ وَالسُّنَّةِ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “Medina was the land of shirk” [Nisai 13:55] الْمَدِينَةَ كَانَتْ دَارَ شِرْكٍ

· The Prophet (saw) said: “And he carried me to the land of hijra” [Tirmidhi 12:176] وَحَمَلَنِي إِلَى دَارِ الْهِجْرَةِ

· Abdul Rahman bin ‘Awf was speaking with Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra) (who was the Khaleefah at the time) he said, “…until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.” [Sahih Bukhari 3713]

· Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, “Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar al-Shirk and they came to the Prophet (saw) on the night of the Bay’ah al-Aqabah.” [an-Nisa’i]

· From the companions, the letter of Khalid bin Walid mentions “…as long as he lives in the dar al-Hijrah and dar al-Islam. If they leave the dar of the Muhajirs, the dar al-Islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.” [Abu Ubaid, Kitaab al-Amwaal, pg. 98 & Abu Yusuf, Kitaab al-Kharaaj, pgs. 155-156]

Like most technically defined terms in the Islamic sciences (uloom) they do not appear in the source texts in their technical form, aside from linguistic references[45]. Maajid’s argument if applied to other technical terms in the Islamic sciences, covering both decisive and indecisive ideas would result in one arguing:

· the term aqeedah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., Allah’s existence is indecisive, as is the Messenger, as is the Day of Judgement etc.)

· the terms uloom al-Quran, mushaf and asbab al-nuzool are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in Quran)

· the terms uloom al-hadith, ahad, sahih, daeef, mawdooh, mashoor and mutawatir are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the Sunnah)

· the term ijma al-sahabah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the consensus of the companions on matters including finality of the Prophethood)

· the term sirah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the entire life of the Messenger)

· the terms mandub, mubah, ruksah, azimah and fasid are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the Sharia and its laws)

Historically, the Dar (land/territory) paradigm defined the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim political sovereign entities and those between the Islamic state and its citizens from different regions and their situations[46]. These legal terms, like others deemed important in Islam (e.g., mukallaf, mandub, aqeedah, fasid, illah, ijma, isnad, matn, hadith etc), were coined by Muslim jurists in the early centuries of Islam with the formulation of the various disciplines. The terms were necessary as they came to encompass realities, rules and values, both decisive and speculative, in relation to these relationships and how to manage them according to the scriptures. Their core meanings were decisively rooted in divine texts, (branches being disputed) being determined from the Quran, the Sunnah and the practices of the companions[47]. They encompassed rules regarding matters of practicing Islam individually and collectively, migration, citizenship, war, security etc.

Over time a collective and agreed position emerged amongst the classical jurists – where Islamic rules (ahkam) were dominant along with security this comprised Dar al-Islam whilst Dar al-Harb (or Kufr) would be where there was lawlessness and one’s life or property was not safe – through jihad the aim was to ensure the Sharia was dominant and security was with the Muslims. This bi-polar division of the world and the discouragement (generally prohibition) to reside in Dar al-Harb, where security was an issue, meant that Muslims viewed Dar al-Islam as their lands whilst Dar al-Harb was viewed as the lands of the foreigners or the enemies. There were some nominal fringe discussions debated amongst some scholars regarding ancillary issues that followed from this major discussion, for instance, whether individuals living in non-Islamic lands or Islamic lands invaded/occupied by foreigners.

However, in the twentieth century, the redefinition of the Muslim world along colonial inspired lines occurred and Muslims began to migrate to the West seeking economic betterment. These trends clashed with the classical views resulting in some modern jurists reopening this discussion arguing for redefining these positions according to the new colonialist defined realities, a pragmatic position at best. These included thinkers like Faysal Mawlawi, Mana Qattan, Yusuf Qardawi, Taha Jabir al-Alwani and most recently Tariq Ramadan who broadly argued for the integration of Muslims into the West and a re-consideration of international relations. Others like al-Nabhani argued that the normative rules of Islam were relevant to all times and places and as such the reality needed reconfiguring rather than reinterpreting and reconfiguring Islam[48].

There appears to be no desire by modern jurists to address the evidences which the classical jurists used with some going as far as to even deny the existence of the evidences[49]. One hadith in question is the narration by Sulayman al-Buraydah that clearly touched on this issue[50]:

“When the Messenger of Allah appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment… He would say…”When you meet enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, accept it and restrain yourself from doing them harm. Invite them to Islam; if they respond, accept it from them and desist from fighting. Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen and inform them that if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajireen. If they refuse, tell them they will have the status of the Bedouin Muslims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims”’[51]

This text makes the point Medinah is different from other Dars, due to its rule and security, which affords privileges and obligations, different to the Bedouin Muslims who simply follow the commands of Islam. Likewise the letter of Khalid bin Walid to the people of Hira reflects the same notions:

“Khalid b. Walid wrote to the people of Hira: I have granted (the people of Hira) that any of their elderly who is unable to work, afflicted by a plague, or became poor such that his co-religionists give him alms, then his jizyah will be waived and he and his family will be provided for from the Bayt al-Mal of the Muslims as long as he lives in the Dar al-Hira and Dar al-Islam. If they leave the Dar of the Muhajirs, the Dar al-Islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.”

In fact many evidences assume the existence of a Dar paradigm without which such texts make no sense and remain devoid of any application e.g., ‘And if they incline towards peace, you also incline towards it’[52]. This is because these verses are not addressed to individuals in their personal capacities but state entities. The Dar paradigm in jurisprudence is a legal term whose principles are valid for all times unlike international geopolitics which varies over time[53]. It is law and not political analysis, and defines how things should be (normative) and not how things are (positive). It is prescriptive whilst political paradigms are descriptive (observational) and predictive. Furthermore it is not monolithic but made of independent but interrelated parts. The absence of one part does not mean the absence or irrelevance of the other (e.g., the absence of occupation or a peace treaty does not invalidate the entire model)[54].

By initiating a discussion centred on these terms, Maajid provides no conceptual clarity on the subject, leaving the reader with a limited comparison of the various wordings used in the composition of some technical terms and the conclusion that this matter was contested – a blatantly false conclusion.

HT’s quote is accurate and correct when it states: “Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims…” – none of the Jurists disputed the above when it was used in relation to the Islamic State. This importantly is the subject matter of HT and not minority Muslims living in non-Islamic societies or occupied lands – thus the discussions of the branches of the definitions by the juists are not relevant, nor is the generalised clumsy conclusion that there were differences on the entire definitions.

Furthermore, Ibn Qayyim said in relation to the same usage, “The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.”[55]

Regarding their “astonishing” acceptance that there are differences of opinion, this is not stated in relation to the definition of Dar al-Islam as per Maajid’s quotes from HT in his footnote 134. HT however stated that there have been differences expressed as to when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr comprising, “1. The appearance of the rules of Kufr, 2. Bordering of Dar al-Kufr and, 3. Absence of the Security of the Muslims…”, descriptive definitions and not based on divine texts.

Out of the three points, the second point is disputed amongst the classical scholars. HT state a review of the (historic) reality would eliminate the second condition that is stipulated as obviously incorrect as Dar al-Islam will always border Dar al-Kufr – does that mean there is never a Dar al-Islam? It thus leaves only the remaining two points which are agreed upon and upon which HT rely. More so, they are consistent with the decisive notions that the implementation of Sharia is required and the foreign systems and ideologies implemented in Muslim societies post-colonialism are invalid and security must be in the hands of Muslims and not foreign powers.

Thus HT’s position is intellectually sound and consistent – unfortunately Maajid’s analysis of it is not.

8. Are the terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr decisive in HT Adopted Culture?

Maajid’s critique of HT centres on an analysis of the juristic views of what constitutes Islamic land and when this changes to non-Islamic land. His article comprises a number of citations that form the basis of his work, quoted from “Way for Revival”[56]. However a key question that he appears to have overlooked is: does HT adopt or state that the wordings used in the formation in any of these definitions are definite and decisive (qati)?

The answer appears to be no. In the adopted book, “Mafaheem”, HT presents the results of their insight and complex analysis as to the causes of decline of the Muslim world. They then articulate the problem of institutionalized non-Islamic ideologies in the Muslim lands and provide a solution for the problem, which comprises the means for change (detailed in the books “Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change”/“Party Structure”) along with the ideology of Islam with elaboration of its shape and form in a number of books (detailed in the adopted books “System of Islam”, “Economic System”, “Social System” and “Constitution”). The underlying premises and assumptions are articulated in the series of adopted books “Islamic Personality”. At no point do they utilize the terms Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr in their analysis as definite and decisive definitions. Even the quote from “Islamic Personality”, does not state the definitions of the terms, utilising their wordings, are definite and not open to being defined using different terms – nor does HT stipulate acceptance of these terms nor enter this discussion.

What is expected and stipulated as decisive is that the Islamic lands must be ruled by Muslims and Islam, notions stated categorically and unambiguously by decisive texts, and found throughout HT’s works.

Maajid argues his objective is to show the inconsistency of HT adoption – to successfully do so, he must demonstrate what HT state as decisive is to the contrary indecisive by elaborating the different views on that – otherwise all he demonstrates is that a definition is indecisive, a matter already known and acknowledged by HT – a futile exercise. With the collapse of this point, Maajid fails in his objective from the outset.

Thus the use of this point is nothing more than a “red herring”.

9. Confusion Surrounding the Definition and Usage of Technical Terminology

A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term, word or phrase[57]. Definitions assist discussions by agreeing on common terminologies which alleviate the need to consistently refer to the underlying definition. The need for precision and accuracy in definitions is important.

Definitions are of two kinds:

· Descriptive, one which is generally used, or,

· Stipulative, one where a new meaning is imposed on an existing term.

Furthermore, they may be:

· Intensional which specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of a specific set, often seen in attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, or,

· Extensional, where it specifies its extension, for example a list naming every object that is a member of a specific set.

In Arabic, terms may have a linguistic usage and a technical usage. Both can acquire definitions in the above manner. Islamic scholarship has traditionally focused discussion on technical definitions of terms. These comprise terms that are discussed and defined by the Sharia texts (e.g., salat, zakat, hajj, siyam etc), terms that are descriptive (e.g., mutawatir, ahad, sanad, qati, zanni etc) and terms that are necessitated through textual injunctions in order to understand and apply Sharia rules (dar al-Islam, aqeedah, ijma, illah etc).

The terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr have not been explicitly defined by the Sharia texts, however the Sharia texts necessitate their recognition in order for their implementation. For example, the texts relating to war and peace in Islam recognize relations between states and attempt to regulate them.

As such, the classical jurists coined the term “Dar” (land/domain) and articulated definitions in relation to it. These definitions are generally stipulatively and intensionally defined[58] although some are extensional making like comparisons between definitions more difficult. Added to this is the fact that many jurists did not explicitly document definitions of these terms however utilised them whilst discussing jurisprudence.

The jurists generally utilised the term Dar in relation to the divine rules relating to the following concepts – as such, they were relevant when considering what constitutes Islamic land and what does not. The concepts below are mentioned in a number of divine texts, however, as most scholars generally did not enumerate them (which would be seen in an extensional definition) it is debatable which concepts are included in their definitions and which are not. There is no Sharia requirement that all these concepts are embedded in one definition – what is important is that the Sharia rules are not changed or abandoned through the use of definitions:

· authority and ruling

· security and safety

· war and peace

· practice of Islam (outside the state)

· migration

· ownership of land

An important note – HT’s discussion and focus is on the first three points in relation to Muslim lands. As such, any definitions and discussions beyond this not only confuses the discussion, but is disingenuous and deceptive. HT’s contention is the first three points result in a definition of Dar al-Islam that requires the Muslims rule by Sharia and the security is in their hands – on this there is no dispute.

Maajid’s review of the definitions surmises there is a major dispute amongst the jurists with some accepting a land as Islamic based on authority and security whilst others accept ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present whilst others stipulate Islamic authority. He thus concludes from this superficial understanding of the definitions that there is a dispute on the underlying Shariah rules.

Firstly he has mixed definitions from the six points above, avoiding comparing like with like, as it would not support his conclusion. Despite this, he has not quoted one scholar who defines Dar al-Islam based on the ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present – all his quotes assume the presence of Islamic authority (NB: It is not being argued that such views may not exist as it is acceptable to state any land is Islamic based on the ability to practice Islam – however it is not possible to define the Islamic State itself on this basis alone as the texts relating to ruling do not accept Muslims ruling by kufr or security in the hands of non-Muslims).

If the categories are corrected and the concepts untangled the following nomenclature emerges, which is what HT state, is consistent with Islam and the traditional scholars and inconsistent with Maajid’s portrayal:

Islamic State (Dar al-Islam – agreed upon)

· authority and ruling

· security and safety

Non-Islamic Lands (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb – disputed terminology)

· practice of Islam (outside the state)

· migration

· ownership of land

Relations between Islamic State (Dar al-Islam) and Non-Islamic States (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb etc.) – disputed terminology

· war and peace

Transformation of the Islamic State (Dar al-Islam) to a Non-Islamic States (Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Kufr/Dar al-Harb) – partially disputed

· appearance of the rules of kufr in it – agreed upon

· it borders Dar al-Kufr – disputed

· there does not remain the security of the Muslims – agreed upon

As can be seen, there is no dispute on the core understanding of what is meant by Dar al-Islam, the notion of implementing Sharia and security by Muslims in their domain and the absence of these means the state becomes Dar al-Kufr – differences were discussed in relation to political realities outside of this domain, some wishing to extend this definition, and others seeking to limit it. Those who extended the definition and used the terminology such as Dar al-Islam for labelling non-Islamic lands caused potential confusion for the non-initiated and ammunition for those with dubious agendas. One can legitimately state there was debate on the extended usage of the term (furu’ or juziyyat), however, it would be nothing more than sophistry to say there was a dispute on the core meaning after scrutinising the classical texts .

Secondly, when not misquoting definitions, Maajid attempts to interpret and derive definitions from discussions he quotes, “ijtihad on ijtihad” – something prohibited – and then impose them on the discussion. His citations of Dusuqi, Bujayrami and Mawardi are such examples. Jurists discussed all the above issues without limiting or disputing the entire meaning of Dar al-Islam in the way Maajid is attempting to portray as can be seen in the example from al-Mughni (vol. 8, p. 457) under the discussion of people with respect to migration (hijra): “One of those who must migrate is one who is unable to show his deen and is not able to establish the obligatory duties (wajibaat) of his deen due to his residence with the unbelievers. On such it is obligatory to migrate as Allah said: “Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end.” (Quran 4:97)”

Thirdly, this argument is conceptually flawed as it focuses entirely on the variations of the form of definitions whilst ignoring the intended meanings (i.e., the substance of the definitions), putting the cart before the horse so to speak. It also violates the usooli principle which makes this very point: “There is no objection to definitions in that they do not contradict the Sharia – for importance is not attached to the words but the meanings” – لا مشاحة في الاصطلاح ما لم يخالف الشرع؛ لذلك فليست العبرة بالمباني إنما بالمعاني

Thus, even if for the sake of argument, a scholar was to define a land as Dar al-Islam based on the ability of a Muslim to practice his deen, he is not stating that it is legitimate to rule and enforce kufr, but is highlighting the fact that the Muslim does not need to migrate to somewhere he can practice his deen. Likewise, if one were to define the land as Dar al-kufr if the ruling system is kufr, he would not be stating that Muslims cannot practice their deen there and must migrate – he is stating that Islam requires the system needs changing. As such, the two definitions would not be in conflict in substance, simply in form. Maajid has ignored this point and deemed a contradiction when there is none.

He has also failed to note the implications of his analysis if his reasoning was applied to other definitions. It is well recognised that virtually every term in Islam is contested, even those as fundamental as Imaan, Muslim and Quran – one would be hard pressed to identify a definition which had an absolute consensus. Would one conclude these (and all) matters are doubtful and speculative? Obviously not. Some examples are highlighted below though the argument could similarly be applied to many others.

· Definition of the Quran

The definition of the term, Quran, according to the Hanafi linguist Jurjani in his book on technical definitions is “revelation to the Messenger compiled in the Musaahif and transmitted through tawatur means without doubt”[59].

According to Sharawi[60] it is “speech of God, revealed to the final Prophet in the Arabic language, worship when recited, compiled in the Uthman mushaf and transmitted via tawatur (decisive) means”.

And according to Aamidi “The word of Allah is revealed to his slave Muhammad in Arabic. It is a miracle (Ijaaz) in even the shortest surah, it is written down and narrated to us through tawatur, through which we worship Allah by reading it, it starts with surah al-Fatiha and ends with al-Naas”[61].

If the definitions are compared, it is apparent there are a number of differences, including “speech of God”, “in the Arabic language” and “worship when recited”. If Maajid’s reasoning was applied in this case, one would conclude that there are massive diffences in the definition of Quran being the speech of God or in Arabic – as these points are disputed hence the Quran must be zanni (speculative). However, the jurists (as well as all Muslims) did not dispute these matters and agreed they are decisive (qati) due to the evidence – difference in selection of the words of the Quran are irrelevant.

· Definition of Shaheed (martyr)

According to the Hanafis: “One who is killed by the pagans, or is found killed in the battle bearing a mark of any wound, whether external or internal – such as blood emerging from an eye or the like.”[62]

“Anyone who is killed while fighting pagans, or rebels, or brigands, by a means attributed to the enemy – whether directly or by consequence – is a shaheed, anyone who is killed by a means not specifically attributed to [an action of] the enemy is not considered a shaheed.”[63]

According to the Malikis: “One killed while fighting warring unbelievers only, even if killed on Islamic land such as if the enemy attacked the Muslims, [even if he] did not fight on account of being unaware or asleep, [and even if] killed by a Muslim who mistook him for an unbeliever, or trampled by a horse, or mistakenly by his own sword or arrow, or having fallen into a well or from a cliff during the fighting.”[64]

According to the Shafi’s: “One who is killed in fighting unbelievers, facing and not running away, for the raising of Allah’s word…and not for any worldly motive.”[65]

Ibn Hajar has mentioned fourteen means by which a person can acquire the title, some of them specifically related to being killed in the path of Allah and others not.[66]

According to the Hanbalis: “One who dies in a battle with the unbelievers, whether male or female, adult or not, whether killed by the unbelievers, or by his own weapon in error, or by having fallen off his mount, or having been found dead with no mark, provided he was sincere.”[67]

From the above, it may be argued that martyrdom is speculative as the definitions are contested, whereas the notion of martydom whilst engaged in war ordained by Allah is in fact a decisive concept in Islam. There are speculative issues in aspects that relate to it but that does not detract from the decisiveness of the issue.

Technical terms are also used in different contexts to reflect varying realities – for instance, the definition and qualification of the terms mujahid/shaheed of the dunya and akhira are defined differently, in order to apply Sharia rules. However, one does not conclude from these that the whole matter of being a mujahid/shaheed is disputed simply due to the attempt by scholars in articulating concise and precise definitions reflecting texts and their various rules. The term Sunnah for instance has several technical usages across the different sciences, even multiple usages within a given science. It is used to refer to Masdar al-Sharia (source of law), Sirah (kutub al-sunnah biography), Hadith (kutub al-sunnah narrations), Mandoub (recommended), Nafl (superogratory), Medina (Dar al-Sunnah) etc. These multi-usages of a term were normal and accepted throught Islamic history and importantly, never contradicted Sharia rules.

Likewise, some jurists[68] also utilised the terms Dar al-Islam in relation to ownership of land conquered by non-Muslims (in a manner contemporary Muslims allude to Spain being Muslim land) or whether Muslims could practice their religion there or not – categorising such lands Dar al-Islam or al-Kufr was an issue of which definition they would be a more appropriate subset. These considerations never conflicted with divine texts and the rules thereof. Jurist did not attempt to justify the rule of non-Islamic law or creeds solely focusing on issues of ownership or practice – a point Maajid has failed to note.

The Jurists did however entertain the notion that the rule by the Islamic Sharia was required. Thus it is seen Abu Hanifah believed an unjust ruler must be fought, let alone one who rules by kufr. That is why he funded the rebellion of Imam Zayd against the Umayyad Khalifah Hisham bin Abdel Malik bin Marwan and he funded the rebellion of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah against al-Mansur, the Abbasid Khalifah.

The point here is not a dispute on definitions. The point here, which HT adopted culture argues and thus makes the whole definition dispute irrelevant, is that Islam must be implemented in the Muslim lands, as it was historically, and it is forbidden to implement/enforce non-Islamic ideologies. Not one of Maajid’s quoted scholars differs with HT on this.

10. Systematic Misquotation of the Classical Scholars

Maajid makes the emotive statement “…the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture”[69]. However, upon checking the quotes Maajid has used in relation to the classical scholars, a number of discrepancies emerge. Anyone can make a mistake in referencing or quoting – we are all human. However, when unintended errors or mistakes occur, they are usually inconsistent – for them to all consistently lead to an intended conclusion is highly suspicious. Maajid’s article misrepresents the classical jurists on a number of points by systematically misquoting and misinterpreting them to support his conclusions[70]. Some examples are cited to illustrate this point below.

· Bujayrimi’s Quote

Al-Bujayrimi incorporates the ideas mentioned above in his actual definition which Maajid ignored. He instead selected only a part of al-Bujayrimi’s explanation of his definition whilst ignoring the definition itself and the rest of the explanation – the consistency of his misquoting is indicative he is more interested in achieving a predetermined goal rather than determining the truth. Maajid said, “al-Imam al-Bujayrimi… maintains that Dār al-Islām is a place where Muslims reside even if there are non-Muslims present.”

However the actual quote of Sulayman bin Mohammed al-Bujayrimi in “Sharh al-Bujayrimi ala al-Khatib” is as follows:

شرح الروض. قوله: (في دار الإسلام) أي بأن يسكنها المسلمون وإن كان فيها أهل ذمة أو فتحها المسلمون وأقروها بيد الكفار أو كانوا يسكنونها ثم جلاهم الكفار عنها “شرح الروض”

“(About Dar al-Islam) that Muslims live there even if there were with them there ahl al-dhimma (those protected by the Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it.”

And in his book, “Nihaya al-Muhtaj”, al-Bujayrimi provides an actual definition of Dar al-Islam along with an explanation of it:

وقال الشّافعيّة: هي كلّ أرض تظهر فيها أحكام الإسلام – ويراد بظهور أحكام الإسلام: كلّ حكم من أحكامه، أو يسكنها المسلمون وإن كان معهم فيها أهل ذمّة، أو فتحها المسلمون، وأقرّوها بيد الكفّار، أو كانوا يسكنونها، ثمّ أجلاهم الكفّار

“Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear and it is intended by the phrase “appearance of the Islamic laws” every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma (those protected by Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it.”

Maajid’s selective quote is presented as Bujayrami’s definition when it comes from only a part of Bujayrimi’s elaboration – he also mistranslates the portion he does quote by translating the term “ahl al-dhimmah” who are legally protected non-Muslims by the Islamic state rendered simply as non-Muslims. This mistranslation leaves the reader with quite a different understanding when compared to the actual translation, especially on a discussion centered around the political or non-political nature of a definition.

Maajid insinuates Bujayrami defines the term with a meaning that applies only to individual practice of Islam in a Kufr land – this is incorrect as the actual definition contains the words “appearance of Islamic rules”, which is general and from the language this would include both societal and individual rules of Islam – i.e., appearance of the rules of Islam without restriction. This would most certainly include the rulers as he states Dar al-Islam is the ENTIRE LAND WHERE THE ISLAMIC RULES APPEAR, as it is unqualified without any references limiting the matter to individual matters alone – furthermore, he clearly mentions terms in his definition including “ahl al-dhimma”, “opened up by Muslims” and “it was given to govern by non-Muslims” which all relate to authority. As such this the exact meaning of the Arabic language and is not an ideologically inspired reading.

Maajid’s quote of a part of al-Bujayrimi’s explanation fails to translate an important part correctly which changes the meaning of even the part he quotes i.e., “even if there were ahl al-dhimma” – which indicates the Muslims are living under Islamic authority, (as ahl al-dhimma as already mentioned do not come into being unless the land is under Islamic rule/authority and these people pay the jizyah and are afforded security and do not have the obligation of participating war) – resonating with the authoritative Hanafi definitions.

Revealingly, al-Bujayrimi discusses this issue in the chapter of Jihad, and the whole chapter details the Imam’s responsibilities and involvement in this obligation – thus Bujayrimi’s discussion in this context clarifies the importance of Islam in the political context of his definition.

An interesting observation that shows the absurdity that results in Maajid’s conclusions from his interpretation of this and other definitions to be discussed. If any jurist defined Dar al-Islam solely as the ability to practice in a non-Islamic land in security, this would mean that all lands that containing Muslims (regardless of number) would be Islamic lands and would not therefore require anything further to be done – thus there would be no requirement to try to impose the obligations of hudud (penal), jihad, zakat, jizya, arbitration etc a situation that contradicts definite texts and one that the remaining texts of the same scholars contradict by discussing the necessity of an Imam and the implementation of Islam – as such Maajid’s interpretation of the classical scholars definitions of Dar al-Islam is little more than a blunder.

Finally, to seal the point, even if one for the sake of argument (or otherwise) was to accept that the definition indeed intended to include non-Islamic lands where Muslims resided, the effect at best would be that the definition of Dar al-Islam , according to al-Bujayrimi, would be broadened (akin to Mawardi’s definition below), comprising a core element (authority of Islam/security) which is not contested and the branches which were contested (as already discussed in detail above). This would be akin to Sunnah comprising tawatur and ahad elements, the latter being disputed and indefinite and the former not; or imaan comprising belief and action with the latter disputed. It does not support Maajid’s argument as he is trying to demonstrate the entire definition is contested (or at minimum the core aspects of it are, i.e., the need for Islamic rule and authority) as HT’s arguments are built on the core and not the branches.

This definition does not support his argument and is not relevant to the discussion.

· Mawardi’s Quote

Maajid quotes Imam Shawkani from Nayl al-Awtar as stating that Maawardi believed “If it becomes possible to manifest ones religion (Din) in any Kufr land, then that land becomes by such a virtue Dār al-Islām”. Shawkani does not state this in his book at the cited section – he quotes Mawardi in his chapter of Jihad in relation to the initial obligation of jihad, whether it is singular (ayn) or collective (kifaya). Mawardi’s view he states is that “the obligation was originally individual on all of those who emigrated from Mekkah…”[71].

However in a much later section, Hijra (migration), Shawkani’s full quote is below, (the final line shows Shawkani’s comment which has been omitte in Maajid’s quotation) and the translation has also been corrected:

وَفِيهِمْ نَزَلَتْ : { إنَّ الَّذِينَ تَوَفَّاهُمْ الْمَلَائِكَةُ ظَالِمِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ قَالُوا فِيمَ كُنْتُمْ ؟ قَالُوا كُنَّا مُسْتَضْعَفِينَ فِي الْأَرْضِ ، قَالُوا أَلَمْ تَكُنْ أَرْضُ اللَّهِ وَاسِعَةً فَتُهَاجِرُوا فِيهَا } الْآيَةَ ، وَهَذِهِ الْهِجْرَةُ بَاقِيَةُ الْحُكْمِ فِي حَقِّ مِنْ أَسْلَمَ فِي دَارِ الْكُفْرِ وَقَدَرَ عَلَى الْخُرُوجِ مِنْهَا .

وَقَالَ الْمَاوَرْدِيُّ : إذَا قَدَرَ عَلَى إظْهَارِ الدِّينِ فِي بَلَدٍ مِنْ بِلَادِ الْكُفْرِ فَقَدْ صَارَتْ الْبَلَدُ بِهِ دَارَ إسْلَامٍ ، فَالْإِقَامَةُ فِيهَا أَفْضَلُ مِنْ الرِّحْلَةِ عَنْهَا لِمَا يُتَرَجَّى مِنْ دُخُولِ غَيْرِهِ فِي الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَلَا يَخْفَى مَا فِي هَذَا الرَّأْيِ مِنْ الْمُصَادَمَةِ لِأَحَادِيثِ الْبَابِ الْقَاضِيَةِ بِتَحْرِيمِ الْإِقَامَةِ فِي دَارِ الْكُفْرِ .

“”Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah’s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey’s end.” (Quran 4:97)” …If one is able to manifest their din in any kufr land then that land thereby becomes by him ie by that individual a Dar Islam. So residence there is preferable than journeying away from it in the hope others may embrace Islam. And it is apparent that this view conflicts with the ahadith (narrations) in the chapter of al-Qadiya prohibiting residence in the Dar al-Kufr.”

Maajid uses Mawardi’s quote as part of his argument to suggest a major difference amongst the scholars. To understand Mawardi’s view one must review his other works, as the above unreferenced quote from a secondary source does not comprise his definition. The most important works on this topic are al-Ahkam al-Sultanniya (his famous manual on Islamic Governance) and al-Insaaf – in the latter Mawardi said, “Dar al-Harb is Dar al-Kufr, where Kufr law is dominant” (Vol 4 pg. 122).

When discussing state governance and international relations in al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, Mawardi uses the terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb (Kufr) in their usual contexts, implying he has a simiar understanding of the concept. Tellingly he does not allow any exceptions to these rules in relation to non-Islamic societies, where Muslim individuals live, giving any accordance as being like Dar al-Islam.

The quote above utilises the term dar Islam with a new usage (akin to the multi-usages of the term Sunnah in Islamic sciences discussed previousy). Its usage by Mawardi is relative and personalised – it describes where an individual is able to practice his religion freely then for him that reality is the same as if he was in the Islamic state – he therefore should not migrate as the texts ordering migration only require this where his reality is he cannot practice his religion. The term بِهِ bihi refers to the person and the transformation of Dar al-Kufr to a Dar Islam in his view. Mawardi does not believe the international relations between states change due to this relative change nor that non-Islamic rule is acceptable and should not be Islamic.

As such this view widens the definition of Dar al-Islam (and as such, this part of the definition is disputed) however it does not show the core discussions are contested (akin to the usool al-ittiqaad (core creed) and furu al-ittiqaad (branches of creed) discussions that were delineated by the scholars). Mawardi’s quote here is again not pertinent to the HT discussion and its usage is mistaken.

HT, unlike Maajid, have relied on Mawardi’s primary sources ignoring quotes from secondary sources thereby avoiding such mistakes and confusion.

· Kasani’s Quote

Maajid lifts the criteria of when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr and presents it as his definition, without documenting Kasani’s actual definition which Kasani discussed in Badai al-Sanaai clarifying the two essential aspects of Dar al-Islam that are understood from the divine texts, akin to HT’s elaboration in “Shaksiyyah Islamiyya”:

قَوْلِهِمَا أَنَّ قَوْلَنَا دَارُ الْإِسْلَامِ وَدَارُ الْكُفْرِ إضَافَةُ دَارٍ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَإِلَى الْكُفْرِ ، وَإِنَّمَا تُضَافُ الدَّارُ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ أَوْ إلَى الْكُفْرِ لِظُهُورِ الْإِسْلَامِ أَوْ الْكُفْرِ فِيهَا ، كَمَا تُسَمَّى الْجَنَّةُ دَارَ السَّلَامِ ، وَالنَّارُ دَارَ الْبَوَارِ ؛ لِوُجُودِ السَّلَامَةِ فِي الْجَنَّةِ ، وَالْبَوَارِ فِي النَّارِ وَظُهُورُ الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِهِمَا ، فَإِذَا ظَهَرَ أَحْكَامُ الْكُفْرِ فِي دَارٍ فَقَدْ صَارَتْ دَارَ كُفْرٍ فَصَحَّتْ الْإِضَافَةُ ، وَلِهَذَا صَارَتْ الدَّارُ دَارَ الْإِسْلَامِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِ الْإِسْلَامِ فِيهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ شَرِيطَةٍ أُخْرَى ، فَكَذَا تَصِيرُ دَارَ الْكُفْرِ بِظُهُورِ أَحْكَامِ الْكُفْرِ فِيهَا وَاَللَّهُ – سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى – أَعْلَمُ . ( وَجْهُ ) قَوْلِ أَبِي حَنِيفَةَ – رَحِمَهُ اللَّهُ – أَنَّ الْمَقْصُودَ مِنْ إضَافَةِ الدَّارِ إلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ لَيْسَ هُوَ عَيْنَ الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ ، وَإِنَّمَا الْمَقْصُودُ هُوَ الْأَمْنُ وَالْخَوْفُ . وَمَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ الْأَمَانَ إنْ كَانَ لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ فِيهَا عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، وَالْخَوْفُ لِلْكَفَرَةِ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، فَهِيَ دَارُ الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَإِنْ كَانَ الْأَمَانُ فِيهَا لِلْكَفَرَةِ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، وَالْخَوْفُ لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ عَلَى الْإِطْلَاقِ ، فَهِيَ دَارُ الْكُفْرِ وَالْأَحْكَامُ مَبْنِيَّةٌ عَلَى الْأَمَانِ وَالْخَوْفِ لَا عَلَى الْإِسْلَامِ وَالْكُفْرِ ، فَكَانَ اعْتِبَارُ الْأَمَانِ وَالْخَوْفِ أَوْلَى

“Dar al-Islam and Dar al-kufr is the conjunction of Dar (land) with Islam and Kufr – and when you conjunct Dar to Islam or Kufr, it is determined by the presence of Islam or Kufr therein. Like when you say Paradise land of peace, or Hell land of torment, you find peace in paradise and torment in hell and the appearance of Islam and Kufr is the appearance of its rules. And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus the appropriate term. And thus Dar became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the laws of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr laws in it (and Allah knows best). And the crux of this is according to Abu Hanifa (ra) in relation to the land being Islamic or otherwise is not the essence of Islam or kufr but the issues of aman (security) and khawf (anxiety/fear) – and its meaning is that if the safety was for the Muslims absolutely and anxiety for non-Muslims absolutely so it is Dar al-Islam and if the safety was for the non-Muslim absolutely and anxiety for Muslims then it is Dar al-kufr and the ahkam depend on the safety and anxiety and not on Islam and kufr so it was considered safety and anxiety foremost.”

· Ibn Qayyim’s Quote

Ibn Qayyim’s view is the most critical of Maajid’s usage and conclusions from the quotes – Ibn Qayyim’s conclusion was that there is a collective (majority) position amongst the jurists which is congruent with HT’s position with an emphasis of the dominance of Islam.

Ibn Qayyim said, “The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.”[72]

· Dusuqi’s Quote

Dusuqi, in his chapter on Jihad, discusses the Sharia rules in relation to non-Muslims who enter the Muslim lands, take their wealth and later try to resell it to them. Following this he extends the discussion in relation to the occupation of Muslim lands and when those lands become Dar al-Harb. In this context he states that the lands remain Islamic despite their occupation so long most or all the signs (sha’air) of Islam are established there.

Maajid has taken this statement out of its actual context which is when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Harb and presented it as the Maliki view of Dar al-Islam. At no point does Dusuqi state or indicate that this is the definition of Dar al-Islam (a definition in fact not in his book).

At best the same comments apply in Dusuqi’s case as they do in al-Bujayrimi and Muwardi’s cases above – there is no dispute by Dusuqi on the core aspects of what constitutes Dar al-Islam – the difference is again on the branches.

The original quote is below in its full context.

( قوله : ولو قدم حربي بأمان إلخ ) أي ، وأما لو دخلوا بلادنا بالقهر ونهبوا منها أمتعة وأرادوا بيعها فيها فلا يجوز الشراء منهم ، وهي باقية على ملك أربابها فلهم أخذها ممن اشتراها بقصد التملك مجانا وأما إن اشتراها بقصد الفداء لربها فالأحسن أخذها بالفداء ؛ لأن بلاد الإسلام لا تصير دار حرب بأخذ الكفار لها بالقهر ما دامت شعائر الإسلام قائمة فيها ( قوله : اشتراء سلعه ) أي من الحربي الذي دخل بها بلادنا بأمان ( قوله : أو ؛ لأنه بشرائها يفوتها على المالك ) هذا التعليل هو الظاهر ، وأما ما قبله فيأتي أيضا فيما إذا كان المشتري هو المالك مع أنه لا يكره له شراؤها ، ولذا رده أبو الحسن انظر بن . ( قوله : وبهبتهم لها ) أي بعد دخولهم بها بلادنا بأمان ، وأما ما أخذوه من بلادنا نهبا ووهبوه فيها فلا يملكه الموهوب له ، ولا يفوت على مالكه بالهبة ثم إن ظاهر المصنف أنه لا كراهة في قبول الهبة كالشراء ، وإلا كان يقول ، وكره لغير المالك اشتراء سلعة واتهابها أي قبول هبتها وبعضهم سوى بينهما في الكراهة . وبالجملة فالمسألة ذات خلاف ، والتعليل الثاني في كراهة الشراء موجود في الهبة قاله شيخنا ( قوله : أو ؛ لأنه ) أي الحربي ( قوله : لا أحرار مسلمون قدموا بهم ) سواء كانوا ذكورا أو إناثا فلا تنزع منهم جبرا عليهم لا بالقيمة ، ولا بدونها ، ولا يمنعون من الرجوع بهم بلادهم كما لا ينزع منهم شيء من أموال المسلمين التي قدموا بها عندنا بأمان ، وقد كانوا أخذوها غصبا أو نهبا لا سرقة كما مر ، وأما ما أخذوه من بلادنا بعد استيلائهم عليها بالقهر ، وقدرنا على نزعه منهم قبل أن يذهبوا به لبلادهم فإنه ينزع منهم ؛ لأن بلاد الإسلام لا تصير دار حرب بمجرد استيلائهم عليها بل حتى تنقطع إقامة شعائر الإسلام عنها ، وأما ما دامت شعائر الإسلام أو غالبها قائمة فيها فلا تصير دار حرب

Relisting Maajid’s summary of the positions of the different schools of thought produces quite a different result, one that is remarkably similar to HT’s presentation of the matter in “Shaksiyyah Islamiyya” that Maajid refers to[73]:

“Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims even if its inhabitants were Muslims or Zimmis. And the scholars (fuqaha) also said that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam by the appearance of the Islamic rules within it. However they differed as to what changes Dār al-Islām into Dār al-Kufr. Some jurists (Mujtahidīn) said that Dār al-Islām does not become a Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions: firstly, the appearance of the rules of Kufr in it. Secondly, that it is bordering Dār al-Kufr. Thirdly, that there does not remain in it any Muslim or non-Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) secured by the first security (Amān) which is the security of Muslims.”

THE SHAFI SCHOOL

al-Rāfi’ī states, “It is not conditional to Dār al-Islām that Muslims reside there, rather being in the hands of the Imam and his Islām is sufficient.”

(corrected) Imam Mawardi said, “Dar al-Harb is Dar al-Kufr, where Kufr law is dominant.” [al-Insaaf,Vol. 4 pg. 122]

(corrected) al-Bujayrimi said, “Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear” further elaborating this definition “by this it is meant every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma, or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it”

Al-Ba’lawi considers “Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is Dār al-Islām, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.”

THE HANAFI SCHOOL

Al-Sarakhsī defines it as “A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof is that Muslims are secure therein.”

Al-Sarkhasi said, “A Dar (piece of land/nation) becomes Dar al-Muslimeen (Islamic nation) when the Islamic rules become dominant (and apparent).” [Sarkhasi, Sharh as-Seerah al-Kabeer, Vol. 5 pg. 2197]

Al-Kāsānī states, “There is no difference between our companions (the Ĥanafī’s) that Dār al-Kufr becomes Dār al-Islām due to the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein.”

(corrected) Al-Kasani said “And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus this is the appropriate term. And Dar (a land) became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the ahkam (laws) of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr ahkam in it”

(corrected) Al-Kasani also said, “There is no disagreement among the ahnaaf (scholars of the Hanafi Madhab), that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam, when the rules of Islam becomes dominant. Our brothers only dispute on how Dar al-Islam transfers to become Dar al-Kufr. Our Imam (Abu Hanifa) said, “Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr in three (situations); when the law and order becomes Kufr, when the state has a border with a Kufr (state) without treaty or when there is no longer any security for the Muslim or the Dhimmi (citizens).” [Badai al-Sanaai, Vol. 7 pg. 131]

Abū Yūsuf believed, “The land is considered Dār al-Islām by the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein even if the majority of its people where disbelievers, and it is considered Dār al-Kufr for the appearance of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Kufr therein even if the majority of its people were Muslims”

Ibn ‘Ābidīn stated, “Indeed, Dār al-Ĥarb becomes Dār al-Islām by establishing the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām such as the Friday prayer and the ‘Eid prayer; even if the indigenous non-Muslims remain therein and that country is not adjoined to Dār al-Islām.”

THE HANBALI SCHOOL

Ibn Mufliĥ writes that Dār al-Islām is every place where the rulings of Muslims are predominant.

Ibn Muflih stated “There are only two, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr. Any Dar (domain) where Islamic law is dominant is Dar al-Islam, and any domain where Kufr law is dominant is Dar al-Kufr, there are only these two camps [Al-Adaab al-Shari’ah, Vol. 1 pg. 190]

Ibn al-Qayyim maintains “Dār al-Islām is the land upon where Muslims descended and upon where the rulings of Islām were executed. Any land upon where the rulings of Islām were not executed was not Dār al-Islām.”

(corrected) Ibn Qayyim said, “The Jumhour (majority) of theUlema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant, that is Dar al-Islam If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered. [Ibn Qayyim, Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah, Vol. 1 pg. 366]

THE ZAHIRI SCHOOL

Ibn Hazm states, “Because the land (Dār) is associated to the person dominant over it, its ruler and its king.” [74]

On reviewing the corrected list, Ibn Qayyim’s view that the jamhoor (majority) had a consistent view relating to Islamic rules and authority begins to emerge not that portrayed by Maajid, more so with the inclusion of additional quotes of some other jurists including al-Nabhani of HT[75]:

Taqiudeen al-Nabhani (Shafii) said, “The truth is that in considering the land as Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr, two matters must be looked into: firstly, the rule by Islam and secondly the security by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority (sultan). If the land augments these two elements i.e. it rules by Islam and the security is by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority, then it becomes a Dar al-Islam and changes from a Dar al-Kufr to a Dar al-Islam. Whereas if it loses one of the two, it does not become a Dar al-Islam. Similarly if Dar al-Islam does not rule by the rule of Islam then it is Dar al-Kufr. The same if it rules by Islam but its security is not by the security of Muslims i.e. their authority, then it also becomes Dar al-Kufr. Hence all the lands of Muslims today are Dar al-Kufr because they do not rule by Islam”[76].

Qadi Abu Ya’la (Hanbali) said, “Any country where the law is Kufr (disbelief) instead of Islam is Dar al-Kufr”[77].

Mohammad bin Ali al-Shawkani (Zaidi) said, “When we speak about a Dar (dominion) by whoever’s word being dominant, we mean if the command and prohibition is for the Muslims, in a way that no one from the Kuffar becomes dominant with his Kufr except by what is granted him from Islam, then that is considered Dar ul-Islam”[78].

Sayyid Qutb said, “The whole world in the eyes of Islam is divided into two, the first is Dar al-Islam, and the second is Dar al-Harb. Dar al-Islam is where the Shari’ah of Islam alone is implemented, regardless of whether the inhabitants are all Muslims or Muslims mixed with Dhimmi (Jews and Christians) or if all of the citizens are Dhimmi with only some Muslims in power. Dar al-Harb is any land where the Kufr law is dominant even if everybody in the land is Muslim”[79].

Historically no jurist disputed or rejected the core decisive textual issues, however certain branches were differed over due to ijtihad on zanni texts, (e.g., the signs (sha’air) of Islam from the narrations instructing warriors not to attack lands where azan is heard or mosques exist). The core issues comprise implementation of the Islamic creed and security in societal life along with all aspects thereof which are decisive – this state which all confirm is Dar al-Islam is then the basis of discussions of jurisprudence in relation to non-Islamic states (harb/kufr). The scholars Maajid quotes are congruent with this understanding and there are no differences on this point despite minor variations in the wording of their definitions.

11. Monolithic theories?

Maajid’s thesis that HT’s theory is nothing but a legal opinion assumes the party’s understanding is homogenous which is incorrect. HT’s work comprises an understanding, definition and articulation of the problem and reality, following which is the process of scriptural analysis to determine the proposed normative solution. Aspects of each process may or may not be decisive depending on the case in question – it is most certainly not homogenous.

HT’s assertion would be that the discussions of the problem, its reality and associated rules of jurisprudence that are discussed are decisive whereas aspects of its methodology for change, systems and proposed policies are open to interpretation. To bunch the lot together as Maajid has done and state it is all nothing but legal opinion which is indecisive is erroneous.

The decisive reality which HT’s ijtihad of transformation is built upon has not been addressed by Maajid especially as it is elaborated in a number of adopted HT books which all who study with HT are required to study (“The Islamic State”, being one such example and summarised in section 3 above).

HT have never argued that their attempt at changing the colonialist inspired reality is one where the methodology is decisive or alternative views (ijtihad) are kufr – it is acknowledged there are potentially alternative ijtihads. Maajid however fails to cite any other such methodology in his critique; however, in subsequent media interviews he has approvingly spoken of the legitimacy and openness of one of the most avowed secular systems in the Muslim world, the Turkish political system.

12. Will HT unify the Muslim world through violent means?

This is a point Maajid (and his friend Ed Hussain) mention and emphasise in the media in an attempt to link HT with violence – “every single Muslim government, then forcibly unite them into one military state even if it means killing millions of people”. In his article, he fails to cite any text HT where this has been stated.

Maajid’s reference in his interviews to “How the Khilafah was destroyed” as the source for this view is incorrect – firstly this book is not an adopted HT book, a fact that is easily verifiable by the absence of HT’s name on the front of it (the importance of adoption to HT has already been discussed in detail). Secondly the pages highlighted by Newsnight during Maajid’s interview of the 11/09/2007 refer to a discussion not about the foreign policy of the forthcoming Caliphate, however, a policy, based on Islamic notions of vital issues, the state should have enforced that would have prevented the political intrigue that plagued its final days and its eventual dismemberment.

The full context of discussion from the chapter “The vital issues according to Islam” is:

a) Whosoever changes their religion (apostasy from Islam) the penal punishment is death – Islamic evidences supporting this are quoted along with an example from Imam Ali’s rule and the subversive activities of Mustapha Kemal during the Ottoman period without this punishment being applied. The author concludes this is a vital issue and no matter how many people apostasise from Islam, the Islamic State should enforce capital punishment even if it amounted to millions (a conclusion which it is argued emanates from divine texts)[80].

b) A similar discussion arises in relation to the unity of the Islamic State; the author states this rule in the context of the dismemberment of the Khilafah state and not in the context of unifying the currently divided Muslim lands, “The situation reached the point where Muslims lived in several states…Hence it came as no surprise when Mustapha Kemal declared the dismemberment of Turkey from the rest of the Islamic lands… So the calamity took place and the Muslims became indifferent towards having to live in several states…Hence it is imperative to restore this issue to its rightful place and to consider it as a vital issue, THUS PREVENTING THE DISMEMBERMENT OF ANY COUNTRY FROM THE BODY OF THE KHILAFAH even if this led to several years of fighting and even if it led to killing of millions of Muslims”[81].

c) The concept is provided in relation to the matter of kufr law being implemented in the Khilafah state[82].

Nowhere does it state in “How the Khilafah was destroyed” that HT intends to spill blood or kill in order to unify the countries in the future – something that it goes to great lengths to avoid whilst working for the establishment of the Islamic State adopting peaceful means. The title of the book, its historical analysis and the discussion quoted above all indicate clearly that vital issues were left unchecked in the historic demise of the Ottoman state. Had it rigorously enforced these issues internally it may have maintained the integrity of the state and prevented the catastrophe that struck it. Moving forward, these issues need to be considered in relation to the internal matters of the future Khilafah state – in relation to unifying the Muslim lands, HT believe this can be done through numerous political styles and means according to the political landscape at the time.

Furthermore, in its adopted book, “Party Structure”, HT state:

“Islam should be propagated universally while working to implement it must be confined to one or several countries until it becomes firmly established. Once established, the Islamic State would naturally grow until it encompasses all the Islamic countries. Then the state would propagate Islam to the rest of the world, because the Islamic State must convey the Islamic da’wah as an eternal and universal message for all mankind.”[83]

Maajid’s interpretation and application of these ideas in relation to what the potential foreign policy of the Khilafah will be outside the state is incorrect, speculative and unsubstantiated and appears little more than scaremongering, propaganda and a dishonest attempt at linking HT with violence, a theme he revisits regularly.

13. New Political Pawns?

In the aftermath of 9/11, Tony Blair said he “believed passionately that we are at mortal risk” from Islamism[84]. Since 2003, there have been a number of articles and conferences written globally suggesting that HT might present a serious threat and there have been a number of orchestrated attempts to try to link HT to terrorism.

Jean-Francois, a former Swiss civil servant and historian, in his research paper entitled “Hizb ut-Tahrir-The Next al-Qaeda, Really?” cites a number of examples[85]:

“On 8 September 2003 the Russian news agency Rosbalt published an article, “Hizb ut-Tahrir to replace Al-Qaida?” Views very critical of the international Muslim political party Hizb ut-Tahrir… have been expressed for some time in the former Soviet Union. There have also been several attempts to link it… to violent actions, such as the March and July 2004 events in Uzbekistan, although initial allegations in that case were received with scepticism by most observers and the group itself firmly rejected them.

In the West too, since 2003, there have been a number of articles suggesting that Hizb ut-Tahrir might present a serious threat… a frequently quoted report published in late May 2003 by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank based in Washington, DC… the author, Ariel Cohen, a research fellow… describes Hizb ut-Tahrir as a clandestine, totalitarian organization… Cohen emphasizes – conveniently forgetting to mention that disclosure of membership is a sure way to jail in some Central Asian countries, and that Hizb ut-Tahrir organizes public meetings and is easily accessible by media in those parts of the world where it can operate freely. While the organization tends to be somewhat secretive, it is certainly not clandestine in such places[86].

In February 2004, the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think-tank, organized a closed conference on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Ankara, Turkey. While there was a general agreement among participants that Hizb ut-Tahrir ‘as a group has never been involved in terrorist activities’, some suggested that it acted as ‘a “conveyor belt” for producing terrorists’[87].

In June 2003, a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG)[88] provided a detailed analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asian. According to the authors, ‘[t]he evidence suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir is far from presenting a present-day threat to the stability of the Central Asian states in any direct senses. There is no evidence that it has any military capabilities, only limited evidence that it would even contemplate a call to arms under present conditions …’”

This increasing attention given to the potential threat of HT’s radical call, even led to Tony Blair announcing on Friday 5 August 2005 that he planned to proscribe HT, a solely political organisation with a history of non-violence spanning more than fifty years. With no political party ever being banned in modern Britain, and even the notorious Sinn Fein being permitted to operate despite links with the IRA, this created significant waves and opposition in the UK. This has led the establishment in general, and security services in particular, to seek political actors in an attempt to combat their ideas. This trend is also reflected in the Middle East, with Saudi and Egyptian regimes funding programmes to combat Islamist thought as per the recommendations of pretty much all Western think tanks and policy advisors. Egypt has had some success with figures that have been “detoxed” in Egyptian prisons, including the highly publicised example of Dr Fadl of Gemaa Islamiyya; as such this raises serious questions about the motives of the author, especially when considering his friend Ed Hussain’s revealing comment on the Guardian Commentisfree site: “In Sayyid Qutb’s prison, Maajid studied with traditional Muslim scholars who had abandoned the jihadist cause. His own intelligence, combined with greater study of Islam, led Maajid to question the intellectual and scriptural premise on which the entire Islamist project is based”. Was this meeting of intellectuals in an Egyptian prison a coincidence? The current political climate is proving difficult for many who joined Islamic movements as a fad, forcefully arguing their case for change over many years, and then leaving to combat the movements they worked for. All this without any serious idea of the ideogy of whom they joined nor any serious idea of the ideology they adopted when they left.

Maajid’s resignation of HT following his return from Egypt came as a surprise. It is unusual why he would remain committed to HT on his return, working with it as normal, if he changed his ideas whilst in prison as he claims. Stranger still that he did not raise or escalate his concerns, doubts and findings within HT – something every member is obliged to do having sworn an oath on becoming a member. Notwithstanding this, his recent public posture in combating HT, his announcement of a series of rebuttal articles, his close relationship with the media, his self-professed difficult situation in the Egyptian prison[89] (including 3 months isolation and his subsequent illumination), his early (unconditional) release, his collaboration with and contributions to Ed Hussain’s book, the roundly condemned “The Islamist”, his subversive activities on return to the UK[90] and regular references to Egyptian“ullema” and other government aligned scholars, are indicative his new direction appears to have began under the Egyptian regime’s pressure during his period of incarceration. When one is isolated and unsupported, especially by the group of which one is a member, facing serious charges by an unsympathetic and tyrannical regime, one is vulnerable, open to advances and suggestions one would normally not entertain. It is a recognized phenomenon in prisoners and these situations are easily taken advantage of. In Maajid’s case his only permitted helpers comprised the UK government (represented by its Cairo consulate), his local MP, Amnesty International (who adopted him as a prisoner of conscience), his London Solicitors and the national and local media during this period[91]. The forming of such a collective group appearing more than just coincidental.

Maajid Nawaz, and more specifically, Ed Hussein and Shiraz Maher, have been courted by the political, intelligence and media hierarchy in Britain[94]. After Maajid and his colleagues were released and deported back to the UK, they were greeted at Heathrow airport by Special Branch officers who interviewed them for around three hours. There they had a DNA sample taken, were fingerprinted and asked about their political beliefs. Maajid claimed that the officers suggested he offer them his services[95]. Making such an offer appears unusual for such an experienced organisation, unless one recalls that the British Consulate in Egypt tracked Maajid’s progress throughout the trial period and beyond an exchange of intelligence was probably a prelude to such an offer. Such an approach may also have been an attempt to verify the effect of the Egyptian prison reform programme on Maajid Unlike his friend Ed Hussain, who has openly said he is willing to cooperate with intelligence services[96], Maajid is more discreet about his response to them. However his close relationship with Ed Hussain and articulation of ideas bear a remarkable similarity[97].

There is also a strong commonality in Maajid Nawaz, Ed Hussain and Shiraz Maher’s attempts at combating HT, from a call to oppose “Islamists” from hijacking Islam for their narrow political goals, a return to an authentic brand of Islam, supporting Israel (repeating anti-semitic allegations) and attempting to protray HT via a receptive media as a “conveyor belt for terrorism” – reflecting Zeyno Baran’s phrase of the conservative Nixon Centre. Most of these arguments have been summarily discounted by Jean-Francois in his research paper entitled “Hizb ut-Tahrir—The Next al-Qaeda, Really?” and by the only established research on HT by Exeter university academic Suha Taji Farouki[92]. On BBC’s Newsnight on 11/09/2007, Maajid’s attempt at highlighting a connection between HT activities and violence comprised one single example, from his twelve years of activism, of the killing of the Nigerian, Ayotunde Obunabi, at Newham College in 1995 (from which both he and Ed Hussain, who interestingly cited the same example, are eager to distance themselves from all personal responsibility). This incident is widely acknowledged as having no connection to HT, or its call, being rather an alleged drugs related incident[93].

However Maajid’s intended objective which he touches on in his introduction, “Islam needs… a counter-reformation and a return to its true essence by Muslims insisting that their religion is not used merely to serve narrow political agendas”, is indicative that he has become a pawn in the newly emerging political landscape. This is also a consistent theme that appears in the comment section of his moderated blog judging by the small number of comments that have been approved [98]. He is currently coy about what he views as the true essence of Islam, but his friend Ed Hussain believes it to be a secular spiritual form of Islam with no political content, speaking in the New Statesman in June 2007, “Islam, with its history of plurality and spirituality, has a natural home in Britain. Islamism, a political ideology set up to confront the West, does not”. Throwing caution to the winds, he goes on to say, “…former Islamists can demolish the psychological confidence of extremists” and “Just as we don’t talk to the BNP to understand white, working-class grievances, we need not engage with Islamists to comprehend Muslim suffering”[99]. These comments resonate with his Newsnight interview where he confirmed his intention of trying to “convert” as many members of HT as possible.

“Religions are not for governments or states, they are for individuals. The state can assist individuals religious responsibilities, but governments cannot, should not, profess faith”, (Ed Hussain, The Islamist)

14. Conclusion

Maajid Nawaz was unknown before rising to fame as a British member of HT having been arrested in Egypt in 2002 along with two others. He was reported to the Egyptian security services for his indiscreet political comments whilst studying at a university there as part of his SOAS course. Despite his incarceration being seen by some as a sacrifice, it is something inevitable for the naive individual who ill-considers the tight security situation in most Muslim countries and “rushes in where angels fear to tread” – his treatment was insignificant compared to others have not had the benefit of a British passport.

Maajid’s self-confessed knowledge of Islam, like that of his predecessors Ed Hussain and Shiraz Maher, is based on some limited HT teachings and general readings – absence of any serious study of the Islamic sciences prior to or during their encounters with HT is woefully lacking. This leaves them susceptible to those government scholars, manipulating Islam and presenting it as “authentic” to fool them into believing any non-Islamic ideology is Islamic – Maher for example states in his TimesOnline article that he believes Islam is compatible with secularism despite the fact that Mohammed (pbuh) was a religious political ruler of a religiously structured expansionist state as were his followers. Maajid’s route however led him to attempt to teach himself the Islamic sciences by reading material he claims he found whilst in an Egyprian prison, a questionable academic institute, its influence on many historical political figures Maajid reviles. His apparent journey to enlightenment has the hollow sort of ring reminiscent of the “spin” that would appear on the business plan of a dot com in the late nineties.

Thus his article, “Evaluating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Theo-political Stance” contains a significant number of elementary mistakes, the research is selective, sources are misquoted and misportrayed, principles are misapplied and there is no referencing (with only secondary sources) on a number of important citations[100]. Though the piece is presented in an “academic” style, it reads more as an undergraduate’s defence of the current despotic Middle Eastern regimes aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Muslim world, and maybe would have been more appropriately titled as such[101]. The gist of his argument is that HT is Islamist and Islamists are not following Islam but a political ideology – which ideology, he fails to name. He believes “his religion” does not entertain Islamists – the supporting reasoning lacking somewhat. He acknowledges HT have an Islamic ijtihad which would make them Islamic by all counts – however, due to difference of opinion on the definition of a land HT should not be trying to remove the rulers. Through misquotation, dubious interpretations and unusual application of principles, he fails to demonstrate what he started out to do. It is not inconceivable that anyone including Maajid can show an error in HT methodology – however he has yet to show that he has identified any such error. His article in fact supports HT’s assertion that it is an organisation that extracts its views from the Islamic sources, wishes to bring about the classically understood Islamic form of governance, the Caliphate, and undertake political and intellectual reformation of the Muslim world.

Although style is not a major consideration, utilization of an academic style implies the article is well researched, critical and neutral. Most of these criteria are not met by the article. This is no doubt due to the fact that Maajid’s academic background is lacking, having only in recent months been awarded his undergraduate degree after ten years of commencing it; no doubt his youthful diary was full of activities with little time devoted to study or development of intellectual and critical thinking.

Many activists when engaging with groups fail to undertake research, read or develop beyond the basic culture they are provided with, despite being strongly encouraged to do so[102]. They are therefore surprised and often disorientated when they discover the Islamic cultural heritage for the first time, shaken by its depth, breadth and sophistication of thought. Maajid appears to have been a victim of the same problem, as he mentions in his Newsnight interview[103], his enlightenment occurring having read some classical Islamic texts in prison[104], (or so he claims[105]). However he fails to have recognised the limitations of the self-taught, especially those who develop delusions of grandeur and high self worth – in Maajid’s case this is seen in his miscitations of the books he read (or more probably lifted uncritically from other works), misinterpreting Sharia principles and classical texts and disputing decisive concepts.

Maajid expects the reader to believe that his lone experience with HT and its Islamist ideas are enough to make him an authority on the subject of Islamism. He attacks Islamism absolutely giving no consideration to the contribution made by successive generations of jurists, sufis, thinkers and writers in movements ranging from Morocco to Indonesia. In particular, he has failed to recognise HT and its contribution to this organic process – the creation of a political party built solely on Islam, embodying five decades of distillation and contemporisation of the strongest ideas from fourteen centuries of Islamic civilisation and scholarship to engage with the problems of modernity – a challenge the Muslim world is attempting to collectively resolve.

The thrust of Maajid’s endeavours advocate a secularised Islamic theology – however, he does not appear to have any conviction in his ideas, failing to establish any organisation to propagate them, instead, focusing on an agenda of attacking Islamists and impeding their work. His manner is remarkably similar to that of his friend, Ed Hussain, tarnished as an establishment figure and attention seeker, labelled by some as an agent. Maajid’s close association with Ed and the proximity of ideas has left a similar indelible mark in relation to his writings and views – his TimesOnline article reading very much like Ed Hussain’s, “The Islamist”. Ed’s ideas are weak and insignificant – Maajid’s role appears to be provision of substance for them, in collaboration with a team of sub-editors, who apparently write and publish much of his content.

The emergence of a new cadre of political actors, willing to work with the establishment to openly and intellectually counter efforts of those working to establish the Islamic Caliphate, is a new dimension to the UK political scene. Their value as political actors is not in their expertise of Islamism, offering only limited ethnographic accounts of their experiences, but in their contribution to stifle the formidable rise of political Islam.

History is said to repeat itself – those guilty of treason in the historic demise of the Ottoman Caliphate by working to further the interests of foreign powers, like the Egyptian Mohammed Ali, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, Sharif Hussain and Abdul Aziz bin Saud walked a path not unlike that of their less significant modern day counterparts Hamid Karzai, Mahmood Abbas, Nuri al-Maliki, Musharraf, Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher, Hassan Butt and most recently, Maajid Nawaz[106].

Maajid states the flaw he has found is “astoundingly obvious” for any trained practioner of the Sharia[107], apparently missed by generations of thinkers, activists, critics and jurists, commenting, “no one fully understanding what it is that Ĥizb ut-Taĥrīr actually believe”. However, there is a significant flaw in his return journey from Islamism to secularism – the attempted application of classical Islamic juristic texts relating to discussions and problems of a different milieu to a postmodern nihilistic world, which embodies an accumulation of experiences of enlightenment, modernity, ideological turbulence and civilizational conflict. One would have expected him to have done further research to ensure that maybe he had not misunderstood something “astoundingly obvious” before publicizing his embryonic views.

However, for the new cadre working against those advocating political reformation and change in the Muslim world, maybe this is not an important consideration…

“As for those who sell for a small price the covenant and faith they owe to Allah and their own plighted word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter. Nor will Allah speak to them or look at them on the Day of Judgment, nor will He cleanse them: They shall have a grievous torment, a painful doom.” [Quran 3:77]

[1] “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda”, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf, reviewed 09/09/2007

[2] Including Hasan al-Banna, Mawdudi, Syed Qutb, Khomeini and al-Nabhani

[3] “The Government’s Approach”, http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/12-05-sp-terrorism-bill, reviewed 10/09/2007

[4] Notable examples including Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and members of al-Muhajiroon amongst others

[5] “Blair launches fund to improve teaching of Islam”, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,,2094977,00.html, reviewed 05/09/2007

[6] “Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism”, http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 12/09/2007

[7] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 01/09/2007

[8] From pg.5 of his article

[9] From pg.5 of his article

[10] Op. Cit. http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf

[11] Christian missionary movements also participated creating Catholic and Protestant colleges in the Levant including the American University in Beirut, St Joseph’s College in Lebanon. Roberts College in Turkey and Forman Christian College in Lahore.

[12] Marxist Fidaiyan-i Khalf of Iran, Parcham and Khalf parties in Afghanistan, Communist activists in Yemen and Turkey and guerrilla factions in Malaysia

[13] The British even had the Himalayan Gurkha soldiers continue to fight for them as recently as the Falkland War in 1982.

[14] However new legislation in 1998 curtailed much of its powers and autonomy

[15] The current American occupation of Iraq reflects this

[16] Ferguson, Niall, “Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World”, Penguin Books Ltd, 2004

[17] Cleveland, W, “A History of the Modern Middle East”, Westview Press, 2004,

Esposito, J, “The Oxford History of Islam”, Oxford University Press, 1999,

Hitti, P, “History of the Arabs”, Macmillan, 1970,

Hourrani, A, “History of the Arab Peoples”, Grand Central Publishing Ltd, 1992,

Lewis, B, “A history of the Middle East”, Scribner, 1997,

Roberts, J, M, “The New Penguin History of the World”, Penguin Books, 2004,

[18] Including but not limited to: Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (India 1786-1831), Mirza Hasan Shirazi (Iran 1815-94), Imam Shamil (Central Asia, 1796-1871), Amir Abd al-Qadir (Algeria, 1808-83), Mohammed ibn Abdille Hasan (Somaliland 1864-1920), Mahdi (Sudan, 1885), Uthman Dan Fodo (Nigeria, 1754-1817), Mohammed Iqbal (Pakistan, 1877-1938), Abul-Kalam Azad (India, 1888-1958), Mawlana Husain Madani (India, 1879-1957) and Mawdudi (Pakistan, 1903-79)

[19] In which issues of knowledge, truth and certainty are discussed

[20] Presented by the founder father of Rationalism, Renes Descartes, in his Meditations, resonating a similar discussion of al-Ghazali in his autobiography, Munqid Min al-Dalal, an argument which Ghazali rejects

[21] Quran 102:5, 102:7 and 69:51

[22] This is supported by narrations from the Sunnah, for example, “O God, apportion to us such…certainty (of faith) that the calamities of this world will be made easy for us by Thee” Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 783

[23] Elaborated in the book, “Shaksiyyah Islamiyyah (The Islamic Personality)”

[24] Quran 5:38

[25] “The twisting of ahadith to justify the abandonment of the Shariah”, http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/twisting-of-ahadith-to-justify.html, reviewed 10/09/07

[26] Violated on occasions by some jurists historically like Ibn Hazm or Ibn Taymiyyah, who took more decisive approaches to matters

[27] Quran 12:40

[28] Quran 5:60

[29] Quran 5:44

[30] Quran 5: 49

[31] Quran 5:141

[32] Ibn al-Qayyim, “Madaarij as-Saaliheen”, 1/336-337

[33] Sharh At-tahaaweeyyah,pg.324

[34] Minhaj as-Sunnah, 5/pp.130-132

[35] Ibn Kathir, “Tafseerul Quran ul Atheeem”

[36] Al-Shawkani, “Ar-Rasaa’il as-Salafiyah”, pp.33-34

[38] Sovereignty for Allah being the popular phrase

[39] al-Nabhani “Party Structure”, al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 1

[40] The adoption of the book “Hamla Dawah tul-Islam wajibat wa sifaat (The way to carry the call – its obligations & characteristics)” by HT in 2001 was one that some of its members had problems with as it constituted the introduction of a set of concepts into HT rather than being simply the expression of personal thoughts of an individual – it was subsequently removed from the adopted list of books

[41] Adoption in Hizb ut-Tahrir, pp. 1-2 – it is published on the HT official website cited above

[42] Note 19

[43] Pg. 7 of his article

[44] The Islamic laws relating to Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr/Harb (referring to lands where Islam ruled and non-Islamic lands respectively) are detailed in these famous texts, written by jurists from across all the main schools of thought: Mughni, Kishaf Alqina An Matn Al-Iqna, Sharh Muntahi Al-Iradat, Insaaf, Al-Furu, Al-Iqna, Alsharh Al-Kabir, Al-Hashiya Al-Jamal, Nihayat Al-Muhtaj, Thufat Al-Muhta, Sharh Albahja, Al-Majmoo, Hawahshi Al-Sharawani, Iaana Al-Talibeen, Al-Umm, Radd Al-Muhtaar, Al-Bahr Al-Raiq, Fath Al-Qadir, Al-Jawhara Al-Neera, Badai Al-Sanaai, Al-Mabsoot, Tuhfa Al-Fuqaha

[45] See section 9 for a detailed discussion of terms and definitions

[46] Examples including Dar al-Amn (Abode of Security), Dar al-Silm (Abode of Peace), Dar al-Muwada’ah (Abode of Mmutual Peace), Dar Al-‘Ahd (Abode of Covenant), Dar Al-Sulh (Abode of Truce), Dar Al-Maslubah (Abode of Pillaged Land), Dar Al-Bid’ah (Abode of Heresy), Dar Al-‘Adl (Abode of Justice), Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Unbelief) etc.

[47] The most pervasive mention of the terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb are to be found in the siyar or maghazi literature or under the section of jihad in fiqh books (where jurists classified the wider rules of international relations, including rules regarding treaties, ceasefire, asylum and international trade).

[48] The Dar Paradigm and Identity, http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/dar-paradigm-and-identity.html, reviewed 08/09/07

[49] Tariq Ramadan states: ‘The concepts of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-harb, and Dar al-‘ahd were not described in the Qur’an or in the Sunna. In fact they constituted a human attempt, at a moment in history, to describe the world and to provide the Muslim community with a geopolitical scheme that appropriate to the reality of the time. This reality has completely changed’, Ramadan, T, “Western Muslims and the Future of Islam”, Oxford University Press, 2004, pg.69.

[50] Additionally, the following texts amongst others have been cited in this discussion:

“Those who do not govern with what Allah has revealed, they are the disbelievers” [Al-Maida:44]

“Allah will not allow the disbelievers to have an authority over the believers” [An-Nisa:141]

Junada b. abi Umayyah who said: “…the Messenger of Allah (saw) called upon us and we gave him the Bai’ah, …and that we should not dispute the authority of its people unless we saw open Kufr upon which we had a proof from Allah” (Al-Bukhari). Anas narrated that: “Wherever the Prophet (saw) raided some people he would not raid except in the morning. If he heard the Adhan he would refrain, and if he did not he would invade after dawn”.

And it was narrated by Essam Almusny, who said: “The Prophet (saw) used to tell to the expeditions that he sent: ‘If you` have seen a mosque or heard a call for prayer, then do not kill anybody.’”

Once Abdul Rahman bin ‘Awf was speaking with Caliph Umar (ra), he said, “Do not be harsh on them (speaking about some of the Hujaaj) until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.” [Sahih Bukhari Hadith no. 3713]

Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, “The Prophet (saw), Abu Bakr and Umar (ra) where from the Muhajireen because they migrated from the Mushrikeen. Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar ul-Shirk and they came to the Prophet(saw) on the night of the Bay’ah al-Aqabah.” [an-Nisa’i]

[51] Ibid. cited from Sahih Muslim, Hadith no. 4294

[52] Quran 8:61

[53] Hence the usage of terms unipolar, bipolar or statist paradigms

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibn Qayyim, “Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah”, Vol. 1, p.366

[56] “Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change” is the revised name of the same book

[57] Ali bin Mohammed al-Sharif Al-Jurjani defines it in a similar manner in his “Kitab al-Tarifat”, 1969, Maktaba Lubnaan, Arabic Edition, pg. 64, namely that “a definition is a statement expressing an understanding in terms of another thing”

[58] These definitions are generally required to adhere to basic rules to ensure they are meaningful and useful . Traditionally the following conditions have been imposed:

1. A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined.

2. Definitions should avoid circularity.

3. The definition must not be too wide or too narrow (jami/mani). It must be applicable to everything to which the defined term applies and to no other objects.

4. The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are commonly understood and whose meaning is clear.

5. A definition should not be negative where it can be positive.

(http://www.reference.com/search?q=definition, reviewed 08/09/2007)

[59] al-Jurjani op. cit. pg. 181

[60] “Mujizat al-Quran”; Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti has a similar understanding in his “al-Itiqan fi ‘ulum al-Qur’an”, (2 vol. Cairo, 1951/1370)

[61] Sayf al-Deen al-Aamidi, “Al-Ihkaam”, 1/28 and “Rawdat al-Nathir” by Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi 1/178

[62] Al-`Inayah published on the margins of Fath al-Qadeer (2/142) and Hashiyat Ibn `Abideen (2/268)

[63] Zayla’i, “Tabyeen al-Haqa’iq”, (1/247). See also Al-Bahr al-Ra’iq (2/211)]

[64] Dardeer, “Al-Sharh al-Kabeer”, (1/425)

[65] Mughni al-Muhtaj (1/350) and Fath al-Bari (6/129)

[66] Fath al-Bari (6/43)

[67] Kash-shaf al-Qina`, 2/113 and Al-Mughni (2/206)

[68] Abu Hanifa being an example

[69] Pg. 7 of his article

[70] Maajid seems to be emulating his colleague Ed Hussain… “Hussain has said that he does not accept the concept of the Caliphate or an Islamic State. He misrepresented Shaykh Hamza Yusuf by alleging that he said that there was “no such thing as an Islamic state”. When questioned on DeenPort as to whether the Caliphate was fard kifayah, as discussed by the classical scholars, Husain says that he does not discuss in terms of fard ain or fard kifayah. Husain writes that the Islamic state “is not a rukn of the deen and without it the deen is not lost. An individual can remain a firm believer, a mutadayyin, without the imam and the jama’ah.” However, the classical scholar, Sa’d al-Din Mas’ud bin Umar al-Taftazani, wrote, “There is consensus that appointing a Caliph is obligatory. The difference of opinion is on whether the appointment must be by Allah or by his servants, and whether the basis (for appointment) is textual evidence or rational proof. The adoption is that it is obligatory upon the servants by textual evidence because of the saying of the Messenger, “Whoever dies not having known the Imam of his time, dies the death of the days of ignorance.”” http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?t=22827&page=2

[71] al-Shawkani, “Nayl al-Awtar”, Vol 4, Book 8, Dar al-Fikr, 2000, pg. 24

[72] Ibn Qayyim, “Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah”, Vol. 1, p.366

[73] Maajid omits aspects of HT’s quote – the full quote is presented here with the omissions, reflecting how closely aligned HT’s position is with the classic scholars

[74] Pp. 9-12 of his article

[75] “Clarifying the meaning of Dar al-Kufr & Dar al-Islam”, http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/islamic-thoughts/islamic-thoughts/clarifying-the-meaning-of-dar-al-kufr–dar-al-islam.html, reviewed 13/09/07

[76] al-Nabhani, T, “Shaksiyyah Islamiyya”, Volume 2, pg. 249

[77] al-Mu’atamad fil Usul ad-Deen, pg. 276

[78] al-Sayl Jaraar, Vol. 1, pg. 576

[79] Qutb, S, “In the Shade of the Qur’an”, Vol. 2 pg. 874

[80] Ibid., pp. 191-194

[81] Ibid. pp. 196-197

[82] Ibid. pp. 197-199

[83] al-Nabhani, T, “Structuring of a Party”, (Attakattul el-Hizbi, tr. From 4th edition), 2001, Al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 6

[84] “Oh! What a Lovely War on Terror – it’s the number the arms dealers love”, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/columnist/story/0,,2168993,00.html, reviewed 14/09/2007

[85] “Hizb ut-Tahrir-The Next al-Qaeda, Really?”, http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf, reviewed 14/09/2007

[86] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf

[87] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf

[88] “Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir. ICG Asia”, International Crisis Group (ICG), Report, No. 58, 30 June 2003. The report is available from the ICG website: http://www.crisisweb.org.

[89] Made none the easier by HT publicising his and his co-defendants plight internationally to highlight the tyrannical Egyptian dictatorship, or the hostile reception received by Mubarak’s Foreign Minister, Ahmed Maher, by a HT incited demonstration in Jerusalem to name but two incidents

[90] Attending public appearances and advocating HT ideas at events organized by HT whilst collaborating with those who had left the party, secretly attending meetings and discussions and other such subversive and clandestine activities

[91] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021105/debtext/21105-37.htm

[92] Taji-Farouki, S, “A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate”, Grey Seal, 1996

[93] Maajid Nawaz’s brother, the Islam Channel presenter, Kaashif Nawaz, disputes the account, saying “The murder at East Ham college was not of a man who was Christian, but of a man who was high on drugs, and carrying 2 knives with intent on attacking one of the students on campus, he was intercepted by a gang of Muslims, who intercepted him – nothing to do with Islamism or HT, but more do with gang wars which Muslims got involved in and HT members tried to resolve.” Regardless of the causes nothing has been proven to be related to HT in this instance or any other instance despite the party operating across the UK for nearly two decades. Both Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz both attempt to make this tenuous connection by citing HT created an atmosphere that led to this incident – this is akin to stating the UK government is at fault for issuing a British passport that permitted entry to a foreign land, resulting in attrocities being caused

[94] “Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism”, http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 14/09/2007

[95] “Who’s Listening to Whom?”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2006/03/14/kurt_met_police_trust_feature.shtml, reviewed 14/09/07.

[96] In his interview with the New York Times, 02 June 2007, Hussain explained that he had been approached by British government officials to join their “anti-extremist efforts”. In an interview with Sky’s Adam Boulton, Hussain did not deny Boulton’s suggestion that he has been called in by “Gordon Brown or government”. His comments in the Guardian however indicate where his loyalties lie: “…More than ever, we have a duty to define Britishness and teach children and newcomers how Britain developed democracy, tolerance, plurality, and why these are cherished, non-negotiable values”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/britain/article/0,,2099556,00.html

[97] In an interview with altmuslim.com published on 03 June 2007, Hussain says, “In this, I’m backed by Maajid Nawaz who, alhamdulillah, recently left Hizb-ut-Tahrir partly as a result of conversations we had about these issues, and more importantly, his exposure to traditional Islam in all its diversity. Soon, Maajid will speak publicly and I ask Hizb members and others to listen and learn from Maajid’s wisdom, knowledge, and experience.”

[98] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, A section that is allegedly subject to rigorous editorial control with many comments not being posted or heavily edited to suit before being presented – a number of sites and fronts by his colleagues/sub-editors have been set up with similar views albeit crudely expressed, including: http://www.tftd.ws/ , http://www.jargonistic.com/ and http://rashadzamanali.blogspot.com/2007/09/rashad-zaman-ali-khilafah-is.html

[99] “New Statesmen”, 14 June 2007

[100] For instance the quote “opposing views are based on Kufr” is incorrectly attributed to HT who are amongst the most liberal thinking when it comes to entertaining alternative views

[101] As such, a host of comments have been made on various internet sites – blogs have even appeared satirizing the immature and naïve stance Maajid and his cadre has taken, examples including:

http://edhusain.blogspot.com/2007/09/message-from-hosni-mubarak-to-ed-husain.html,

http://www.maajidnawaaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 19/09/2007

[102] Ed Hussain’s book, “The Islamist”, (to which Maajid contributed) reflects this problem with the frequent jumps from one position to the other.

[103] “BBC Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman”, http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl?scope=all&edition=d&tab=all&recipe=all&q=maajid+nawaz, reviewed 11/09/2007

[104] “Why I joined the British jihad – and why I rejected it”, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2459969.ece, reviewed 16/09/2007

[105] “Leading militant in split with Islamists”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,,2165546,00.html, reviewed 12/09/2007

[106] Maajid’s arguments resemble those of Abd al-Raziq, a senior member of al-Azhar University, who in 1925 responded with “Islam and the Bases of Government”. In it he argued that Islam did not lay down any particular political system, nor did Islam have anything to do with the Caliphate as the Muslims understood it. He furthermore said that the rules that the Prophet (pbuh) laid down only related to such things as prayer and fasting, rules appropriate only for people in a simple state with a natural government. He was expelled from al-Azhar for such heretical views, his books were condemned by religious circles and he was dismissed from his post as a religious judge. Rosenthall commented on him saying: “we meet for the first time a consistent, unequivocal theoretical assertion of the purely and exclusively religious character of Islam”. Black, A, “The history of Islamic Political Thought”, Edinburgh University Press, 2001, pp. 316-319.

[107] Something he considers to be given his stint in prison where he “taught himself” Sharia and his Arabic/Law studies at the British establishment SOAS

Area: 803,940 km² or 340,403 sq miles (34th in world)   [Wikipedia]

Population: 172,800,000 [2008 estimate]           (6th in the World)  [Wikipedia]

Coastline: 1,046 kilometer (650 mile)

Labor Force: 10^th/222 countries [CIA world fact book]

Coal: Pakistan has been blessed with the world’s largest untapped coal reserves, whilst its operational coal reserves are the 4^th largest in the world. The Thar coal field in Sindh is the world’s largest coal field. Thar coal is one of the world’s largest lignite deposits discovered spread over more than 9,000 sqkm. It comprises around 175 billion tonnes of coal which is the equivalent of 618 billion barrels of crude oil. This would meet country’s fuel requirements for centuries.. They are more than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait oil combine (if we can compare oil to coal in terms of energy they produce). “If 2% of the whole coal reserves at Thar gets utilized, the country could generate 20,000MW of electricity for 40 years and if the whole reserves are utilized, then it could easily be imagined how much energy could be generated.”[ http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=12859 ] Based on available infrastructure and geological parameters, the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP) has evaluated the resources over an area of 352 sq km in Thar. [ http://www.pak-times.com/2007/08/20/commercial-production-of-thar-coal-mines-begins-in-2012/ ]

Gas: 6^th in Asia, 30^th in World. Balochistan and southern part of NWFP has huge potential of untapped gas reserves. [bbcurdu]

Gold and Copper: One of the world’s largest reserves of gold and copper were discovered last year in the Chaghi area in Pakistan’s southwest Balochistan Province. This project, Reko Diq, is believed to contain 12.3 million tons of copper and 20.9 million ounces of gold [http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page36?oid=39325&sn=Detail](Gold value estimated to be 18 Billion Dollars) in inferred and indicated resources, while other reserves [ http://english.people.com.cn/200610/12/eng20061012_311186.html ]  are untapped as yet.  Pakistan is currently ranking at 7^th [bbcurdu] in terms of copper production.

Canal System: World largest canal system, three times bigger than Russian canal system.

Rivers: Numerous spread all over the country

Cultivable land: 19,700,000 Acres of cultivable land out of which currently half is cultivated. [Agriculture survey of Pakistan 2004-05]

Wheat production: 22 million metric ton. This is more than Africa whole production and equal to South American continent total production.

Agriculture product of Pakistan as per Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN (including international ranking): [ FAO website]

Technological

PHD’s:    5011 as of 2007 (http://hec.gov.pk/ )

Scientists and Engineers: At a time when Pakistan had produced 465 PhD (1978, Refer www.hec.gov.pk ), our Engineers and scientists numbered 140,000 (“Some Elementary Scientometric Studies; A Study of Science and Technology Manpower Patterns vis-à-vis population and GNP in the Muslim world”, by M.M. Qurayshi and S.M. Jafar); Now when our PhD has reached 5,011, what the number of Engineers and scientist would be? Calculate? [Its 1.5 million]

Troop Strength

As of 2008 about 921,000 people are on active duty in the military with an additional 528,000 people in reserves.

Source: Wikipedia

Ranking in troop’s strength

Source: Global Security

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/active-force.htm

Fit for Army: Just Pakistan’s fit for army people that can be trained in 3-6 months are 29,400,000         (CIA World Fact book 2007)

Pakistan possesses: (Wikipedia)

Un-manned Aerial Vehicle: 2 squadrons (soon to be 6)

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/11/pakistans-uav-p.html

(Infact Pakistan is currently exporting UAV’s to USA http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/11/pakistans-uav-p.html )

Pakistan needs a sincere leadership and an independent system i.e. the Khilafah

1. Pakistan has sustained America’s war in Afghanistan by supplying it essential fuel. According to expert data , almost 80% of the fuel used by the American war machine in Afghanistan is currently being supplied by Pakistani refineries. Just this fact alone is enough a proof of the Pakistan capacity to withstand any pressure.
2. Pakistan has immense varieties of minerals and natural resources. Baluchistan province is a mineral rich area having substantial mineral, oil and gas reserves which have not been exploited to their full capacity or fully explored.
3. Any developing nation needs large reserves of energy resources as industrialization would not be possible without them. Whilst countries like Japan and Germany were forced into territorial expansion and colonialism due to their small energy resources, Pakistan has no such problem. Pakistan has no shortage of coal and gas.
4. Pakistan has managed to achieve virtual self sufficiency in submarine development, tanks, aircraft overhaul, bullets, arms, ballistic and cruise missiles, trainer aircraft, combat aircraft, frigates and navy ships. The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex facility is the world’s third largest assembly plant assembling and manufacturing aircrafts.
5. Pakistan has managed to establish the foundations of a manufacturing sector and military industry. All it would need to do is expand its capacity. It has already managed to develop nuclear weapons, its own drones, a tactical ballistic missile programe and a basic space programe. With the political will, only achievable today with a sincere Islamic leadership, Pakistan could very easily become a global player.

An exposure of the American Plans

Contents

Part 1: Iran and the Revolution

• · Roots of U.S – Iranian Relationship
• · Mussadiq, U.S & U.K
• · U.S Strengthens its foothold in Iran

Part 2: Iran and the Revolution

• · Why the need for the Revolution
• · Khomeni’s role in the Revolution
• · The U.S – Khomeni Relationshp
• · Evidence from Shah’s Memoirs
• · Al-Watan Newspaper

Part 3: Iran and the Revolution

• · Bazargan’s attitude towards U.S
• · Hasan Habibi
• · Iran – Iraq War
• · Dual Containment

Part 4: Iran and the Revolution

• · Conclusion

References

Part 1: Iran and the Revolution

“To break the deadlock over compensation to Anglo-Iranin, the US and Britain agreed to accept the principle of Iranian ownership of its oil resources. In return, Iran ceded production and marketing rights which were given a consortium, including 40 percent US participation, that formally ended Britain’s oil monopoly in Iran. With the establishment of the Iranian consortium, the US was now the major player in the oil, and the volatile politics, of the Middle East.”

The involvement of the colonial powers in the Middle East politically and culturally is evident. On the surface it may appear to some that the West interferes and manipulates the internal affairs of the third world countries to spread their “democratic” values, but the bottom line is imperialism.

As Muslims, it is our obligation to realize and understand howi nternatinal affairs are controlled and how countries such as the US, Britain, and France have a direct influence on our land. In this article we will examine US involvement in Iran, observing the vents such as the oil crises in the 50′s, the Mussadiq affair, the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the current US policy towards Iran.

A Brief Historical Overview

Historically, US in the beginning had cultural ties with not just Iran, but with the entire Middle East. Until World War II the missionary efforts in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, extending back into the early years of the 1 9th Century. While, this served the only continuing American interest in the region. Missionaries had made few converts from amongst the Muslims. They did, however, establish schools and colleges to train leaders which served as their catalysts.

In the 1930′s American oil companies entered Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During World War II, US did become involved politically, especially in Saudi Arabia. The meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake at Suez in February 1945 symbolized this concern.2

However, before World War II the relationship between the United States and Iran were cordial but distant. The United States had established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1856, but did not send a diplomat of ambassadorial rank until 1944. However, during the late 1 800s and early 1 900s, the US did have missionaries, teachers and archaeologists in Iran. With the World War II raging in Europe, Britain and the Soviet Union jointly invaded Iran in September 1941 to establish a supply route to the Soviet army. The invading forces quickly overpowered the Iranian army and forced Reza IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA Page 3 of 7

Shah out of power, who had established relations with the Germans. Reza Shah was replaced by the British by his twenty one year old son, Muhammad Reza Pahlvai, the late Shah.3 Following the US entry into the war, the United States sent troops to Iran in conjunction with the supply operation, initiating a period in which US-Iranian relations grew rapidly.

Roots of US – Iranian Relationship

In 1942, US established two military missions to balance the British and Russian presence. Of the two military missions, the US Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH) was by far more important than the US Mission to the Iranian Army (ARM1[SH). Under Article 20 of the agreement between Iran and the US in 1943, the head of GENMISH exercised executive control over the internal security force of 25,000 men. He reported directly to the minister of the interior in Tehran.4 Brigadier General Norman H. Norman Schwarzkopf, (father of the Gulf War general Schwarzkopf) was the head of GENMISH and the Gendarmerie. He was appointed to the post in Tehran by Roosevelt. Schwarzkopf virtually ruled the large Iranian force of internal security police (SAVAK). The Gendarmerie took part in the ere-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, which was under Soviet Union control.5 Schwarzkopf, to say the least, became a powerful man. In 1947, he confidently wrote that by the end of 1948 (when the Gendarmerie agreement was to expire) he expected to have the force sufficiently organized to make American command (military) unnecessary. During an audience with the Shah, Schwarzkopf insisted on the need to increase the Gendarmerie to 40,000 men, and when the monarch expressed fear that the force would become the private army of the prime minister, he replied that the nation required such a force because his men had to do much of the work of the army in Azerbaijan and among the tribes.6 The general even had control of the Iranian Majlis, by having 88 votes in it. He boasted this to Wiley, the US ambassador to Iran.7

In 1947 and 1948, the US embassy staff grew considerably in size, enhancing diplomatic, commercial and cultural interactions between the two nations. More importantly, the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CLN established a station in the Tehran's military attaches and embassy political officers. These covert operations included intelligence-gathering and propaganda operations aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies in Iran, cross-border espionage and subversion raids into Soviet territory, and efforts to map out escape and evasion routes and organize "stay-behind" guerrilla networks for use in the event of a Soviet invasion. Although these operations were all aimed ultimately at the Soviet Union, they did have the effect of straightening or weakening various Iranian political actors during this period8 Consequently, an increasing US involvement in the internal affairs of the country was becoming evident. This fact becomes evident in the Mussadiq affair, the revolution and in the general setup and direction of Iran.

Mussadiq, US, and UK

In the late 1940s, unrest began growing steadily among the politically active in Iran, but mainly by the help of the Americans. This was because of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British-owned firm which was earning large profits from its monopoly over Iran's oil industry. In October of 1949, a group of prominent political figures established an organization known as the National Front to press for political reforms and nationalization of the AlOC's assets in Iran. The National Front became extremely popular and managed to elect eight of its members to the Majlis in late 1949 which was greatly influenced by the American General Schwarzkopf. The National Front was led by Muhammad Mussadiq, a charismatic Majlis deputy from a wealthy land owning family who had established a reputation as an ardent nationalist and democrat. By all accounts, it seems that Mussadiq was brought into power with the American help. This is due to many reasons such as:

Britain had oil monopoly in Iran and Mussadiq called for the end to this by calling for nationalization of the oil industry.

Mussadiq was from a prominent land owning family from prominent tribes. As mentioned earlier, Schwrtzgopf had already been working with many of the tribes to prepare them to take a more active role in the Iranian government.

The US government during this period had renewed their global strategy of containing Soviet's influence. It concluded that a major effort had to be made in Iran to prevent Tudeh Party (communist) from coming to power and delivering Iran into the Soviet hands. The answer to communist was the nationalist Mussadiq.

Razmara, predecessor to Mussadiq was brought in by America's blessing and turned anti-American.9 Therefore, Razmara was assassinated. After the assassination, the Majlis nominated Mussadiq for the primership. As stated above, Schwarzkopf, the American General had said that he had considerable influence over the Majlis.

After Mussadiq assumed office, the Truman administration publicly expressed strong support for him. Recognizing that he could serve an effective alternative to the Tudeh Party. "Washington concluded that Iran must be kept in the Western camp at all costs because of its strategic location and that a protracted oil crisis might weaken the US economy and threaten US and Western security. Accordingly, for the remainder of Truman's term in office the administration pursued a policy of supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow him, and attempting to mediate an agreement that would satisfy both parties to the oil dispute and minimize disruption of the world oil market." 10

US brought Mussadiq to power, so that US would0btain their share of oil wealth from Iran. During the same period, the US had already reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia for sharing the oil resources based on a 50-50 plan. 1 l After coming to power, the first thing Mussadiq did was to nationalize the oil on April 29, 1951. Nationalization of the oil posed threat to Britains weak economy and dwindling prestige, so the nationalization decree initiated a confrontation between Britain and Iran. This lead Britain to start covert operations in Iran, none of which succeeded. Britain then persuaded major world oil companies to boycott Iranian oil exports. The British also imposed a series of bilateral economic sanctions on Iran and began an ominous military buildup in the region. In September 1951, British officials began implementing a plan to invade southwestern Iran and seize the oil fields. When US officials were told about this plan, President Truman notified British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that the US would not support an invasion and urged him to resume negotiations with Iran over the oil dispute. As a result, Attlee was force to abandon the invasion plan, telling his cabinet that "in view of the attitude of the United States government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to use force” in Iran. 12 Soon after the oil nationalization law was enacted, US officials began to implement a plan to ease the effect of the British oil blockade on the world oil market. Under this plan US oil companies were asked to provide oil to US allies that had been adversely affected by the blockade. Although this effort was intended to help stabilize the world oil market, it also reinforced the oil blockade and therefore inadvertently helped to weaken the Iranian economy and undermine Mussadiq’s popular support. At the same time, US officials began a concerted effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the oil dispute. They advised the British to accept nationalization of the AIOC and agree to a 50/50 division of profits with Iran. However, the attempt failed.

US Strengthens its foothold in Iran

A few months latter, US was able to strike a secret deal with Shah’s sister, Princess Ashraf.

In the deal, Iran conceded production and marketing rights which were given to a consortium, including 40% US participation. This formally ended the British oil monopoly in Iran.13After the deal was reached by the Americans, the CIA officers in Tehran began to turn some of their anti-Soviet covert operations in directions that undermined Mussadiqis base of support. Under a propaganda operation code-named BEDAMN, they distributed newspaper articles and cartoons that depicted Mussadiq as corrupt and immoral and portrayed him as exploiting Aytullah Kashani. They provided financial assistance to certain clergymen to drive them away from Mussadiq. CIA officers had long-standing ties to the Pan-Iranist Party and the Toiler’s Party (both had strongly supported Mussadiq) made efforts to turn these organizations against Mussadiq. In a particular noteworthy case, two CIA officers in the fall of 1952 approached Baqai, who had headed the Toiler’ Party, encouraging him to break with IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA Page 6 of 7

Mussadiq and giving him money. Similar approaches may have been made to Kashani, Makki. and other prominent figures.”l4 By November 1952 both the Pan-Iranists and Toilersi Party had split into pro and anti-Mussadiq factions; Kashani, Makki, Baqai, and other National Front leaders had openly turned against Mussadiq, thanks to the heavy covert efforts by the CIA. Hand in hand with the CIA, the British were carrying out very similar, but more extensive covert activities against Mussadiq. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, who had been heading British intelligence operation in Iran, was sent to Washington in November to present US officials with a plan to oust Mussadiq.15 The plan called for a coordinated uprising to be engineered by the Rashidians and certain Bakhtiari tribal elements, with or without the Shahis approval. On February 3, 1953, two weeks after the Eisenhower inauguration, top US and British officials met in Washington and made a decision to develop and carry out a plan to work together in order to over throw Mussadiq. By using the BEDAMN network, CIA carried out extensive propaganda barrage against Mussadiq and organized antigovernment and anti-Tudeh demonstrations, adding considerably to the turmoil that was engulfing Tehran. They sought the support of top military officers, arranging to have certain army units participated in the coup.

Finally, Mussadiq fell in August of 1953. With Mussadiq out of the way, the Eisenhower administration rushed to support General Zahedi, who had already been chosen to replace Mussadiq as the prime minister. The US provided Iran with $68 million, mounting to roughly one third of the total revenue Iran had lost as a result of the British oil embargo. Over $300 million in additional US economic aid was given to Iran during the next ten years. The United States also began a major effort to strengthen Shah’s security forces soon after the coup, reorganizing and training his domestic intelligence apparatus and giving him almost $600 million in military assistance during the next decade. l6 As a result, Iran’s economy grew rapidly. With the more effective security apparatus in place, Shah consolidated his grip on power in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By late 1963, this process had been completed: Shah presided over an authoritarian, repressive regime under which organized opposition to his authority was not tolerated, and there seemed little chance that he would fall from power.

For twenty six years, Iran was a virtual colony of the US corporations and the Pentagon. During these years, the process of Iran’s integration into the global capitalist market dominated by the US was consolidated. Iran’s role, along with other countries in the region was to deliver cheap oil and receive mostly finished consumer commodities.

1 George D. Moffett III, Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1991.

2 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51.

3 David Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, page 52.

4 Ibid., page 24.

5 John Waller Interview, December 1982, RG59, 891.105A/2 July 1948, Wiley to Henderson.

6 RG 319, Plans and Operations Division (P&O), o91 Iran, eLettersi 17 February 1947, Schwarzkopf to Colonel Pottenger.

7 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51.

8 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975) PP. 159-162; Confidential interview conducted by Mark Gasiorowki with several CIA officers stationed in Iran during this period.

9 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51, page 83.

10 NSC, The position of the United States with Respect to Iran, NSC 107/2, June 27, 1951.

11 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51, Page 89.

12 Henry Byroade, interview by Mark Gasiorowski, Potomac, Maryland, August 7, 1984; Record of Interdepartmental Meeting, March 20, 1951, Foreign Office 371/91525.

13 George D. Moffett III, Christian Science Monitor Date, March 20, 1991.

14 Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle, pp. 244-246; confidential interviews conducted by Mark Gasiorowski with several CIA officers from that era.

15 Talk about why US and Britain worked together??????chk with AT

16 Mark Gasiorowski, US Foreign policy and the Shah, Ch. 4.

Back to top

Part 2: Iran and the Revolution

Why the need for the Revolution?

Since Shah was serving America’s interest so well, the question comes to mind is why he was removed from power. Was there a sincere and honest to goodness revolution which brought Khomeni to power? In this section we will demonstrate that it was the United States who used Khomeini and his colleagues to oust the Shah.

The American administration, under President Carter, charged that the CIA had failed in its mission to protect the Shah. However, such a claim must be completely rejected because, as mentioned in the previous sections that there were more than 40,000 American military advisors in Iran who worked in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as in the security offices (SAVAK), and the oil companies. These advisors had the most sophisticated spying devices and were free to move within Iran as well as in the Gulf region. They also constituted one seventh of the Iranian army. For every F-14 and F-15, there was an American advisor. Then, how can anyone believe that what happened in Iran was a surprise to the CIA? A more convincing theory is that the CIA wanted to remove Shah from power. There are several reasons that support this claim:

Shah wanted to build an empire that he claimed would be the sixth greatest power in the world. To make his dream a reality, he wanted to buy the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the world. To accomplish this, the Shah spent more than $20 billion in the military field. This was a great concern for the U.S. because this would create an imbalance between Iran and its neighbors. Such a point was mentioned in the documents seized from the Embassy, right after the revolution. One of these documents stated that the Iranian military buildup would have serious consequences on the future cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. at that time was supporting. 17 This relationship was strategically important in securing the Gulf region. In addition, the Iranian arms buildup might have forced Iraq to move closer to the Soviet Union for protection and armaments, which consequently could have increased the rise in armaments in the region, jeopardizing U.S. efforts to have a friendly relationship with Baghdad. 18

Shah visited the USSR and met with some of leaders by his initiative, which angered the U. S. America’s patience ran out when Shah began dealing with the Americans as an independent partner. In an interview with U.S. News & World Report, Shah said that if the U.S. would take an unfriendly attitude towards Iran, then Iran “can hurt you (U.S.) as badly, if not more so, than you can hurt us (Iran). Not just through oil, we can create trouble for you in the region. If you force us to change our friendly attitude, the repercussions will be immeasurable.”19

Concern over Shah’s attitude towards the oil policies, which differed from America’s point of view. This was another point mentioned in the seized documents from the American Embassy in Tehran.

Therefore, how would US remain silent when a third world leader was revolting? In an interview with Muhammed Hasanayn Heikal, the Egyptian Journalist, Shah said, “Some people accuse me of being an American puppet, but give me one reason why I should accept such a role You have no idea the number of clashes I have had with the Americans. The last of these was over OPEC. The Americans wanted to break it up from the inside and tried to do so. The Saudis were terrified. It was I who had to bear the brunt of the confrontation. I can exercise power on my own. Why should I want to exercise power on behalf of somebody else?”20 The CIA, as it is well known, had brought Shah back to power, after Mussadiq, and protected him for twenty-seven years. The entire American presence in Iran was in danger and for U.S. this was a life-and-death issue.

Shah was quiet aware of the CIA’s involvement in his country. He said, in a private conversation with some American visitors, that he received some reports that the Americans were involved with a few oil companies during some of the most recent riots in the country. Shah said in an interview with Dean Brellis and Parvis Raeim from Time Magazine that the CIA began making contact within dissident ranks fifteen years ago so that the U.S. would have influence with anyone who might manage to overthrow him.2 1 Also, he said that “if he left the throne, thousands would die in the ensuing fight,” and if that happened, he feels that “Communist forces would take control of what would then be a bankrupt and fragmented country.~22 When Shah became sixty years old, he did not have a strong party to inherit his policies. The people wanted him out because of corruption, though many had valued the things he did. They wanted somebody else to lead them. The strongest alternative to Shah was Khomeini, especially during a time when Islam became a hot topic in the region. Shah accused the CIA of being behind the plot to get rid of him and of having strong relations with his opposition. While, Khomeini was the head of that opposition.

Khomeni’s Role in the Revolution

Can it be right what Shah said? How can anybody believe this accusation and at the same time believe in the asceticism which surrounded Khomeini? First, we would like to mention Khomeini ideological understanding. He says about Tuqi’a (dissimulation),

which means “legitimacy to lie if it is beneficial.” Additionally, Khomeini said: “If the circumstances of Tuqi’a forces anyone of us to enter the Sultan’s doors, we should not do it even if it causes murder, unless his seeming treachery causes a real victory for Islam and the Muslims like the treachery of Ali bin Yekteen and Nasir ad-Deen Tusi.”23 Thus, Khomeini took Tusi as the ideal figure to follow. Tusi, as every Muslim should know, was the Vizir of the Criminal Holakou. Tusi guided Holakou to the Baghdad massacres some seven hundred years ago. If Khoemin considered Tusi as a role model then what’s the big deal for him to have a relationship with US?

Khomeini added: “…it is natural that Islam permit us to enter the Tyrant’s establishments if the real aim is to stop oppression or to make a coup de’tat. Against the people in power, this “treachery” will be mandatory, and there is no doubt about it.”24 It is obvious that Khomeini saw the deal and cooperation with the enemies of the Muslims as mandatory if it benefited his sector. As a result, Khomeini claimed that it was permissible for Tusi to serve the Tartar invaders and used it to justify his cooperation between him and the CIA on the notion that it was beneficial for him and his country.

Some would still find it hard to believe that Khomeini had a relationship with the Americans while attacking the US at the same time? In this regard, we should remind ourselves of Abdul Nasser who used to badmouth U.S. in the media and U.S. would do the same. However, Nasser was a US puppet. Miles Copeland, the CIA operative in the region, used to write his speech in which he heavily criticizes the U.S. along with making the announcement to buy arms from Czechoslovakia.25From this, we can see how a leader from the Third World can appear to be an enemy of the U.S. but in reality is a puppet. Consequently, American agents can wear several masks and we have to be aware of this.

The US – Khomeni Relationship

There are tremendous amounts of information which link Khoemin with the Americans. He served their agenda and purpose regardless of his intention. The American influence in the region was deeply rooted and remains until today. US-Khomeni relationship is obvious based upon the following evidences:

Intro. To the following meeting especially the Bruce

1. By the late 1978, many in the Embassy and in the State Department were convinced that the Shah could not last and were in contact with secular and religious figures that might enter a governmental position26. Shah sent a leek to the Iraqi government accusing the CIA of what happened in Iran, telling Iraq that the U.S. was trying to change the political systems in the region by using religion and that Baghdad’s turn would be next. The Shah asked Iraq to watch Khomeini more closely because he had

connections with the CIA. Some news from the Iranian Palace accused the former Information Minister, Dayrysh Homayun, of publishing an article in Ettala’at violently attacking Khomeini and of having a connection with the CIA, which ordered the distribution of this article and initiated the riots against the Shah as a result.27 All of this gave Khomeni great amount of publicity.

Note: give background info of what the dialogue really means do not leave it up to the reader to assumed that his is an agent. Also mention the dialogue was continuos not just once or twice.

On January 21, 1979, the former Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, arrived in Paris from Tehran. He held some talks with the opposition leader Khomeini and told him Carter’s opinions of the recent events. As the news agencies reported, when Clark left Khomeini, he said, “I have a great hope that this revolution will bring social justice to Iranian people.” 28

An interview with the Sudanese leader, Sadeq Al-Mehdi, in Al-Mostaqbal magazine, convinces us that the American administration used him as a mediator in the hostage crisis by visiting Khomeini. He added that this was not the first time he mediated between the American administration and Khomeini.29

Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, said in a conversation with the Iranian newspaper, Iyianadjan, which Reuter broadcasted on August 7, 1979, that Carter warned Khomeini to be careful, if Bakhtiar did not support the Revolution. This warning was in a letter which two French presidential envoys carried to Khomeini in exile on Neauphle Le Chateau in France. What is important here is the letter and the warning which Carter gave to Khomeni.

NBC news reported that Sheikh Al-Islam Reza Al-Shirazy, one of the religious figures in Iran, had secret medical treatment for four months in Minnesota. The network reported that Al-Shirazy was wounded in an assassination attempt in July 1979. A speaker of the State Department said that there is no relation between Al-Shirazy and the Revolutionary Council in Iran, but he is a friend of Khomeini. However, the network did not report whether Shirazy left the U.S. at that time.30 Why was the U.S. so loyal to Khomeini while he held some American hostages? And how did the Americans know the names of the Revolutionary Council while we know the names were secret?

5. The Meeting between Bruce Laingen and Khomeini Laingen, the American Charge D’ Affairs in Tehran, held three meetings with Khomeini in Qom in mid-August, 1979. He also held a fourth meeting with him in Tehran while Khomeini was making a short visit there. Right after the meeting, the riots took place in Ahwas that reduced the oil supply, and the result was a shortage in the gasoline supply. The U.S. then supplied the needs of Iran, and Congress, at that time, uncovered the secret deal.

At the same time, the Kurdish revolt occurred, which made Tehran import the spare parts and equipment from the U.S. to operate their fighter planes and troop carriers. Al-Watan Al-Arabia magazine from Paris stated that the first meeting between Laingen and Khomeini took place in Qom, accompanied by revolutionary guards, and that Laingen was carrying a file about the Kurdish revolt and the financial support of the Kurds by Russia. The magazine added that the Iranian cargo planes used Madrid as a refueling station on the trip between the U.S. and Iran to carry the spare parts, after an eight-month cut in the supply.3 1

Furthermore, Yazdi confirmed in an interview with the Associated Press, that there were talks with the American government about sending spare parts for at least part of the military equipment, as he stated, which Iran had, and these parts did arrive in Iran.32 On August 11, 1979, The Daily Telegraph said that there was a termination of the U.S. arms deals except those for spare parts.

There is no doubt that there was mediation between the U.S. and Khomeini via Al-Mehdi and Clark, or via the French envoys from the presidential office of the French Republic. From this news, there is clear evidence about the connections between Carter the “Satan” and Khomeini the “Angel.” At this point, we would like to cite three pertinent sources:

Some declarations from the Shah; Khomeini’s partners who disagreed with him after the Revolution succeeded; the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Watan.

Evidence from Shah’s Memoirs

Shah said in his memoirs, that he did not know about Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe General Huyser’s arrival in Tehran until a few days after its occurrence. Shah also said that this was strange because the General “had come to Tehran a number of times, scheduling his visits well in advance to discuss military affairs with me and my generals.”33 However, this arrival was secret. Shah stated that his generals did not know anything about his arrival. He continued by saying:

“As soon as Moscow learned of Huyser’s arrival, Pravada reported, ‘General Huyser is in Tehran to foment a military coup.’ In Paris, the International Herald Tribune wrote that Huyser had not gone to Tehran to ‘foment’ a coup but to ‘prevent’ one.”34

Shah added:

“Did such a risk exist? I do not believe so. My officers were tied to the Crown and to

the Constitution by an oath of loyalty, but the different American information services had perhaps solid reasons to think that the Constitution would be abused. It was therefore necessary to neutralize the Iranian army. It was clearly for this reason that General Huyser had come to Tehran.”35

Then Shah said:

“Huyser succeeded in winning over my last chief of staff, General Ghara-Baghi, whose later behavior leads me to believe that he was a traitor. He asked Ghara-Baghi to arrange a meeting for him with Mehdi Bazargan, the human rights lawyer who became Khomeini’s First Prime Minister. The General informed me of Huyser’s request before I left, but I have no idea of what ensued. I do know that Ghara-Baghi used his authority to prevent military action against Khomeini. He alone knows what decisions were made and the price paid. It is perhaps significant that although all my generals were executed, only General Ghara-Baghi was spared. His savior was Behdi Bazargan.

“By the time Huyser left Iran, the Army had been destroyed, and the Bakhtiar government he had supposedly come to save was in shambles.”36

Shah said that he met Huyser only one time during his visit to Tehran. He was accompanied by Sullivan, the American Ambassador. According to the Shah, the only thing they thought about was when he was going to leave Iran.37

Shah said after the revolution:

“At the travesty of a trial which preceded the execution of General Rabbii, the Commander of the Iranian Air Force, the General told his ‘judges’ that General Huyser threw the Shah out of the country like a dead mouse.”38

Shah ended by saying that plans for his departure had been announced, “interestingly enough, on January 11 in Washington by U.S. Secretary of State Vance.”39

A Testimony From Khomeini’s Partners

Among those who supported Khomeini were the National Front, Sanjabi, Feda’iyan, and Majahedian Khalq, and they all disagreed with Khomeini. The reporter Houda Al-Hocine from Al-Hawadess met with these people, and she reported an important story as follows:

“These new revolutionaries rejected Khomeini’s revolution because they said the revolution carried America’s blessing and they consider America as the force behind the fall of the Shah and therefore, were backing Khomeini. They gave evidence by saying that America’s president Carter was against Shah since the beginning for these reasons:

1. The Shah was having a feud with the Democratic Party, and most of the members of Congress were against the Shah because the Shah considered himself a leading hawk from the OPEC and led the campaign of raising the oil prices.

2. After the coup in Ethiopia’s, the U.S. was planning to take the initiative in Iran to protect its interests after the loss of her largest base in Asmara, Ethiopia. Shah was also getting old and the Crown Prince was too young. Thus, the U.S. was looking for a solution that would protect American interests, either through the Pahlavi family or through someone else. The American interest was the important thing. Americans then noticed the Communist activities that began to take its position by organized terrorist activities. Also, they found that the Soviet Union was the only beneficiary from the situation to gain whatever natural resources they wanted from Iran, especially natural gas. Afghanistan invasion took place, as well as the incidents in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen. This made Iran under the mercy of the leftist wave. Therefore, the situation had to be salvaged.

A coup de’tat was not acceptable by the Iranian people. Therefore, the change had to be from the people who could be incited by a revolution that would depend on religion. Accordingly, the Americans looked for a religious personality that was Khomeini.

The Americans did not keep an eye on Yazdi, which meant that he did not need to be monitored. Also, it meant that they knew who were the influential personalities.

Huyser came to Iran and spent all of January there after Shahpour Bakhtiar’s government was assembled to persuade the Shah to temporarily go into exile and to persuade the army not to rebel but instead to support Bakhtiar. They used Bakhtiar to deport the Shah.

As soon as the revolution was won, the army commander said that the American advisors should come back and the oil would be pumped once again to the Western countries, including the United States. As soon as the American Embassy had been attacked, Ibrahim Yazdi went by himself to stop it. (The Army Commander was Muhammed Waly Karny).

The American advisors paid their rent three months in advance for their houses when they left Iran.

There was an attempt to destroy Khomeini’s movement on the night of February 1 l, but something unexplainable made the attempt fail. The army announced that it was standing neutral. This announcement changed the core of events. The orders were given to the army and to the Embassy’s guards to drop their weapons.

Al-Watan newspaper

The Al-Watan reported uncovered some secrets. One of them mentions that “the United States explicitly asked the army commanders and generals to take this attitude at the last moment, and the State Department urged Ambassador Sullivan to persuade the senior generals, as soon as possible, not to intervene in any offensive action and to announce their neutrality in the political feuds.”

That is what happened and after the Air Force revolt, General Ghara-Baghi, whom the Shah spoke of in his memoirs, ordered his forces to return to their camps and to avoid more riots and new bloodshed. At the same time, on February 14, the general met with the army commander. They issued a communiqué that stated:

“To prevent disorder and bloodshed, the superior body of the army decided to keep neutral in the recent political feud, and for this reason, an order was given to all the soldiers to return to their units and barracks. The Ambassador said that the reason for this was the possibility of a dangerous conflict between the army and the people, and the fear that the leftist world infiltrates and benefit from the conflict between Khomeini and the army. It was also to preserve the strength of the army to play a future role similar to the role which ‘Suharto’ played in Indonesia or to the role the generals played in a coup in Chile against Salvador Allende. The Ambassador added that the United States might have resorted to a military coup de’tat if the revolution got out of hand and they failed to contain it.”40

17″Above the Doubt Documents — Part II,” Ministry of Islamic directive — Iran. P. 195, document dated 1976.

18 Ibid.

19 A False Sense of Security will Destroy you, US News & World Report, March 22, 1976, p. 57-58.

20 Muhammad H. Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York Pantheon Books, 1982), p. 108-109.

21 The Shah is Not Giving Up, Time, November 27, 1978, p. 35.

22 Ibid.

23 Ayatollah Khomeini, The Islamic Government, p.128.

24 Ayatollah Khomeini, Walgaht Al-Faqih, pp. 142-143.

25 Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 133-134.

26 Christian Science Monitor, December 6, 1978, p. 2.

27 Al-Hawadess, No. 1156, London, December 29, 1978, p.13.

28 Al-Hawadess, No. 1161, London, Feb. 3, 1979, p. 26.

29 Al-Mostaqbal …..

30 NBC News, January 19, 1980.

31 Al-Watan Al-Arabi, No. 139, October 11-17, 1979, p.32.

32 Al-Hawadess, No. 1183, London, July 10, 1979, p.47.

33 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.

40 Fashal Mohawlat Intelap Daid Al-Khomeini,” Al-Watan, Kuwait, March 18, 1979, p. 1.

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Part 3: Iran and the Revolution

Divergent views about US-Iranian Relationship in US

There was a dispute in the U.S. between the two parties regarding the removal of Shah. The Republicans mainly opposed such a move. But, Carter and his aides supported Khomeini without any doubt, and here are some facts to show this: Time magazine published on March 5, 1979, a declaration from Carter responding to his opposition saying, “Those who argue that the U.S. could or should intervene directly to thwart these events are wrong about the realities of Iran.”41 President Carter, in his memoirs Keeping Faith, talked about Huyser’s mission to Iran by saying:

Huyser believed the military had made adequate plans to protect its the equipment and installations, and that it would stay off the streets. He had dissuaded some of its leaders from attempting a coup and from moving out of other parts of Iran into the more stable southern part.”42 Furthermore, President Carter praised Khomeini’s first Prime Minister by saying:

He and his predominantly Western-educated cabinet members cooperated with us. They protected our embassy, provided safe travel for General Philip C. Gast, who had replaced Huyser, and sent us a series of friendly messages. Bazargan announced publicly his eagerness to have good relations with the U.S. and said that Iran would soon resume normal oil shipments to all its customers.”43

President Carter also praised Khomeini when he said:

Khomeini sent his personal representative to see Secretary Vance to pledge increased friendship and cooperation, and to seek our assurance that we were supporting the new Prime Minister and a stable government. Despite the turmoil within Iran, I was reasonably pleased with the attitude of the Iranian government under Bazargan.”44

In an interview with the former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had with CBS program, Face the Nation, he said that the Bazargan government was very helpful in trying to protect Americans in a difficult and unstable, dangerous situation. He added that America can work out friendly relations.45 At that time, the assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Sanders said in his report before the Middle East Committee: “The American interests did not change in Iran, and we have a strong interest to keep Iran a stable, free, and independent state.”46 It is true that the American interests in Iran did not change and that the American administration knows best about their interests, especially because they worship their interests. If their interests were in danger, they would take the proper type of action to do what is best about the matter as Carter stated earlier (see above). Leaders of the Republican Party, on the other hand, bitterly opposed. George Bush described Carter as a liar, and he noted that during Carter’s visit to Iran on December 31, 1977, the former president said, “Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.” Bush made a remark about this part of Carter’s speech saying that Carter, “at the time, was giving the secret code to the CIA to start destroying Shah’s authority.” And, as we know, Bush was serving in the CIA, and he was familiar with their tactics.47 On January 7, 1978, the first riots erupted in Iran. Nevertheless, there was a battle between Kissinger and Carter’s National Secretary Advisor, Brzezinski. The first blamed the second of hatching a conspiracy against the Shah, and he criticized Carter’s attitude towards the Shah, who served the American interests for more than 26 years. In an interview with The Economist on February 10, 1979, which then published a book, Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, showed his support for the Shah. He also showed that the American policy at that time was deliberately directed to oust the Shah.48 As it is clearly evident from these sources –The Shah’s memoirs, the accounts of Khomeini’s partners, and the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan — Huyser neutralized the army, and it was not coincidence that different political figures agreed to blame the United States. This blame was reasonable to anybody who followed the core of events which came before Khomeini’s victory.

Bazargan’s Attitude towards the United States

In the rest of this section, we would like to bring some proclamations from Bazargan about his country’s attitude towards the West, his speech from Tehran radio voicing his opinion of the West, as well as a document from the students who held the hostages and found documents in the American Embassy. One of these documents shows that Bazargan was an agent of the United States, but we believe that Khomeini intervened in favor of his friend, which pacified the students.

In a speech with the New York Times, Bazargan said that his government is willing to maintain a good relationship with the United States, and he renewed his apology about the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran during the first days of his government in office. Regarding the oil exports, Bazargan said that his country will begin exporting soon to all the world including the United States.49

Islamic Republic Party (IRP) as an Agent of the U.S.

Hajuat Al-Islam Ali Tehrani, a religious figure in Mashad, sent a letter to Khomeini charging three Ayatollahs, among tl1em Ayatollah Beheshti, the Secretary of the Revolution Council, of having a connection witl1 the United States and attempting to take over the authority. Hajuat Al-Islam, in his letter, published in the Islamic Republic newspaper on January l 9, 1980, charged Beheshti, Hash RaLsanjani, a former Minister of Interior (the current president), and Ali-Khameni, the former Imam of Tehran’s Mosque and the current spiritual leader, of trying to seize the authority by nominating Jalaeddin Farsi to represent the IRP in the election. He also said that it is the students’ duty to uncover the documents they found in the Embassy which will prove that these three figures are guilty together with Abbas Amir Entezam, the former government spokesman who was imprisoned as a spy for the United States.50

Abbas Amir Entezam, one of key figure was known to be a CIA agent. After the occupation of the Iranian Embassy, some documents were discovered which confirmed his relationship with the CIA.51

Rouhani: “The Americans Gave Us the Green Light”

In an interview with Paris-Match magazine, Ayatollah Hamid Rouhani said:

“The army was in the hands of its 40,000 American advisors. From the moment when America gave the green light — and I am convinced that America gave us the green light — the army could no longer do anything except what it is doing today: An honorable fight in fidelity to its oath to the Shah. When it understands that it is face to face with a revolution and not just a riot, it will fall into the hands of the people.”52

Hasan Habibi

Habibi was the Revolution Council’s spokesman, and once he was a nominee for the Iranian presidency. He has been accused by more than one organization in Iran, and his name was brought forth in Counter Spy magazine with the information that he had been called to the U.S. when he officially entered the CIA on May 15, 1963.53

Ibrahim Yazdi

Yazdi studied for sixteen years in tl1e United States, and he had both the American citizenship along with his Iranian citizenship (his wife and children carried only the American citizenship).54 Yazdi was formerly responsible for the activities and the hostile demonstrations against the Shah when he visited the White House in November of 1977. The newspapers found it strange, at the time, that Carter did not take the proper kind of action against the demonstrators.55

In a talk with the United States Press on March l, l 979, Senator Jim Abu Rezk said that he gave Khomeini’s representative, Ibrahim Yazdi, some political as well as non-political support in Washington. He also helped to free the students who had been arrested in the demonstration against the Shah on February 2, 1978. When Yazdi was the Foreign Minister, it was his idea of not cutting but improving relations with the U.S.56 He also negotiated with some American figures to import some military spare parts. Yazdi, together with Bazar, an agent ,Brezezinski in Algiers in November 1, 1979, three days before the American Embassy had been taken over.

Yazdi is still active in Iran. He is the leader of the “liberation movement of Iran”: an opposition movement working with in the system to give the Iranian system legitimacy.

As we can see, the high figures in the Iranian Revolution did have a connection with the United States. After all of this, how can we believe that the Revolution was clean. This is also reinforced from the Islamic point of view which forbids the Muslims to cooperate with the enemies of Allah, the enemies of Islam, and the enemies of the Muslims. Also, if we examine the Iranian Constitution, we will find that, although it is good for a Western country, it has no similarity to the Islamic Constitution which would define an Islamic country. We can criticize the Iranian Constitution from the Islamic perspective, but it is not the subject of this paper.

After all this evidence, how could anybody believe that Khomeini was an Islamic leader or that he was sent to bring justice? Some may argue that there were some polluted figures in the Revolution, that Khomeini did not know, or that he knew about them and tried to eliminate them. This is not the first time in recent history that this occurred, as when Nasser claimed to be the leader for the Arabs. The same thing happened in Iran, except that instead of Nasser carrying the slogan of Pan-Arabism, Khomeini carried the slogan of Islam.

Iran-Iraq War

The imperialist nations are always thinking ahead and they have to, to maintain their domination in the world. After brining Khomeini to power, the US had already made a back up plan of bringing “secularist” to power, in case the revolution failed or got out of hands. However, the revolution succeeded. Now, the US had to control it, so that the situation did not get out of hands. In pursuing this policy, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was ‘encouraged’ to attack Iran. Saddam Hussein thought that the Iran “could not withstand an attack for long, because its air force was nonexistent. The army had a combat capability of zero, the navy 10 percent. The Iraqi were not far of the mark”, Bani Sadr wrote in his book. Bani Sadr continues, “and had they [Iraqis] attacked then, would have had every chance of a rapid victory. But they had not received the green light from the United States.”57

Coming to power with the United States assistanh58, Khomeini was certain that no one would attack Iran. Saddam on the other hand was certain that the war would be a simple exercise. who put these ideas into their heads, Bani Sadr asks in his book.

In July of 1980, Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had met Saddam Hussein . He prepared a report for Carter, “explaining that the Iran-Iraq war was consistent with American policy in the region.”59

On September 22, 1980, Iraq attacked Iran. With in hours, Iraqi tanks crossed Iranian borders at several points and the Iranian air bases were bombed. Iran was able to survive the initial Iraqi attacks and launched their own attacks after a few days. So, began the long 8 years of Iran-Iraq war, where Muslims were the only losers. Nearly 30O,000 Muslims died, just from the Iran side.

For the American government, this is nothing new. The history has proven that they are able to wipe a whole race just for the measly worldly possession, such as the case with the American Indians. For the Persian Gulf, American strategy was simple, which was to destabilize the region, by having one boogie man. Khomenie was a perfect man for this job. In the end, it was the US economy which benefited from this policy of destabilization. The Saudi’s stepped up oil production as a result of the war and thus made the ‘black gold’ cheap for the Americans.

To maximize their gain, the Americans supplied weapons to both Iran and Iraq. It was reported that “the US subsidiaries all around the world found Iran to be an excellent customer because the Mullah paid top market prices.”60

Initially, the US began to support Iraq with weapon and intelligence in 1982, when it appeared that Iran might be winning.6 1 The Regan administration secretly decided to provide highly classified intelligence to Iraq in the spring of 1982, while also permitting the sale of American-made arms to Baghdad in a successful effort to help Saddam Hussein avert imminent defeat in the war with Iran, former intelligence and State Department officials say. The American decision to lend crucial help to Baghdad so early in the war came after American intelligence agencies warned that Iraq was on the verge of being overrun by Iran, whose army was bolstered the year before by convert shipment of American-made weapons. The New York Times and others reported last year that the Regan administration secretly decided shortly after taking office in January 1981 to allow Israel to ship several billion dollars worth of American arms and spare parts to Iran.”62

Iran was even forced to buy the American weapons, to defend against Iraq. The Americans urged Iraq to carry out air strikes deep inside Iran. The plan was conceived during the Iran-lraq war as pressure tactic intended to force Iran to turn to the United States for sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to repel the Iraqi attacks. The United States could then use its increased leverage with Iran to press Teheran to free

American hostages being held by pro-lranian groups in Lebanon. When asked about this information, White House spokeswoman, Laura Mellilo, told Reuters ‘This is nothing new.”’63

Americas objectives were being achieved by this war. There was a deliberate attempt to create no winners, no losers in order to keep the area destabilized. As a result, America was “gaining control of the revolution, control over OPEC was reestablished… Three other objectives described in the reports seized in the embassy were as yet unattained: using the Iran-Iraq war to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf, stabilizing the regimes in the region, and establishing military bases for the American strike forces.”64 (This situation w as early the Iran-Iraq war. However, as we know, these goals are now already achieved by the US.)

When it seemed like Iran was gaining an edge in the war, the Americans decided to go all out to help Iraq even overtly, because the United States did not want the revolution to get out of hand. To help Iraq, Washington removed it from the list of nations supporting terrorism, enabling trade with the US to resume. Agricultural Sales and export-import bank credits were restored, as were diplomatic relations. “The US also shared with Iraq, military intelligence on the deployment of Iranian forces. ‘Operation Staunch’, was launched to stem the flow of arms to Iran. Washington turned an indifferent eye toward allied arms deals with Baghdad.”65

In 1987, Iraq was becoming desperate. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on Iran. An important question comes to mind is that who provided Iraqis with technology and the know how to deliver these chemical weapons? [Band Sadr mentions in his book that, the Soviets and Germans supplied the plans and training, and the French sold them 40 percent of the guns So, where did the other 60 percent of the guns to deliver the chemical weapons come from?]

By now it was obvious that the United States wanted the war to end. Most of their objectives were being fulfilled. Now they wanted to get Saddam Hussien, who had been in the British camp to join the American camp, like Iran.

By mid-1987, the American Navy started escorting Kuwaiti tankers (bearing US flags) through the Strait of Hormz and punished Iran for interfering with the tankers. The same year an Iranian airliner was shot down, killing 290 Muslims. This was seen “as the precursor of other catastrophes. if Iran did not immediately agree to the cessation of hostilities.”66

On July 20, 1988 Iran accepted the cease-fire. After agreeing to cease-fire agreement, Khomeini declared publicly, I have sold my honor; I have swallowed the poison of defeat.i~67

As expected, the Americans profited from both the war and its conclusion.

Dual Containment

It is well known that during and after the Iran-Iraq war, Americans were building Iraq in hope of making him the “police man” of the Gulf, or at least to deter Iran from taking any ‘threatening’ moves. This strategy appeared in may State Department document beginning in the fall of 1988, but it did not appear in a major policy document until presidential National Security Directive NSD-26, signed by President Bush on October 2, 1988. The directive stated:

“Normal relations between tile US and Iraq world serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq… [Also], we should pursue and seek to facilitate opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy… where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation .. objectives…. The US should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges.”68

Policy of trying to build up Iraq to be the policeman failed miserably, leading to the Gulf ‘war’. We are not going to discuss this war at any length, because it is out of the scope of the discussion. Seeing their failure, the US changed its policy from building up Iran or Iraq to “a strategy of dual containment”. “This policy departs from the past US practice of helping to build ~,~ one of the countries in hopes of balancing the other’s military and political influence” a US official said. He also said, “the new US objective is to ensure that both Iran and Iraq remain equally weak for an indefinite period. The [Clinton] administration’s principal approach is to ensnare both countries in a tight web of international trade restrictions meant to deprive them of the income and technology they need to develop new armaments’ pursue terrorism, foment revolutions or intimidate their neighbors.”69

41 Iran Time Magazine, March 5, 1979.

42 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 449

43 Ibid., p. 450.

44 Ibid., p, 452.

45 “Face the Nation,” CBS, February 25, l 979.

46 Al-Hawadess, No. 1 163, London, February 16, 1979, p.29.

47 Ibid.

48 Henry Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 198 l ), pp. 17.- 187.

49 New York Times, February l 8, l 979, pp. 1, 14

50 Islamic Republic, January 19, 1980, p.2

51 “NVDI comments on Entezam A Test,” FBIS, December 26, 1979, pp. Sup. 23-24

52 George Menant, Translation by Dr. Marshall Windmiller, “A interroge L’ayatollah Rouhani Chef de la communaute chiite d’Europe,” Paris Match, No. 1550, February 19, 1979, pp. 64-65

53 John Kelly, “The CIA in the Middle East,” Counter Spy, November/December 1978, p. 13

54 Al-Hawadess, No. 1171, p. 37.

55 Al-Nahan Arab and international, Paris, May 20, 1978.

56 Carter, p. 453

57 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, Page 69.

58 Iran Times, October 20, 1989, Page 8., A quote by Richard Cottam, an Iranian specialist and a professor- at the University of Pittsburgh.

59 Ibid., page 70.

60 Newsday, March 20, 1991, Page 6.

61 Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America’s Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush. (New York: William Morrow and Co. 1993.)

62 New York Times, Sunday, January 26, 1992.

63 Ibid., New Yorker Magazine, November 2, l 992.

64 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 144.

65 Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1992.

66 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 214.

67 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 215

68 The White House, presidential documents, Presidential Determination Number 90-7 of January 17, 1990, Application of export-import Bank Restrictions in Connection with Iraq, P. 1.

69 The Washington Post, Sunday, May 23, 1993.

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Part 4: Iran and the Revolution

Rafsanjani the moderate

After Khomeniis death, the existing organizations will try to change the country, each in a different way. The people are aware of this, and the United States will support any government that restores freedom and democracy.”70 These are the words of Ronald Regan. After reading this, it is easy to analyze where the current regime of Iran is headed.

After Khomeniis death, sure enough Hashemni Rafsanjani became the president. He is the current president. Although, according to the Iranian Constitution, a president can only serve two-4 year teens. But, since Rafsanjani is paving the way to moderation”, the Iranian Majlis is in the process of changing the constitution so that Rafsanjani to can become president for a third time. Rafsanjani has maintained contact with the Americans since the revolution. For’ example, back in December of 1986, “the Heritage Foundation mentioned a prospective rapprochement with the Khomeini regime on four points, which also served as the basis for relations between Rafsanjani and George Bush. They were: organization of the oil market, stabilization of the regime, the release of political prisoners, and the end to the Iran-Iraq war as an investment in the American elections 1988.-71

Just three months after Khomeini’s death, the newly elected President Hashemi Rafsanjani moved swiftly to end Iran’s political and economic isolation. He excluded from his Cabinet former Interior minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the chief patron of anti-Western terrorist in Lebanon, and hardline former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mouisssvi. We’ll have more surprises now, says; R.K. Ramazani, an Iran expert at the University of Virginia.72 A big surprise did come during the Gulf War, when Iran declared its neutrality in the war. When Iraq flew its cream of the Iraqi air force to Iran. Even American General Norman Schwarzkopf was surprised. No clear explanation came from Tehran. iRat:sanjani did assure the US-led coalition, however, that the decision to provide sanctuary to some of Saddamis most sophisticated French and Soviet fighters and most of his SU-24 Gencer bombers would not affect Iran’s neutral status. The planes, Iranian officials said, will be impounded and held until hostilities end. They also insisted that no deal had been cut with Baghdad in advance.”73

From the beginning of l~is presidency iRafsanjani has worked quietly to improve ties with Washington… So fa~, Rafsanja’~i l~as seceded on one major front: he has shed much of Iran’s ultraconse~ ative i~nage and upgraded or restored time with many European and Middle Easte~n countries as well as Canada. ~74

Raisanjaniis ai~n is to ~nake Iran into a “moderate” state. His policies seem to be working. As Newsweel~ ~-eported, ~ ln Teheran, peeling slogans have been scrubbed off the walls… A capitalist-st~le stocl; n~arl;et is booming, children snap up Ninja Turtle toys and “Dancing with Wolves” is tl~e ilrst Hollywood movie to be screened legally in years.”75

What about all the anti-American slogans we hear all the time from the various leaders in Iran. ~Anti-American rhetoric bv Isla~nic extremists in Tehran is not be taken seriously. eIt is for domestic, anti-i~nperialist consumption that the so-called radicals shout war mongering slo~rans against the Americans,’ says an Iranian political scientist living in Paris. ‘Even the~lranian revolutionary Guards are in no mood to join the hostilities.”’76 Rafsanjani is known as the epragmatisti and a emoderatei, even if it means that he will abandon Allahis laws, he will do it. He is known to have eliberalize social codes). He il1as not actually called for a reversal of strict Islamic injunctions, but in oblique ways he is si~aling that he favors a more relaxed approach, especially in the enforcement of Hijab. In a m~cl~ publicized sennon last November, for example, Rafsanjani chided fellow clerics ~l~o make a virtue of ‘austerity’ and argued that ‘appreciating beauty and seekin~ e~nbellisl~nent are serious feelings. To fight them is not God’s desire.”77 Ralsanjani als~’ said, ithat young people were being asked to deny the esexual urged for too ion=, and tl~e ete~nporary marriage,~ (a Shiiite institution endorsing sexual liaisons for fi.xed ~eriods of time) ought to be more widely accepted. “78

Besides his eliberali anti-lslamic views, it is clear that RaLsanjani has been maintaining trade relation with the United States, despite calling it the eGreat Satan~. Shortly after hostage affair, Washington loosed r estrictions on trade with Tehran, and the US companies were allowed to sell Iran hardware. In March, 1991, American Mitac Corporation of Freemont CA., shipped $28 million worth of computers to Raymeh Saz Engineering Co. in lran. Anotl~er computer firms, Modular Computer Systems Inc. Of Fort Lauderdale, Fl., was given a license to ship $1.3 million worth of computer to the Iranian Chemical Co. Siemen, tl~e German electronics f~rm, received US approval to sell Iran’s RaLsanjani industrial C o~nplex $241,000 worth of computers in 1991. It also sold Iran Telecom~m~nications Corp. $276,000 worth of electronic equipment that year. Rockwell Internatic~nal sold ~l ehran helicopter gear and electronics worth $533,000. Otl~er contracts went to Apple Computer, Sun Microsystems, Honeywell, NCR and AST Researcl~. Each sale was approved by the Commerce Department after consultation with other ~overnn~ent agencies. 79 Even after 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, wl~icl~ forbids iany transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology that cold be r~sed to mal~e advanced weapons~, the trade with the US has continued. The trade only dropped hom $747 million in 1992 to $616 million in 1993.80

Conclusion

After reading tllrougl~ tl~is paper, l~ow can anyone claim that Iran is an Islamic State. Those who still insist, need to re-read tl~e following Ayat of the Qur’an:

Take not Jews and Christian as yor~r Aulyat….

Just mear seeking aid and protection from the Jews and Christian would make us ‘one of them’ (a non-Muslim). S~rely Allah will cr~rse the person who actively is working to undermine and mix-represent Islan~, with the help of the Kuffar.

Again, Iran was chosen j.rist as an example to show how the Imperialist powers still manipulate the Muslim Ummah. Tl~e sih~ation in all of the other ‘Muslim’ countries in no different. May Allal~ protect the Mr~slims Ummah from the conspiracies of the West and bring back the true Islamic State, so tl~at this Ummah can rise up to its proper place and establish j~stice for not j~’st tl~e Mr~slims, but also for the non-Muslims.

70 Bani Sadr, My Tun1 To Speak, page 219.

71 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 212.

72 Business Week, September I 1, 1989.

73 Time, Michael Serrill’ February I 1, 1991.

74 Time, May 6, 1991.

75 Newsweek, April 27, 1992.

76 Time, February I 1, 1991.

77 Time, May 6, 1991.

78 Time, May 6, 1991.

79 US News & World Report, November 14, 1994.

80 Ibid.

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uploaded 15 mar 2002

it has now been more than a few months since the us overturned the taliban from the status of ruling over 95% of afghanistan.  many slurs have been levelled against the ability of islam to confront 21st century problems which the world faces today, the lie that the establishment of islam on a state level means economic and technological backwardness as well as poverty have been aired.  in view of this khilafah.com embarks upon a series of articles which answer the question ‘did islam fail in afghanistan‘, in order that the confidence in islam’s system of organising the manifest problems which confront the world can be engendered.

introduction

the us has used the killing of its own citizens on september 11 to achieve in terms of its foreign policy objectives results which prior to this event remained as mere thoughts in the minds of strategists and policy makers alike.  since the collapse of the soviet union, the us has sought to shape the world in its own image, ruthlessly engaging internationally in order to vanquish the only serious threat which exists to its unrivalled and arrogant domination of the world’s affairs.  as time has progressed the yearning for islam by the islamic ummah has grown and the us, britain and their allies have attempted through their agents to suppress this latent energy, to borrow a term she is the ‘sleeping giant’.  this giant will inevitably awaken when the gap between the aqeeda (basis of islam) and life is bridged, this can only occur by the resurrection of allah’s (subhanahu wa ta’ala) final message, through the establishment of the khilafah.

within this emerging climate the leading nation needs to engage with its future enemy and smother it in its cradle.  in a like manner to fir’awn (pharaoh of egypt) who ordered that all infant males be killed.  acting upon a prophecy which foretold that a male child from the banu isra’eel would destroy his power and seat of arrogance.  the us and her surrogates are utilising different styles to achieve the same objective.  one of these tools is propaganda; the us spreads the lie that she alone carries the only viable system to address the lives and problems of the world.  in order to build this illusion she has to convince everyone or a significant number of the inadequacies of every other system.  the styles in this campaign are important only so far as to get this message across, but the importance lay in her ability to convince, and the ideas and slogans she uses to get across her message.

the lie that islam is unfit to solve the complex problems of the 21^st century

after september 11^th all manner of personalities and non-entities emerged on the world stage to announce the superiority of western civilisation and the failure of every other, the most arrogant pointed to what they termed the failure of islam and attacked those who wanted to bring any semblance of its system back.  the key proponents of this was james rubin, the former assistant secretary of state under clinton.  he wrote in an article in the independent on sunday:

we must send a clear and simple message to the muslim world. if osama bin laden’s vision were achieved, all of the islamic world would look like afghanistan under the taliban. do you really want to live in bin laden land, a stone age islamic caliphate with no rights, no economy and no future? [the independent on sunday 14 october 2001]

the picture he painted of an islamic khilafah state was one of backwardness, economic stagnation, where the people would be subjugated through force to stop them from rebelling.

general parvez musharraf said something similar when he mocked those who call for the complete implementation of islam:

do we want pakistan to become a theocratic state? do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic islamic welfare state?

musharraf was arguing that islam has not got the ability to practically solve problems, in a sense pointing to afghanistan as the ‘failed project’.  his call for a progressive and dynamic islamic welfare state meant nothing other than applying kufr and using islamic slogans to justify it.

the propaganda attacks came thick and fast.  the pitiful propagandists wheeled out cherie booth (the prime minister of britain, tony blair’s wife) and laura bush, who both argued that the covering of women was a violation of basic ‘universal’ human rights, with this the propaganda machine stepped up a gear, but there were many smaller attempts, some involving scholars with muslim names who went to great lengths to re-shape the picture of islam in the mould designated by the west.  the attacks against islam were cushioned with words of praise of the islamic way of life in such a condescending way as to attempt to hide their true position, although this was clear to all those who possessed the ability to observe the reality of their statements and actions, thus revealing their true venom against islam and muslims.

we must extract an important point from this which deserves scrutinising.  this propaganda war does not care for humanitarian values or notions of justice, interests are at the heart of the matter.  therefore the presence of the taliban in afghanistan as rulers of the majority of afghanistan was not important as long as they could be worked with, when the us realised that there was no way it could achieve its vaunted pipeline from the plentiful energy reserve of the caspian through afghanistan due to the intransigence of the taliban, they had to be removed.  they refused to allow the taliban to take the vacant afghan seat at the un and refused to officially recognise it.  the us now arrogantly stands tall and proclaims that its way of life has triumphed.  it is easy to react to the attack on the perceived failure of the islamic system by diluting islam and conforming to western labels of ‘extremist’ and ‘fundamentalist’.  what needs to be done and what i seek to clarify is where the taliban went wrong in their application of islam, so as to illustrate for those working to bring back the islamic khilafah and those who support this work the framework of the islamic ruling system from the qur’an and sunnah.

the deen is nasihah…

tamim ad-dari related that the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) said, “the deen is nasiha (good advice/sincere conduct). the deen is nasiha. the deen is nasiha.” they (the sahabah) asked, “to whom, messenger of allah?” he said, “to allah and his book and his messenger and the imams of the muslims and the common people.”

therefore what follows is sincere advice to the taliban and the muslims in general.  this article will cover the following.

1. the shape of the state in islam, which the kitab and the sunnah have expounded upon in a precise manner.
2. the importance of political awareness
3. tribalism is not the road to unity
4. how the taliban could have galvanised this ummah for the true solution
5. the future lessons for the islamic khilafah and how it will tackle similar problems.

the islamic state of afghanistan?

one of the most frequent questions we have been asked at khilafah.com is whether the taliban had established the islamic khilafah, a state for all of the muslims.  this is the key to reviewing what happened in afghanistan.  the answer is the taliban did not establish the islamic khilafah, and they never claimed that they had, rather this was always claimed of them.

a delegation from hizb ut-tahrir approached the taliban ambassador in islamabad, one of the members of that delegation asked: “we have been working for a long time to re-establish the khilafah and it is not permissible to have two khilafah states in the ummah. therefore, do you consider your state to be the khilafah so that we may give the bay’ah (pledge of allegiance given to a khaleefah) to you? in addition, if matters were to occur in uzbekistan, maybe we, hizb ut-tahrir, can take the authority in uzbekistan and merge it with you to establish the khilafah. so, is your state the khilafah?” he answered: “no, we are an islamic imara (emirate). the emirate of afghanistan and we do not invite islamic movements to give us the bay’ah. we do not invite our neighbouring muslim states to give us the bay’ah.” he continued to say: “representatives from chechnya approached us and they wanted to give us the bay’ah. the amir (of afghanistan), mullah mohammad ‘umar said to them: “you go and establish an emirate in your country we will help you if we can and you help us if you can but your land is an emirate and we are an emirate.” he also said: “the time of khilafah has ended because the khilafah is for only 30 years upon the saying of muhammad (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam).”

after which a  discussion occurred, the member of the delegation answered by saying, “yes, there is this hadith, but this is not the place for us to demand to make it for only 30 years, nor is it a place to agree to make it for 30 years. it is not allowed to have many states in the ummah and all the imams (ridhwan allah ‘alaihim) are in agreement with what came in the ahadith of the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wasallam). the delegation left the ambassador with a book which hizb ut-tahrir has published called ‘the khilafah’ and parted with the words “this was our opinion and if we see that you announce your state as the khilafah we will work to give you the bay’ah and work for the rest of the muslims to give you the bay’ah. we may be able to merge other countries with yours to give you the bay’ah to become the khilafah”. the ambassador replied “the ‘ulama of afghanistan have come to a consensus that the khilafah is a thing of the past”.

the reality following this visit did not change to the extent that the imara of afghanistan became the khilafah.

the khilafah

it is vital for us to be clear on what the khilafah is; this has been explained in numerous ayaat, ahadith and the ijma of the sahaba (consensus of the companions).  it is the ruling system of any nation which determines the shape of their state, and this is all the more important for muslims as allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) has commanded that his laws must be implemented within any state which counts itself as islamic.

the qur’an and ahadith have clarified that the basis of the state needs to be islamic.

allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) links the judging by islam with the essence of iman, thus linking inextricably the iman with the action of judging/ruling.

“but no, by your lord, they can have no (real) faith until they make you judge in all disputes between them and find in their souls no resistance against your decisions, but accept them with the fullest submission.” [tmq 4:65]

and he (subhanahu wa ta’ala) says:

“and rule between them by that which allah has revealed” [tmq 5:49]

allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) says:

“and those who do not rule by that which allah has revealed are the disbelievers” [tmq 5:44]

the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) said:

«ία ϊγα ανσ ϊανε γγρδη έεζ ρσοψ»

“any action which is not according to our matter (deen) is rejected.”

all of these ayaat indicate that all of the islamic state’s legislations, whether the constitution or laws have to be restricted to what emanates from the islamic ’aqeeda in the form of divine laws. in other words, it is restricted to that which has been revealed by allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) of rules in the book and the sunnah, and in whatever the book and the sunnah directed to of analogy (qiyas) and general consensus of the companions (ijma’a as sahabah).

this is because the speech of the legislator came related to the actions of the humans (’ibad), and obliged the people to restrict themselves to it in all their actions, thus the organisation of actions comes from allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala). the islamic shari’ah came in relation to all the actions of people, and all their relationships, whether the relationship was with allah, with themselves, or with others. so there is no place in islam for the people to put forward rules and laws for the state in organising their relationships, because they are restricted to the ahkam shari’ah.

the khilafah is the general leadership over all the muslims, in the whole world, whose responsibility it is to implement the laws of islam, and to convey the islamic message to the whole world.  the sahih ahadith have labelled the state which restricts itself to the laws of allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) as the khilafah or the imamah, both of these terms have been mentioned in the ahadith of the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) and they both carry the same meaning, it is important to be clear that the shape of the islamic state is determined solely by the divine evidences.  therefore any word can be used as a name for the state as long as it does not contradict with the meaning of the islamic state such as islamic democracy or islamic republic, islamic federation etc.  therefore the meaning has to be adhered to by establishing all the rules of islam comprehensively and engaging with other nations in order to convey the message of islam through invitation and jihad.

this is a brief description from the islamic evidences which lays down the basis of the islamic state which the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) and the sahabah (radiallahu anhuma) established in medina.  so many ahadith have made clear that the muslims must be united behind one khaleefah who implements the rule of allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala).  so numerous are the evidences that no one can deny that we can establish a state for a nation or a tribe.  the reality of afghanistan under the taliban was that the yearning for islam existed, as it does throughout the whole world, but some key ingredients were missing which will insha allah be elaborated upon throughout the rest of these articles.

yusuf patel

kcom journal

15 march 2002

source: kcom journal

the importance of political awareness

in the second of this series of articles, we look at the vital importance of political awareness, something which was lacking in the foreign policy decisions of the taliban.

this islamic ummah has been commanded to carry on the work of the prophets, since the finality of the messengership (risala) of muhammad (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam), there are no new prophets, but the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) has said:

“…there is no prophet after me. there will be khulafa’a and they will number many…” [narrated by muslim on the authority of abu hurayrah]

these khulafa’a have been charged with continuing the mission of prophethood, which was to spread the guidance, call to the worship of allah exclusively (tawheed).  once the messenger (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) established the islamic state in medina after which he began to call nations to islam through sending delegations of invitation to islam.

it was reported in the hadith of sulayman ibn burayda on the authority of his father who said: “whenever the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) appointed an ameer to head an army or an expedition, he would command him to fear allah and be good to those who are with him; then he (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) would say:

‘raid in the name of allah! fight whoever disbelieved in allah! raid but do not abuse, do not betray, do not maim or mutilate and do not kill any newborn. if you encounter your enemies, the mushrikeen, call them to observe three qualities or dispositions, and whichever of these they accept then accept it from them, and do not fight them. call them to islam, and if they accepted it, do accept this from them and refrain from fighting them…” he (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) went on: “if they refused, ask them to pay the jizya, and if they accepted this, then take it from them and refrain from fighting them, and if they refused, seek the help of allah and fight them” [narrated by muslim]

therefore the messenger had commanded that the invitation to islam be given before the fight, if they refused to accept islam as their deen, they should be invited to live under the system of islam and pay the jizya, and if they yet refuse, those who stand as obstacles to the implementation of islam must be fought.  in order to have even gotten to this situation, the messenger (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) and the sahaba (radiallahu anhum) had to undertake political manoeuvres in order to create a global environment where islam could flourish, this meant creating stability in the lands surrounding medina, forming treaties and alliances, sending delegations to different leaders as well as sending armed contingents to open up new lands.  islam was able to spread far and wide as a result.

abu dawood narrated on the authority of anas b. malik who related that the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wasallam) said:

“…and the jihad is continuous from the moment allah has sent me till the last person of my ummah fights against the dajjal; neither the oppression of the oppressor, nor the justice of the just (ruler) will abolish it…..”

this is the eternal method to propagate islam and its system; it is the fixed method to remove the physical barriers that halt the progression of islam to the world.  therefore no one has the authority to abolish or abrogate something which is ‘the peak of islam’.

in short the political awareness is obliged upon a state whose very existence is due to the command of allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) for his deen (religion/ideology) to prevail over all other deens.

let us look at how the taliban fared in this regard.

the taliban’s external relations

the imara of afghanistan was recognised by pakistan, saudi arabia and the uae, and the us was initially quite open about its relations with the taliban.  the relationship between the muslim countries is currently an abnormal one, the closest analogy to describe this irrational relationship would be if hundreds of muslims were to converge to a masjid for salatul jumuah, the adhaan (call to salah) having been called and following the khutbah and the iqama everyone were to pray individually.  similarly the relationship between the muslim countries is an illegitimate and abnormal one as there is no place for nation-states within islam.  for a muslim country to flaunt its islamic credentials and then establish an emirate for the afghans and call for the recognition of other muslim countries is one which islam prohibits.  leadership from the point of view of islam is singular and not collective; the existence of multiple leaders over the affairs of this ummah is a disease which allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) and his messenger (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) prohibits.

the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) said:

“it is not allowed for three persons (to be) without appointing one of them as an ameer.” [ahmed narrated on the authority of abdullah bin amru]

the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) said:

“if three people went out on a journey, let them appoint one of them as an ameer.” [abu dawood narrated on the authority of abi sa’id]

he (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) also said:

“if there are three persons in a journey, let them appoint one (ahad) of them as an ameer.” [al-bazzaar narrated from the tradition of ‘umar b. al-khattab]

all these traditions state that the ameer should be one, as understood from the wording ‘without appointing one of them as an ameer’, ‘let them appoint one of them as an ameer’ and ‘let them appoint one (ahad) of them as an ameer’. 

these ahadith indicate the shar’iah rule which states that there can only be one ameer over one matter, this is denoted by the use of the term ‘ahad’ which means one, the opposite of whose meaning (mafhoom al-mukhalafah)  is that it is not allowed to have more than one ameer.  with regards to the khaleefah, the leader for all the muslims, the messenger of allah (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) has said:

“when an oath of allegiance (bai’ah) has been taken for two khulafa’a, kill the latter of them.” [narrated by muslim on the authority of abi sa’id al-khudri]

this hadith provides a shar’ii permission to kill anyone who presents himself as khaleefah once one already exists.  therefore how can it be that there exist many rulers over us implementing other than that which allah (subhanahu wa ta’ala) has revealed.  it was also the case that the taliban and iran mobilised their forces across the afghan border to fight each other in september 1998 over the killing of iranian diplomats in mazar-e-sharif.  had the taliban publicly called for the iranian islamic people to unify with it based on islam and vocalised their brotherhood, pointing to the plans of enemy states such as us, britain, russia, india, israel, china etc imagine the impact this would have had.  even if the ba’til iranian republican regime had spurned the call to unification, it would have exposed it throughout the world and amongst the muslims of iran, had this been followed by a call for unification for all the muslims throughout the world, the muslims would have risen up to remove their rulers and joined afghanistan.  unfortunately this comes back to the nature of the system established within afghanistan, which was one not fully compliant with islam.

when syed rahmatullah hashimi (senior advisor to mullah ‘umar, afghanistan) was asked on march 10, 2001 at a lecture he gave at the university of southern california ‘what is afghanistan s priority in regards to establishing an islamic state for all muslims, not just for afghans?’

he answered: “we have our first headache in afghanistan, and that’s a big headache. we have a full-time job there. if we were worked 24 hours a day, we will hardly ever be able to re-construct an islamic system in our own country. and we have no intention of going beyond our borders, and neither can we. so, all these people who exist in other countries, or their policies, they have nothing to do with us. we are only concerned about afghanistan. and please do not try to make assumptions.”

i agree with him that the establishment of a stable afghanistan was a full time job, and a hard one at that, but islam requires that this action of building is done in conformity with islam.  surely a country like afghanistan which is land locked, having very little in terms of resources and torn by war for decades should have united with the other muslims under one khilafah, in that way the hadith of the messenger (sallallahu alaihi wa sallam) would have become a reality:

“the ummah are one ummah, their land is one, and their war is one.”

it was pitiful when afghanistan faced an earthquake and then famine, and the response of the muslim countries was pitiful, the small handouts that were given were analogous to the sympathy that someone gives a stray cat, sympathy without any real commitment.  if the muslims were one then the same response which amr ibn al-as gave to khaleefah umar bin al-khattab when asked to send food to alleviate the famine in medina would have been repeated.  amr ibn al-as was the waali (governor) of egypt and its inhabitants viewed the caravans of food leaving egypt as though they were providing food for members of their families.  and when the taliban were attacked by the us and abandoned by pakistan, saudi, qatar and all of the muslim countries, the most that could have been expected of the ummah was sympathy because their relationship though from islam manifested solely in reading about their trial in newspapers, on al-jazeera as concerned bystanders rather than angered participants because the state that was about to be destroyed was an afghani state, if they had attacked the khilafah, the reaction would have been different as the entire muslim world would have fought against the us, as that state would have belonged to them. everyone fights to protect the seizure and destruction of that which belongs to them.  similar to the reaction of the muslims of india to the destruction of the khilafah in 1924, although the state had been in decline for centuries and a lot of the islamic lands had been occupied by the colonialists, the muslims there and indeed in other parts of the islamic lands were distraught and even began movements for the restoration of the khilafah because although they had taken the existence of such a state for granted they perceived its vital link to islam.  this was something which was vitally missing from the rule of the taliban and how they were viewed by the rest of the muslim world, as a result of the fact that the emirate of afghanistan was for the afghanis and not the entire islamic ummah.

in similar light was the relationship that it had with pakistan which was used by the us as a conduit to establish a government that would be stable enough to provide safe passage for a us oil pipeline.

the untamed bear

“it is common knowledge that american imperialism is the custodian of global capitalism. safeguarding the interests of this menace that has crossed national boundaries in search of greener pastures around the world…their entire history is a testimony to the fact that they have no permanent foes and friends, jumping into the fray whenever the environment is found to be entirely conducive but running for cover whenever the stakes are high. these fair-weather friends, notwithstanding the spurious and opportunistic war-time promises of standing through thick and thin to their allies, have an impeccable record of not even looking back to inquire about these allies at the time of their misery. one should not be bewildered, therefore, to find their allies left in the lurch licking their wounds with the american `master’ enjoying the scene from a safe distance… these mercenaries of global capitalism also wanted to gain access to the mostly untapped natural resources of central asia.”

the statement above is a good description of us aims throughout the world, yet it is even more surprising that this statement came from abdul salam zaeef, the former taliban ambassador to pakistan.  this is an illustration of the political naivety of the international situation on the part of the taliban.  the us is an untamed bear which befriends – if you can even call it that – other nations or peoples in order to secure an interest, whether that be a strategic, economic or military goal, once the bear has had its fill or realises that the object of its desire is beyond its reach it will either retreat, or if that interest were to be viewed as too important, she will quickly remove the obstacle which stands in her way to realising it.

it is therefore a folly to ever believe that anyone can tame the beast in order to become its friend and ally, especially when the us is protecting its energy interests.

there are two main areas which illustrate the lack of political awareness linked to the rules of islam which were exhibited by the taliban

1. link to oil companies and the us oil interests.
2. search for recognition and un membership.

the us’s energetic policy

indeed it was lord palmerston (england’s secretary of state for foreign affairs and later prime minister) who insisted that:

“we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

the interest which the us pursued (and continues to chase after) in afghanistan was the utilisation of a yet untapped oil resource in the caspian sea.  the us wanted to clear the way for the proposed oil pipeline through the preferred route which would extend through afghanistan.

the importance of the caspian region in terms of potential reserves to rival the middle-east was too tempting an offer for the us to miss.  the current vice-president, dick cheney underlined the importance of this region in 1998 whilst addressing a group of oil executives, he said:

“i cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the caspian.”

the washington-based american petroleum institute, which acts as the voice of the major u.s. oil companies, called the caspian region, “the area of greatest resource potential outside of the middle east.”

the problem was how it could be piped from its source in the caspian (central asia) to the markets where they were needed. john j maresca (vice-president, international relations unocal corporation) presented this problem to the house committee on international relations (subcommittee on asia and the pacific, february 12 1998) he made clear to the committee, there were many risks involved in all potential avenues for the pipeline, iran was out of the question due the ban on us companies establishing trading deals with iran due to the helms-burton act. john maresca, taking all this into account stated:

“there are few, if any, other areas of the world where there can be such a dramatic increase in the supply of oil and gas to the world market. the solution seems simple: build a “new” silk road. implementing this solution, however, is far from simple. the risks are high, but so are the rewards.”

barry lane, a unocal spokesman was more open about the options that they had referring to the choice between iran and afghanistan, he said there was by the process of elimination one option, “and the u.s. sanctions against doing business with iran left us only one option,” by this he meant that the central asia to southern afghanistan route could be by default the only viable route.

the us believed she could use the taliban in order to create the stability they yearned after.  for example in 1997 a us diplomat told the writer ahmed rashid “the taliban will probably develop like the saudis did. there will be aramco [the former us oil consortium in saudi arabia] pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of shariah law. we can live with that.”

as long as they could achieve stability nothing else mattered.  yet this plan for stability pre-dated this.

in 1996 us assistant secretary of state for south asia robin raphel on a visit to pakistan, afghanistan and central asia, called on all parties to reach a political solution to end the continuing conflict. “we are also concerned that economic opportunities here will be missed, if political stability cannot be restored,” she told the media.

between 1994 to 1997 attempts were made to achieve support for the unocal pipeline.

in march 1996, a prominent us senator hank brown, a keen supporter of the unocal project, visited kabul and other afghan cities. he met with the taliban and invited them to send a delegation to a unocal-funded conference on afghanistan in the us. in the same month, the us applied pressure on the pakistani government to cancel its agreements with the argentinean company bridas and back the america’s boys (unocal).

on september 27, 1996 in a move which shocked the afghan opposition and indeed much of the world, the taliban captured the afghan capital, kabul.  after a few days the us state department responded by announcing they would send an envoy to meet with the taliban to determine the shape of relations.

when asked about the taliban’s human rights record, state department spokesman glyn davies said the us saw “nothing objectionable” in their strict application of shariah as there was “an indication … that they intend to respect the rights of all their citizens.”  upon hearing of the capture of afghanistan’s former communist president, najibullah, his castration and his hanging a white house spokesman called the action “regrettable.” after a few days the us state department condemned the killing.

a u.s. official told the los angeles times in october of the same year, “we’re not choosing. these people walked into kabul, and they are no more or less legitimate than those sitting there last week.”

the taliban held a news conference after their takeover of kabul where a representative claimed the movement desired “friendly and good” relations with the united states and would fervently crack down on the illegal drug trade, and would not export islam beyond its borders.

it was then that the plan to establish fertile ground for the pipeline began to reveal itself; the us was calling for “a broad based coalition government.”

the us began to work to achieve this objective, yet the taliban refused.  they refused to participate in a ‘loya jirga’ with their opponents, julie sirrs, a former us department of defense intelligence agency official who specialised in afghanistan said much later, “there were some bad signs from pretty early on … that i think were just ignored because we had larger geopolitical reasons that we wanted to believe that they would be a good group.”

the us knew that the isi supported the taliban’s quick entry into dominance in afghanistan and the us supported this as indicated by statements from the december 1996 report on afghanistan from the congressional research service (a department of the library of congress which acts as a source of information for the us legislature) declared, “[t]he united states is unwilling to isolate [the] taliban because pakistan, on which the united states has consistently relied to protect u.s. interests in afghanistan, supports the group.”

unocal was the preferred hope of the clinton administration and the latter would do all it could to ensure that it prevailed in the great new game for oil.  unocal hired a set of impressive and high profile consultants, amongst which included robert oakley, a former ambassador to pakistan; zilmay khalilzad, recently appointed by president george w. bush to act as adviser on southwest asia on the national security council and envoy to karzai’s afganistan; and henry kissinger, the former us secretary of state for foreign affairs.  there have also been unsubstantiated claims that unocal was privy to regular briefings by the cia.

unocal officials lobbied the us government to aid it to establish a secure position on the ground for a pipeline.

in november 1997 madeleine albright, during a visit to pakistan, called the regime’s treatment of women “despicable” and condemned “their general lack of respect for human dignity.” this was not a u-turn in us foreign policy but in part a reaction to the women’s lobby, an indication of public appeasement of domestic opinion, whilst maintaining discussions and dialogue.

this is further proved by karl inderfurth, who succeeded robin raphel in july 1997, and was quoted by the washington post on 12 january 1998, as saying: “we do believe they (the taliban) can modify their behaviour and take into account certain international standards with respect to women’s rights to education and employment.”

richard mackenzie in ‘the new republic’ magazine highlighted the importance of the taliban for the us who believed it could mould them into a force for stability and moderation, but in essence a puppet it could toy with and tie into its manipulative web of control just as it had done to the other muslim countries.

“what probably made the most difference to u.s. policymakers [in welcoming the arrival of the taliban], though, was the taliban’s commitment to a particular commercial enterprise. the taliban had promised to permit construction of giant gas and oil pipelines from central asia, down through afghanistan, to pakistan. the main contender for that work was an american-saudi coalition of unocal and delta oil companies….it took a while for many in the west to catch on, but inside afghanistan the key players were already well-aware of the pipeline’s importance–and its potential effect on policy. in 1996, during a conversation in kabul not long before the taliban reached the capital, ahmed shah massoud asked me about unocal, its motives, its methods, and its ties to the u.s. government. when the taliban finally reached the gates of kabul, it was well-financed and well-equipped–and it could count upon the acquiescence of the united states….” ['the succession: the price of neglecting afghanistan', richard mackenzie. the new republic, sept 14, 1998 v219 n11-12 p23]

the saudis were part of this plan and its collaboration with unocal through its delta-nimir oil company, nimir petroleum had more than the funds needed to execute ambitious projects such as the unocal pipeline since it was dominated by the bin-mahfouz family which owned the national commercial bank whose patrons were high ranking members of the saudi royal family. delta-nimir was already a major investor with unocal in the oilfields of azerbaijan, and had close links to crown prince abdullah, the de facto ruler of saudi arabia.

the us government was backing unocal aggressively as bridas had made agreement with some central asia leaders to be the preferred company to build lucrative pipelines, but the us helped to destroy a lot of these agreements and the us ambassador to pakistan forced bhutto’s government to openly come out in favour of unocal whilst ceasing any contacts with bridas, the argentinean oil company, her administration duly complied.

by mid-1996 it was difficult to view robin raphel as anything other than unocal’s marketing spokesman since she was voicing the clinton administrations full backing to its pipeline bid, she said in 1996 on one of two trips to islamabad, that “we worked hard to make all the afghan factions understand the potential, because the unocal pipeline offered development opportunities that no aid program nor any afghan government could” (washington post, 11/5/01).

the situation did change in august 1998, following the bombings of the us embassies in africa. unocal withdrew from the project to build a pipeline,. it has since september 11 gone to painstaking lengths to convey its reason for pulling out of the centgas consortium as a direct result of the bombing and the retaliatory strikes against the taliban by the us.  firstly clinton used the bombing of sudan and afghanistan as a means of diverting attention away from the investigation into his lies about the ‘lewinsky affair’ and the consequent investigation by ken starr, it was not a reflection of the administrations anger towards the taliban’s relationship with osama bin laden, otherwise the strike would have been more devastating and achieved tangible results such as what has been achieved after september 11 in the ousting of the taliban.  the truth of the matter is that contacts with the taliban continued after this, and unocal had not in anyway been pressurised to cease the proposed pipeline, the decision was as a result of good old fashioned economic concerns over the price of oil.  unocal announced that it was closing three of its four offices in the four casian republics where it operated, it had only a month earlier pulled out from another consortium which was due to initiate a $2.9 billion pipeline to ship natural gas from turkmenistan to turkey, if instability was their main concern, nothing had changed in this regard to the central asian republics.

the new york times reported on 4 december 1998 that unocal had made clear they had withdrawn because the venture was no longer economically viable due to the fact that the price of oil had plummeted to $12 a barrel, the previous price of oil had been $24 a barrel, thus highlighting the gamble it would have been for unocal which had counted itself in to the venture based upon the higher projected price.  since bridas the only potential competitor had been frozen out, there was no chance that in the interim period which saw a downturn in world oil prices it would re-enter the race for oil.

unocal and its government backers went to great lengths to convince the taliban to accept the pipeline and create stability on the ground which could only materialise if it was within an environment of a ‘broad based government’, such proposals were aired as early as 1996 by officials such as robin raphel.  therefore like iran, the us believed it could use a series of ‘carrot and stick’ initiatives.  the carrots were indeed quite bizarre, which included a visit of a taliban delegation to houston, texas in december 1997 in which they were housed in a five-star hotel, taken to the zoo and visited the nasa space center, they were also invited to dinner at marty miller’s (vice president, unocal) house.  at the same time a taliban delegation was in buenos aires being courted by unocal’s rival, bridas.

in february 1997, a delegation of taliban leaders had flown to the unocal headquarters at sugarland, texas, for a whirlwind of corporate hospitality, one of many which unocal hosted.

the carrots kept coming as unocal donated $900,000 to the centre of afghanistan studies at the university of omaha, nebraska.  the centre set up a training and humanitarian aid programme for the afghans, opening a school in kandahar, which began to train some 400 afghan teachers, electricians, carpenters and pipe-fitters to help unocal to lay the pipeline.

in the cent-gas consortium, unocal held a 70 per cent stake, saudi oil company delta-nimir 15 per cent, russia’s state-owned gas company gazprom 10 per cent and the turkmen state-owned company turk-menrosgaz 5 per cent. in october 1997, after gazporm left the cent-gas, the consortium was expanded, with unocal’s share reduced to 54.11 per cent, delta 15 per cent, turk-menrosgaz 7 per cent, indonesia petroleum (japan) 7.22 per cent, cieco trans-asia gas ltd (japan) 7.22 per cent, crescent group (pakistan) 3.89 per cent and hyundai ltd (south korea) 5.56 per cent.

as recently as july 2001, christina rocca, the us assistant secretary of state for south asia, met the taliban officials in islamabad and announced $43 million in food and shelter aid, bringing to $124 million the us contribution to the internally displaced persons project in 2001 alone. this money was given straight to the taliban without them having to account for how it was spent.  the renewed us contacts with the taliban, including a visit by seven us officials to kabul in late april 2001 preceded by another visit by three us officials earlier in that month, this was all conducted even though afghanistan fell under the stringent sanctions by washington and the un security council. but more tellingly was a reaction to dana rohrabacher, a member of the house foreign relations committee, who requested access to official us documents related to us relations with the taliban, after two years of repeated requests, the state department relented, handing over one thousand documents which covered the period after 1996, which was the year the taliban had taken kabul.  the documents of interest were those related to us relations with the pakistani inter services intelligence (isi) and the pakistani government with regards to backing the taliban, they are under embargo to this date.

the us-taliban relations was a complex one, which meant that the us became impatient with their stance, not necessarily in terms of failing to hand over osama bin laden, but more its unwillingness to share power to reach a broad-based government, the clinton administration had been fighting for this and the bush administration followed suit.  a recent book by two french authors with links to french intelligence has made some far reaching allegations.  the book ‘bin laden, la verite interdite’ (bin laden, the forbidden truth), that was released recently, the authors, jean-charles brisard and guillaume dasquie said that at a meeting between us officials and taliban representatives, the latter were told:

“either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs.”it consolidates documents released by the state department which indicate a series of missions of shuttle diplomacy by the bush administration since it came to power, the state department line was that these meetings were convened to agree the handing over of bin laden, but was in effect seeking the agreement of the taliban for a broad based government which would encompass ahmed shah masood, abdul-rashid dostam, ismail khan as well as other leaders of the united front (northern alliance).

it is claimed by the authors that the last meeting between the taliban and the us was conducted in august 2001, christina rocca, undersecretary for south asian affairs for the us government met with abdul salaam zaeef, the taliban ambassador to afghanistan in islamabad.

the book continues to describe that frequent meetings took place under the six plus 2 forum of central asian countries, including russia and the us, they claim that on some occasions taliban officials were present.

niaz naik, former pakistani minister for foreign affairs was interviewed both on french television and also by the bbc, he emphasised that the bone of contention during a six plus 2 meeting in a berlin hotel in mid-july was “the formation of a government of national unity.” he was very clear in the options which the taliban were presented with, “if the taliban had accepted this coalition, they would have immediately received international economic aid. and the pipelines from kazakhstan and uzbekistan would have come.”

the meeting was attended by senior americans, russians, iranians and pakistanis, on the american side was tom simons, a former us ambassador to pakistan, karl inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of state for south asian affairs, and lee coldren, who headed the office of pakistan, afghan and bangladesh affairs in the state department until 1997.

naik also claimed that tom simons issued a stern ultimatum which impressed upon him the significance of this meeting, and that the days of negotiation had ended, naik quotes simons as having said, “in case the taliban does not behave and in case pakistan also doesn’t help us to influence the taliban, then the united states would be left with no option but to take an overt action against afghanistan,” he said that following these threats “i told the pakistani government, who informed the taliban via our foreign office and the taliban ambassador here.”

the taliban was invited to this meeting, but refused to send a representative, dr abdullah abdullah, the northern alliance’s foreign minister did attend.

in a cagey statement to the guardian newspaper on september 22 2001, mr coldren confirmed the broad outline of the american position at the berlin meeting. “i think there was some discussion of the fact that the united states was so disgusted with the taliban that they might be considering some military action.” the three former us diplomats “based our discussion on hearsay from us officials”, he said. “it was not an agenda item at the meeting but was mentioned just in passing”.

surely a threat of war as the consequences for refusing us demands would be memorable enough for such high level delegates to remember.  what this does show is that the us had lost all patience and such a view is reinforced by bush’s ‘no negotiation’ statements following september 11, most diplomats are in agreement that even if they had handed bin laden over (which mullah omar refused to do) the removal of the taliban was still a sub-objective of the us stability plan for the caspian oil pipeline.

it was more than politically naïve for the taliban to enter into a protracted engagement with the us believing she would act in the interests of the muslims, her history has shown that she does not allow for any group of people to threaten her interests, she follows the machiavellian principle of “the ends justifies the means” as her mission statement in life, vigorously pursuing her objectives.  she does not follow principles of justice and fair play rather these red herrings are intertwined within her wider marketing and disinformation campaign which she presents to the world.  her relationship with the muslims countries was also based upon an abnormal relationship, a mutual recognition of interests with the us as its conductor.

george kennan the director of policy planning at the u.s. state department after the second world war illustrated this when he said:

“to maintain this position of disparity (u.s. economic-military supremacy)… we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming…. we should cease to talk about vague and… unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standard and democratization. the day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts…. the less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.”

yusuf patel

22 march 2002

This series of articles have sought to counteract the lie that the re-establishment of the Islamic State means a return to the dark ages. It has been claimed that the establishment of the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan was built upon the pure conception of the Islamic State as indicated by the Prophet’s (Sallallahu Alaihi Wassalam) Sunnah. The first two articles aimed to show that the Taliban did not establish the Khilafah, and never claimed to do so. In pointing out their mistakes it is not meant as a slight on them, rather what is being propounded is an element of awareness which must exist within the Islamic Ummah and those who administer the affairs of the Ummah once the Khilafah is re-established. It is this political awareness which transformed a people deeply entrenched in petty squabbles and parochialism, who did not think beyond family and tribe and securing trade routes into an Ummah distinguished by its selfless want to convey the Deen of Islam. The first article aimed to show that the Khilafah must apply all the laws of Allah, indeed the source of legislation must solely be the Kitab and the Sunnah, and both the domestic and foreign policy must be in line with Islam. The second article put into application some of the lessons which needed to be identified with a view to ensuring in the future we do not fall prey to the same traps laid down by Kuffar. The third article in the series of five will identify another trap, that of the UN and the folly in believing that it is an institution independent of the interests of America.

It is important initially to be crystal clear on the futility of the UN as an organisation able to realise our interests, even to the extent of protecting Muslim life. Secondly it is important to realise the rule of Allah (Subhanhu Wa ta’ala) on turning to the United Nations to solve our problem and seeking entry into it.

United Notions?

The United Nations was set up in order to fulfil the ambitions of the Capitalist nations. It is not a neutral organisation that safeguards the rights of the weak, but exists solely to uphold the interests of the leading nation.

It churns out resolutions as though they were flu jabs, but when these resolutions are targeted towards Israel their impact is not dissimilar to a placebo (starch/sugar pills or treatment commonly used by doctors to please the patient, but which work with the patient on a psychological rather than medical level). The UN does not facilitate the security of the Muslims as an objective, when Muslims are protected it is the result of the outcome rather than the aim. Let us consolidate this understanding by looking to a practical reality.

Resolution 1405 was passed on 19 April 2002, it called for a team of international observers whose sole job it would be to investigate the massacre in Jenin. Israel initially welcomed the mission, whilst questioning the make up of the team. She called for additional personnel with military experience to accompany the team – this was duly complied with. She continued to manufacture additional reasons for her non-compliance by arguing that the Israeli Defence Force soldiers who took part in the ‘operation’ in Jenin must have immunity from prosecution no matter what the result of the investigation is. She piled on additional conditions, whilst claiming she had nothing to hide (apart from a pile of bodies resulting from her campaign ‘against’ [of] ‘terror’). In actual fact the US gave its tacit approval to the massacre as a means by which to eliminate those who opposed Arafat and the peace deal with Israel.

Iraq refused to comply with resolution 687 which set the basis for monitoring Iraq’s ‘weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometres, and related production facilities and equipment’. This resolution also established UNCSOM (United Nations Special Commission) which was set up to verify and destroy weapons dumps and nuclear capability and to destroy whatever was found to contravene the terms of resolution 687. For this non-compliance, Iraq has not only been bombed persistently and heavily, but sanctions have been imposed which the UN have no intention of lifting.

In the last 20 years, over twenty resolutions condemning Israeli actions have been vetoed by the US, on many occasions the majority of the security council had voted to pass the resolution which on the whole charged Israel with flouting international law. Israel has ignored over 70 resolutions over the past 50 years.

Israel has refused to implement a whole host of resolutions, and she is allowed to by the US (predominately) but also with the tacit approval of the security council. Would any Muslim country be allowed to act with such defiance? Surely this as a thought proposition should remain where it belongs – as a fantasy in the minds of the Muslim rulers.

Indeed the UN stood over the carcass of Bosnia and watched as the Muslims were killed, the inaction and indeed the practical help which the Dutch troops provided the Serbs in the enclave of Srebrenica merely scrapes at the surface of the complicity of the UN, and though well publicised, is the convenient scapegoat for the intentional slaughter of the Muslims of Bosnia. The UN has played a convenient proxy legitimising the colonisation which underpins US foreign policy. It did this when it initiated the division of Indonesia, and it does this through the imposition of punitive sanctions upon Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Afghanistan. She has destroyed Iraq, her target being the people and not Saddam. So harsh is the sanctions regime that pencils and soap are classed under prohibited items for sending to Iraq, under the lie of ‘weapons of mass destruction’.

The reality of the UN clearly illustrates that it exists contrary to our interests. This will not change as it was set up for this objective. Is there any reason therefore for any Muslim country to be a part of this corrupt institution which enforces and maintains a world order subservient to our values and our Deen.

Allah (Subhanahu Wa’tala) warns us in numerous Ayaat of the dangers of the judgement of taghut, and the mischief of the false promises of Shaytan. How can we dare to seek to accommodate Kufr although the truth has been made manifest?

ζσασδ νσΜϊΪσασ Ηααψευ αφαϊίσΗέφΡφνδσ Ϊσασμ ΗαϊγυΔϊγφδφνδσ ΣσΘφναΗπ

“And never will Allah grant to the unbelievers a way (to triumph) over the believers” [TMQ 4:141]

Γσασγϊ ΚσΡσ Εφασμ ΗαψσΠφνδσ νσϊΪυγυζδσ Γσδψσευγϊ ΒγσδυζΗϊ ΘφγσΗ Γυδφασ Εφασνϊίσ ζσγσΗ Γυδφασ γφδ ήσΘϊαφίσ νυΡφνΟυζδσ Γσδ νσΚσΝσΗίσγυζΗϊ Εφασμ ΗαΨψσΗΫυζΚφ ζσήσΟϊ ΓυγφΡυζΗϊ Γσδ νσίϊέυΡυζΗϊ Θφεφ ζσνυΡφνΟυ ΗαΤψσνϊΨσΗδυ Γσδ νυΦφαψσευγϊ ΦσαΗσαΗπ ΘσΪφνΟπΗ

“Have you seen those (hypocrites) who claim they believe in that which has been sent down to you, and that which has been sent down to those before you, and they wish to go to judgement to the Taghut (false authorities), while they have been commanded to reject them” [TMQ An-Nisa:60]

In addition, Allah (Subhanahu Wa ta’ala) says:

Εφδψσ ΗαΤψσνϊΨσΗδσ ασίυγϊ ΪσΟυζψρ έσΗΚψσΞφΠυζευ ΪσΟυζψπΗ

“Behold! Satan is your enemy! So, treat him as an enemy.” [TMQ 35:6]

Bearing in mind the reality of the UN and the Hukm (rule) of Allah (Subhanahu Wa ta’ala) how can we seek to become a part of it.

Reaping the rotten fruits of futility

The Taliban sought to gain recognition from the US and campaigned to occupy Afghanistan’s UN seat.

Mullah Omar was asked what he perceived to be the solution for the occupation of Kashmir, he answered:

“The UN has passed many resolutions guaranteeing the Kashmiri people the right to self-determination. If these decisions were to be implemented, the problem would be solved. The Muslims of Kashmir have the right to be free, and this freedom must be given to them. And in that, there is benefit for both India and Pakistan”.

Surely advocating the UN as a means by which to solve the problems of the Muslims is not allowed, allowing them the authority over our lands in any way is a means by which the Kuffar can monopolise their stranglehold over Islamic land. This is akin to inviting the fox to guard the chicken pen.

Maulavi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Taliban in a letter to UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan called on the UN seat to be given to the IEA, which controlled ‘95% of the land of Afghanistan’, he argued that Rabbani did not deserve to be recognized as the representative to the UN whilst he controlled barely 5% of Afghanistan. He wrote:

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) demands the United Nation once again to give the seat of Afghanistan at the UN to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and not to give invitation to the enemies of the people of Afghanistan to participate in this organization.

This message was echoed in much of the correspondence between the Muttawakkil and Kofi Annan.

Maulawi Abdul Wahab, the then head of the IEA New York Office in an interview in 1998 said:

As one of the oldest members of the world body (UN), the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan respects and adheres to all rules and principles ratified by the UN, provided they do not contradict the teachings of the Islamic Shariah.

The fact was and remains that the very basis and therefore the actions of the UN contradict Islam. Therefore, it was folly ever to try and join the ‘international community’.

The Taliban were not naοve to believe that the UN (US) would allow the Taliban alone to head an internationally recognised government, they voiced this realisation on many occasions yet they chased after something which they knew they wouldn’t be given.

“The United Nations has become politicised…they want a secular government in Afghanistan, and until that secular government comes along, they won’t grant recognition.”

This was recognised by Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, the IEA representative at the Taliban’s New York mission in New York in January 2000. By that time it was too late to turn back, the UN had a stranglehold over the country and was setting itself as the impartial arbiter in reconciling the Taliban with the Northern Alliance.

And Allah (Subhanahu Wa ta’ala) says:

ζσΕφΠσΗ ήφνασ ασευγϊ αΗσ ΚυέϊΣφΟυζΗϊ έφν ΗαΓσΡϊΦφ ήσΗαυζΗϊ ΕφδψσγσΗ δσΝϊδυ γυΥϊαφΝυζδσ ΓσαΗ Εφδψσευγϊ ευγυ ΗαϊγυέϊΣφΟυζδσ ζσασάίφδ αΗψσ νσΤϊΪυΡυζδσ

“And when it is said unto them make not mischief on earth, they say we are only peacemakers. Are they not indeed the mischief makers? But they perceive not.” (TMQ: al-Baqara 2:11-12)

The last two articles in this series will paint a clear picture of the shape of the Khilafah ruling system. Firstly by showing that the Islamic state is not a police state and secondly how the Khilafah will deal with future problems related to its relationship with the Muslim and non-Muslim countries.

Yusuf Patel
Khilafah.com Journal
07 May 2002

Source: Khilafah.com

Did Islam fail in Afghanistan? Part Four

uploaded 01 Jul 2002

The Western Nations heralded the fall of Taliban to a joyous fanfare. Viewing it as the triumphing of good over evil, liberation was at hand. The truth in many ways clouded over by the mainstream media is more stark and devastating. Breaking through the fantasy one can conclude the future to be a bleak one, the Red army left over 10 years ago, but Afghanistan remains occupied by powers who desire anything but good for its people. In the Fourth part to this series of articles on the Taliban, a focus is placed on the Loya Jirga as an illustration of the continued occupation of Afghanistan.

Loya Jirga

Lights, Camera, Action! The subject for this well known movie phrase does not correspond with an exploration of Hollywood, although a study of this shallow and deceitful industry would dredge up much more truth and honesty than was accorded by the charade that was the Loya Jirga. So deceitful was this lesson in ‘democracy’, it was more accurate to call it the Lawyer Jirga, for it would have taken the greatest legal minds to justify such a false process. So fixed was the result, one would be excused for believing FIFA was involved. The US had planned the result, using the warlords who had consigned Afghanistan to the position of a material prize to be fought over no matter the cost.

The Loya Jirga was meant to signify a representative tribal gathering to decide the future make up of the transitional government. The procedural rules provided for two-thirds of the 1,500 member grand council to be ‘chosen’ via a system of election. Hamid Karzai’s administration was given 53 seats, whilst women were earmarked for 160 seats. All delegates were required to accept the Bonn Agreement, an individual could be disqualified if it were proved that they took part in illegal activities, including ‘human rights abuses’, looting, raping etc. This should have automatically disqualified most of the warlords who were America’s tool to remove the Taliban and were the main backers of Karzai’s interim administration. It seems that these people were given special permission to bypass the predetermined criteria. It is known to all that these warlords have terrorised, raped, looted, demolished property and killed.

Larry Goodson, an associate professor of international studies at Bentley College in Waltham, Massachusetts concluded that the Loya Jirga was a means by which to publicise a pre-determined result.

“The loya jirga is really something that is a facade of decision-making, but it really is a sense of ratification of prior decisions by leaders or smaller groups”.

The leaders are those previously mentioned, the warlords who have literally destroyed Afghanistan, and they have been foisted on the people through the backing of the US.

The American backed Bonn Agreement determined the Loya Jirga as the process by which the political future would be resolved. In effect the Warlords who were prominent within the interim administration foisted upon the people their own men who in turn chose delegates to the Loya Jirga. Reports of coercion and threats by warlords were widely reported but not investigated, election observers were drafted to ensure that the process was ‘free and fair’, but their presence did not achieve this as the Warlords convinced the populace of the temporary nature of their stay, as opposed to the permanence of the Warlords and ability to punish those who failed to comply. The perception rightly justified by the populace gave the Warlords the backing of the US military machine, if they formed an obstacle, the B-52 bombers would be sent in to enact retribution, just as was done with the Taliban.

Under such a veil of fear, it was not unsurprising that Hamid Karzai was elected as President for the crucial 18 months after which a National ‘Election’ will be convened. What was clear to all was that any serious opposition was strong armed or sweet talked as long as it cleared the way for Karzai. Many of the Non- Panjshiri Tajiks were worried by their disproportionate control in Karzai’s interim administration, where they controlled the defence, interior and foreign affairs portfolios as well as running the newly established Intelligence department. They had exacerbated disquiet by their vocal support for Karzai and continuance of the cabinet. Yunus Qanooni, the leader of the Northern Alliance resigned shortly before the convening of the Loya Jirga, he gave a cryptic speech in which he praised the sacrifices of Ahmed Shah-Massoud who was assassinated in September, he called for sacrifices to be made by all including himself, his resignation was seen as a concession to secure Karzai’s position, and a ‘sacrifice’ he had not decided to take without prompting from outside forces. The animosity amongst Non-Panjshiri Tajiks brought out the insecurity which was a mainstay of Afghan society, rivalry drawn down tribal lines was in the past a source of great conflict and this hasn’t changed. Non-Panjshiri Tajiks pushed ex-King Zahir Shah to stand against Karzai, the rumour alone filled the US officials with dread. He would have secured the support of elements as diverse as the Pashtun, Uzbeks under the leadership Abdul Rasid Dostam, delegates from Herat and the Hazarahs amongst other groupings averse to Tajik dominance over the army, the police, the state run media, and the intelligence service.

This was until the former King was strong-armed into withdrawing, it was even said that he did not know of his decision before US officials. Zilmay Khalilzad, Bush’s advisor on Afghanistan and current Ambassador organised a press conference at Zahir Shah’s reseidence and by all accounts this forced him into supporting Karzai.

A diplomat in Kabul said, “Khalilzad had the most important role in this agreement between the King and Karzai. He has forced everyone into accepting this deal.”

An aide to the former king told EurasiaNet, “We had been sitting at the Loya Jirga, then a few ministers came to us and said ’don’t worry about voting, His majesty has endorsed Mr. Karzai,’ it would be announced today.”

The feeling that outside powers had imposed a deal led many to question the legitimacy of the Loya Jirga, and rightly so.
Mohammed Hassan Kakar, a historian from eastern Afghanistan, “There has been an outpouring of feelings for him [Zahir Shah], and a feeling that Karzai has abandoned his principles and the king because of pressure from the Northern Alliance and the [warlords]. It seems the power is not with the people but behind the scenes.”
Abdul Aziz, an ethnic Uzbek delegate left the proceedings feeling as though the Loya was a talking shop which masked the fact that the decision had already been made, the proceedings were meant only to rubber stamp what had already been imposed.
“This was not a free loya jirga, because all the commanders and governors sat in the front and did not give others a chance…there were two poles, north and south. We could speak together, but we could never agree on anything.”
From such proceedings we can extrapolate a general concept about elections in the Muslims countries, which are public spectacles used as a means to provide legitimacy for the rulers who acquired their rule through the patronage of the West. Elections have been used by America and the Western nations in Pakistan to secure Musharraf’s position in order that he is able to carry out US plans. In Uzbekistan it was used to cloak the tyrannical regime of Islam Karimov, who gained a landslide when the candidate who stood against him was revealed to be a plant who openly declared he would be voting for the incumbent, Karimov and urged others to do the same. After the Tunisian elections, Zain Al-Abideen was pronounced leader for life after a change in the constitution. The founder of the Ford Motor Company once offered a deal to his customers which matches Democratic politics in its blatant deception, “The Customer Can Have Any Color He Wants So Long As It’s Black”. Western Democracy which is the beautiful window dressing for Capitalism provides the same illusory promises. At least in the West one can choose drones of varying characters, in the Islamic lands, the system and its rulers are foisted upon the people, without choice.
An illustration of this was found by the discussion which occupied the discussions in the Loya Jirga for several hours, and that was whether the word ‘Islamic’ should be added to the title of the transitional government. It was a reminder of what occurred in terms of disgrace upon this Islamic Ummah in the early part of the last century, where conferences were held to decide whether to name a representative body for the Muslims of Arab origin, the ‘Islamic’ league or the ‘Arab’ league, the label belied the true nature of such an institution. It was pre-determined that such a body would be a colonialist tool to enslave the Islamic Ummah and divert her from the fact that her Khilafah had been destroyed. The Loya Jirga was not solely a diversion, but history will only too well record that this body was a tool by which to annihilate any traces of Islam from the country.
The Bonn agreement which laid down the shape of Afghanistan’s future ensures that it will remain an American protectorate for years to come. Some participants in the Loya Jirga proposed that America should leave, this is not going to happen, America has promised that she will remain indefinitely, even after the bogeymen of Al-Qaeda and the Taleban have been declared ‘wiped out’, if ever such a mythical situation could occur.

Tribal tribulations

Afghanistan has been torn apart by tribal differences. The Loya Jirga showed that the potential for such tribal differences remains, conflict is a natural off shoot of this, the exuberance of the removal of the Taliban by the Northern alliance is beginning to wain as the realisation of Afghanistan’s future direction becomes apparent, and this has caused insecurity amongst elements who believe the power is being monopolised by tribes who seek retribution for past differences. Violence against individuals of Pashtun origin has increased, as power has shifted to the Panjshiri Tajiks. Unification of peoples of differing tribes cannot be accentuated whilst their only strong commonality is drowned, they are Muslims who have been manipulated by traitors and warlords, the same people who acted as America’s stooges against the Taliban are the same people who killed, tortured and raped. The anxiety of such times were brought up in the Loya Jirga by one delegate who recounted how a decade ago a young girl had committed suicide because she feared being raped, her mother followed her in the same action. When Women are asked on the streets of Kabul why they fear to remove their ‘Burqa’, they answer with the same fear which drove the young girl from jumping from her apartment building in Kabul. The West believe pumping money and propaganda into Afghanistan will wipe out crime and the simmering tribal tensions.

It is only Islam that has been able to unify the people together, destroying blind allegiance to tribe or nation and replacing that with a bond which transcends such superficial differences. It is a Deen which when applied managed to unite peoples of different nations, tribes, colours, languages who possessed different traditions, but who accepted Islam as their Deen, and provided security for those who chose not to embrace Islam but lived under its system.

This unity stems from the realisation that Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) is the creator of everyone, and He (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) did not create the Ghilzai Pashtun inherently superior to the Durrani Pashtun, or a natural superiority of the Uzbek over the Panjshiri Tajik or the Hazara.
The Afghani people must discard this hateful racism. He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam)said:
ليس منا من دعا إلى عصبية
“He is not from us the one who calls for tribalism,”
and he (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said:
ما بال دعوى الجاهلية، دعوها فإنها منتنة
“What is this da’wah of jaahiliyyah! Leave it for it is rotten.”
Also Allah (exalted and blessed be He) said:
إن أكرمكم عند الله أتقاكم
“Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has Taqwa” [TMQ Al-Hujurat: 13].
The Afghani people do not believe in anything other than Islam as a system for their daily life and as a way of life. It is futile to forcibly introduce the western culture and the imported Kafir American system. This will incur nothing but the wrath of Allah (Subhanahu wa ta’ala) and more chaos, disturbance, civil war and the spilling of innocent and pure blood. It is incumbent on the Muslim people of Afghanistan, especially the people of influence (ahlul halli wal ‘aqd), the people whose opinion and consultation is sought, to hold on to their Islam whatever sacrifices this may entail. They should not accept any other constitution for the country. There is no place for a Kufr constitution for the Muslims whether it is democracy or international conventions and other such which Allah (Subhanahu Wa ta’ala) did not sanction.
The Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) left behind a clear path for those who seek to please Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala):
تركت فيكم أمرين لن تضلوا ما إن تمسكتم بهما كتاب الله وسنتي
“I left you two things which, if you hold onto, you will never go astray; the Book of Allah and my Sunnah,”
and he (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said:

تركتكم على المحجّة البيضاء ليلُها كنهارها، لا يزيغ عنها إلاّ هالك
“I leave you upon the resplendent path whose night is like the day, from which no one deviates except the one who will perish.”
It would not have been possible for America to have militarily, politically, economically and Socially controlled the US to fulfil her dastardly plans had it not been for the conspiracy of some Tajik, Uzbek and Pashtun leaders who sold themselves to America. In managing through their alliance with America -the enemy of Islam and the Muslims- to overcome their Muslim Afghan brothers, they have opened the doors of Afghanistan from all sides, by their disgraceful action, to the foreign influence and they enabled America to re-impose her control upon them after they had got rid of her. They have opened the gates to the forces of the Kafir states to occupy them. The Afghani people suffered from racial divisions before the war, and after the war they have continued to suffer from racial divisions, direct foreign Kafir control and occupation by the foreign Kafir forces. If the Afghani people discard their abhorrent racial divisions, remove the leaders who have allied with America and they hold onto Islam, then the victory will be on their side, by the permission of Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala).
He (Subhanahu Wa ta’ala) said:

وكان حقاً علينا نصر المؤمنين

“And (as for) the believers it was incumbent upon Us to help them” [TMQ Ar-Rum: 47].
The Final part of this series will seek to build an understanding of the future Islamic State, will it be technologically, economically and politically backward as a matter of principle? How will it seek to engage in the World? What should its relationship be with the Muslim countries and Western nations? How will it take the fight to the West on an intellectual level, in order to expose its thoughts, actions, institutions and character?

Yusuf Patel
Political Correspondent
1 July, 2002

Source: Khilafah.com

Did Islam fail in Afghanistan Parts 5

In the last two articles in this series of articles the spotlight is placed upon the vocal attacks against the Islamic system of justice focussing upon the common intellectual attacks in order to clarify the matter, and in order to ensure the Islamic Ummah is able to discern the straight from the crooked path. It is the western system of ruling over the affairs of man that needs to be placed on the dock, and that is what this lengthy explanation seeks to do.

Context of two-pronged attack on the Islamic Ruling System (The Khilafah)

Since September 11, two forms of attack were accelerated against the Islamic Ummah:

1. Physical Attack: Which took the form of military attack both launched straight away such as against Afghanistan and the intention to attack others was declared, such as the recent calls to attack Iraq.

2. Intellectual Attack: This is always the less open attack, and therefore the most dangerous.This is the attack that I will Insha Allah focus upon. A number of attacks have been levelled against the Muslims since September 11.

A large number of which focused upon the ability of Islam to solve contemporary problems built around the false premise that the application of Islam upon a society leads to inevitable conflicts, oppression of Women, technological backwardness and cannot be applied upon Non-Muslims.

As mentioned in the first article in the series, James Rubin, the former assistant secretary of state under Clinton wrote in an article in the Independent on Sunday:

We must send a clear and simple message to the Muslim world. If Osama bin Laden’s vision were achieved, all of the Islamic world would look like Afghanistan under the Taliban. Do you really want to live in Bin Laden Land, a Stone Age Islamic caliphate with no rights, no economy and no future? [The Independent on Sunday 14 October 2001]

When applied upon a people, Islam would lead society to economic, political stagnation, the state would have to be ruled by the iron fist to stop the people from rebelling, in the picture painted so vividly by James Rubin.

Also, Tariq Ali, born a Muslim but adopted Troskyism (Communism according to the sacred tenets of Leon Trotsky) whilst studying at Oxford described Islam ‘as a stagnant, backward-looking and disastrously factionalized culture badly in need of its own Reformation’. [The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity]

The self-proclaimed Trotskyist argues that the Muslims need to seriously look to reforming Islam, updating it to fit the modern realities of the twenty-first Century.

Just as Microsoft updates its operating system in order to fit with the needs of its consumers, easily shifting from Windows 3.1 to Windows 95, 98, 2000 to Windows XP, Islam needs to follow the same course in reality to become palatable to the tastes of the West

The Italian PM Berlusconi said, “We must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect for religious and political rights”.

Mr Berlusconi well known for his financial probity and business ethics, in a statement reminiscent of Fukuyama trumpets the superiority of Western Civilisation, which stands at odds with the ‘Islamic Countries’ which he erroneously describes as the carriers and guardians of Islam.

It is very easy in this post 9-11 world for the West to celebrate the end of History with the claim that the Capitalist System represents the pinnacle of human history.

Surely bringing back the Khilafah (Caliphate) is an endeavour doomed to failure, hasn’t the ‘Islamic experiment’ failed in Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan?

All of these countries to one degree or another sought rapprochement with the West which ultimately led them to be dependent upon the West to varying degrees.

A number of these acts of intellectual slander have been levied upon the Islamic Ruling System, (the Khilafah) by the Western nations which hope by portraying Islam as a backward culture, it would deter the Muslims from working towards its re-establishment.

It is important in this context to peel away the layers of such lies as well as to show the uniqueness and superiority of the Islamic Ruling system, whilst refraining from taking such a defensive stance with regards Islam, so as to change its intrinsic nature as laid down by Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) through his beloved Rasool (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam).

It is also important to take the intellectual attacks back to the West.

Why should we be on the defensive concerning Islam, when we can all witness the rotten fruits of Western Civilisation on a daily basis.

A number of specific attacks include the following:

1. The Islamic Ruling system is a dictatorship.
2. Islam subjugates Women.
3. The Islamic State is a Police State
4. Islam stunts technological progress
5. Islam cannot be applied on Non-Muslims – Islam spread by the sword.

It is essential for the Islamic Ummah to realise the danger in trying to distort Islam or to dilute its true essence, Islam is a trust upon the shoulders of its guardians whose responsibility once evaluated will lead either to happiness or profound regret depending upon how this responsibility was discharged, this will be felt on the Day of Hashr (accountability).

1. The Islamic Ruling system is a dictatorship.

“The future of Islam lies with democracy and freedom. [Iran] where a real democracy is taking shape with [President] Ayatollah Mohamad Khatami could set a model for an Islamic state…One has to free Islam from decadence, from the Taliban, from damaging beliefs inherited from our ancestors, from those who, for example, say that Islam is against democracy, against the freedom of women, against arts, against free elections, against dialogue between civilisations…against those who pretend that because we are Muslims, we must invade others and impose our faith upon the whole world.”

-Rashed Ghannoushi, (exiled leader of the Tunisian outlawed “Al-Da’wa” Party) in an interview titled ‘Freeing Islam from the Taliban’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 1 – 7 October 1998.)

The mistaken logical assumptions of those who claim Islam to be in harmony with Democracy fall into two distinct traps.

A Misapplication of the rule of opposites linked to a profound failure to comprehend the reality of Democracy. If the Islamic State is not democratic it must be a tyrannical dictatorship. It certainly does not fit comfortably with the framework of dictatorial rule therefore it must be democratic, right? Wrong. Such logical deductions fail to comprehend the fact that it can be – and is in actuality – at odds with the essence of Democratic rule. The Democratic system is built around the premise that the people are the Source of all laws, they must decide how their lives are governed, this places man in the drivers seat in deciding how life should be organised in terms or rules and laws.
From the point of view of Islam Allah (Subhanhu Wa Ta’aala) is the creator and legislator, he defines how we must live our lives and not man. This does not mean the Islamic system is a dictatorship.

What about elections?

Elections are a style permitted by the Shar’ah in principle. Within the Khilafah state it is a permitted means by which to elect a Khaleefah for the Muslims, and to elect representatives to the Majlis Al-Ummah (The Peoples Assembly) which will decide matters related to the implementation of some practical issues related to domestic matters in ruling, education, health, trading, industry, farming and the like, it has full powers to account the rulers within the Khilafah, and it has the right to voice discontent of Waalis (Governors), which the Khaleefah is bound by, and has to remove them if demanded by the Majlis.

Democracy utilises the style of elections in order to choose representatives who in turn legislate rules and laws for the people. The fact that the Islamic Ruling System and Democracy utilise the style of elections should not be a means by which to infer a similarity, the objective behind the utilisation of such a style is completely different.

The Khaleefah must be selected by consent and not by force, If a Khaleefah takes power without consent he would be classed as a Mutasallit (Usurper) and his immediate removal is obliged upon the Ummah as it is classed as a Munkar (evil).

Al-Bukhari reported on the authority of Ibn Abbas who said:

“… Abdur-Rahman came to me and said, “Would that you had seen the man who came today to the Chief of the Believers (‘Umar), saying, ‘O Chief of the Believers! What do you think about so-and-so who says, ‘If ‘Umar should die, I will give the pledge of allegiance to such-and-such person…

‘Umar became angry and then said, ‘Allah willing, I will stand before the people tonight and warn them against those people who want to deprive the others of their rights (the question of rulership).”

This happened during the Haj season, Abdur-Rahman convinced him that he should delay his speech until he arrives to Medina. Umar having arrived in Madina addressed the people with the following words:

(O people!) I have been informed that a speaker amongst you says, ‘By Allah, if ‘Umar should die, I will give the pledge of allegiance to such-and-such person.’ …. Remember that whoever gives the pledge of allegiance to anybody among you without consulting the other Muslims, neither that person, nor the person to whom the pledge of allegiance was given, are to be supported, lest they both should be killed. [Part of a long account narrated in Bukhari, see book of Hudood in Fath Al-Bari, vol. 12, p 174-191]

Umar made clear to the people that the leader cannot be imposed by force, and if he is he ought to be killed, as it is the taking of a right away from the people acknowledged by the Ahkam Shar’iah as such.

Due to the public nature of the address, and the speaking out against this practice, this counts as evidence as the Sahabah remained silent to it which is indicative of approval, therefore this counts as Ijma As-Sahabah (consensus of the companions).

Therefore the Bai’ah needs to be enacted by the majority and without coercion.

The Western Nations claim to adopt democracy, upholding it throughout the globe, and singing its praises at every given opportunity. Doesn’t the World’s leading nation claim to be the land of ‘Freedom and Democracy’ (…And Milk and Honey?). Let us look to their recent record.

In Florida, the home of the ‘pregnant chads’ (controversial voting papers not rate of illegitimate births), the Republican Party Machine disenfranchised 57,000 voters for the simple reason that they were proven Democratic Party voters, and coincidentally African-American. They were left off the voter lists purposefully under the pretext of criminal records which is a bar to voting in Florida, the simple fact is that none of the 57,000 African Americans had criminal records just voting records which the Republican Party saw as a hindrance to ‘stealing the presidency’. Indeed the Secretary of State for Florida, Katherine Harris who was the arbiter for the election and oversaw the election process was the Campaign chairwoman for Bush’s Presidential election campaign, no conflict of interest there!

This is unsurprising as America claims Democracy to be sacrosanct, but is more than willing to sacrifice it on the alter of interest. In April of this year, Hugo Chavez the ‘democratically elected’ leader of Venezuela was unseated by a Coup D’etat supported by the Bush Administration. It was the US State department which falsely claimed that Chavez had resigned, this was disseminated by all major US television Networks and Newspapers. The New York Times in an editorial openly supported the Coup plotters. The Paragon of US factual programming trusted as an unquestionable source of integrity by the US public justified the Coup on the basis that Chavez was a ‘nut’ and a ‘communist’ to boot, who was unpopular and a dictator.

The New York Times wrote, “Venezuelan democracy is no longer threatened by a would-be dictator…[because] the military intervened and handed power to a respected business leader.”

Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman for the State Department stated on April 12, 2002

“essential elements of democracy…have been weakened in recent months.”

Since Chavez was returned to power after two days, the evidence of planning by Washington traces complicity back several months before the Coup took place.

The US supported the overthrow of ‘democratically elected’ governments throughout its post-Second World War history. Although the corruption on the government of Nawaz Sharif was well known, the US supported the ousting of its ‘elected’ government by General Parvez Musharraf whose rigged Referendum campaign was welcomed by the same President who entered office through dubious means. The US supports a string of dictators and unelected thugs throughout the Islamic World, illustrating the subservience of sacred principles where US national interest collides. The Same applies to all Capitalist Nations to one degree or another, although the status of the US as principal hegemon makes her transgressions more pronounced.

2. Islam subjugates Women

What is it about a woman that is so repellently sexual that she must diminish herself into drab uniformity while strolling down Oxford Street one step behind a husband who is kitted out in razor-sharp Armani and gold, pomaded hair and tight bum exposed to lustful eyes? (No letters please from British women who have taken the veil and claim it’s liberating. It is their right in a tolerant society to wear anything including rubber fetishes – but that has nothing to do with the systematic cultural oppression of women with no choice.) [Polly Toynbee, The Guardian, September 28 2001]

Western academics, politicians, journalists and Feminists as well as their counterparts in the Muslim Countries seek to label Islam with labels such as Misogynist, oppressive and cruel as a slur on Islam’s treatment of Women. An often repeated stance of the Muslims is to take a defensive stand which is often tantamount to conceding the superiority of Capitalism in the treatment of women. Islam emanates from the creator who is in the best position to define the roles of both Men and Women. The present Capitalist system in the West has failed to truly define the role of either gender and has in the process popularised ‘the war of the sexes’, to the extent that Women are led to believe success translates into career, to the level that motherhood is almost frowned upon. A Woman has not achieved ‘life’s goals’ unless she has had a career. Governments often send cross signals by offering incentives to have children and then childcare policies which encourage the parents to leave the child with a stranger whilst the parents are at work, thereby consigning the formative years of a child to a paid employee.

Any system primarily educates via its popular mediums, the popular mediums in the west are the Television and magazines/Newspapers. They disseminate the ideas which mould general behaviour. The disproportionate depiction of Women as objects of Sexual desire elevate the base desires. Women have to therefore conform to the image pre-determined for them on the whole by Men. The impact of these ideas so closely associated with the general acceptance of Freedom cause severe problems to the social fabric of society. A recent report commissioned by the Home Office in Britain determined that one in 20 Women have been victims of rape, and the majority of these rapes are inflicted by men who the victims knows, only 8% are raped by a stranger. In the Islamic Khilafah, the principle duties and rights are determined by the Legislator, Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala), and not by man. The Principal role of the woman is as a mother and a wife, although there is no bar to involvement in public life whether that be economic or political. She can work, but this cannot be at the expense of her duties to her husband and children. She can be a member of the Majlis Al-Ummah (The Peoples Assembly), a judge or a Civil Servant.

Firstly, Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) addressed Insan (Humankind) with obligations which will be subject to accountability on Yawm Al-Hashr (Day of Accountability). Both Man and Woman are equal in the sight of Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) inasmuch that they both possess the propensity to think and both are vital to achieve the continuation of the Human race.

Islam forbade the free-mixing between the sexes and prohibits Khulwa (Seclusion) which enables the crime of rape which pervades Western society to be conducted so easily. It also puts a halt to the dissemination of ideas of sexual freedom and imagery, it also honours the status of Women by not treating her as a commodity or a sexual instrument. Indeed the Khilafah system will seek to change the ideas which shape the relations between Men and Women, so that Marriage be the institution which binds them both together and nor promiscuous sexual encounters which lead to the cheapening of human interaction.

The crime statistics related to Women are an indictment upon the ‘guardians of freedom and democracy’.

• In the USA 1.3 women are raped every minute, this translates into 78 rapes each hour, 1872 rapes each day, 56160 rapes each month and 683,280 rapes per year (Statistics from the National Victim Centre, NVC)
• 1 out of every 3 American woman will be sexually assaulted in her lifetime (NVC)
• 1 in 4 college women have either been raped or suffered attempted rape (NVC)
• In 1998 there were 3,170,520 arrests of women, of which 272,073 were drug related (US State Department, 1999)
• A woman is beaten every 15 seconds by her partner, it happens at some time in 25%-35% of American homes (FBI)
• 77 women die from abusive partners every week, which is 4000 a year (FBI).
• The BBC reported that nearly 25% of women in the UK face domestic violence at some stage in their life. Police are called to an incident of domestic violence every 60 seconds and receive 1,300 calls each day related to this. Domestic violence kills two women each week in the UK.

  If we study the ultimate form of dishonour that a woman can experience, that of rape, we find shocking statistics illustrating the reality. In the US, a rape occurs every minute, and in the UK, one-third of women have been sexually abused by the age of 18. Also, there was a 500% increase in the reporting of rape between 1996 and 1997. In addition, the sentence for rape can be as low as 180 hours community service.

The final part will Insha Allah appear shortly.

Yusufpatel
09August 2002

Source: Khilafah.com

Did Islam fail in Afghanistan Part 6

In the last two articles in this series of articles the spotlight is placed upon the vocal attacks against the Islamic system of justice focussing upon the common intellectual attacks in order to clarify the matter, and in order to ensure the Islamic Ummah is able to discern the straight from the crooked path. It is the western system of ruling over the affairs of man that needs to be placed on the dock, and that is what this lengthy explanation seeks to do.

3. The Islamic State is a Police State

One of the accusations against the Islamic State, is that it would be a police state, where people will have to be forced to obey its laws, they would be whipped in the streets and live a life of fear to secure the existence of such an oppressive state.

Islam has forbidden the torturing and harming of people. Muslim narrated from Hisham b. Hakeem, who said:

Torturing and harming the people

“I bear witness that I heard the Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) say:

“Allah will punish those who punish the people in the Dunya.”

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) also said:

“There are two types of the people of Hellfire I have not seen yet: some people who have whips like the tails of oxes by which they flog the people”, narrated by Muslim from Abu Hurairah.

Islam has also forbidden the violation of people’s sanctities, dignity, funds and honour, and the dishonouring of the sanctity of their homes. The Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said:

“All things of a Muslim are inviolable for his brother in belief: his blood, his wealth and his honour”, from a Hadith narrated by Muslim on the authority of Abu Hurairah.

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) also said while making Tawaf around the Ka’aba:

“How splendid you look, and how sweet is your scent. How grand you are and how grand is your sanctity. By Whom in Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, the sanctity of the believer is greater to Allah than yours, (that is) his wealth and his blood, and not to think of him except good”, – narrated by Ibnu Majah on the authority of Ubaidullah b. Amru.

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) also said:

“Abusing the Muslim is an aggression and fighting him is disbelief”, narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim on the authority of Abdullah b. Mas’ood.

Spying on the people

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said regarding the sanctity of the houses:

“If a person were to cast a glance in your house without permission and you hit him with a stone and thus gouged out his eyes, there would be no blame on you”, narrated by Muslim from Abu Hurairah.

It has been reported on the authority of Sahl Ibnu Sa’ad Al-Sa’idi that a man once peeped through the hole of the door of the Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam), the Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) was at the time scratching his head with a fork.

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said: “If I were to know that you had been peeping through the door, I would have thrust this into your eyes. Indeed seeking permission was made to protect against the glance”, narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim.

He (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) also said:

“He who peeps into some people’s house without their permission, it is allowed for them to gouge out his eye”, narrated by Ahmed from Abu Hurairah.

Islam has also forbidden spying on the Muslims, watching them, chasing them and looking into their confidential and personal news. It has also forbidden the Muslim from being a spy on other Muslims. Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) says:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اجْتَنِبُوا كَثِيراً مِّنَ الظَّنِّ إِنَّ بَعْضَ الظَّنِّ إِثْمٌ وَلَا تَجَسَّسُوا
“O you who believe, avoid suspicion as much as possible, for suspicion in some cases is a sin, and do not spy on each other.” [Al-Hujurat: 12]

The Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said:

“Avoid suspicion, for suspicion is the gravest lie in talk, and do not be inquisitive about one another and do not spy on one another, and do not turn one’s back to each other, do not hate each other, and be servants to Allah and be brothers”, narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim from Abu Hurairah.

And he (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) also said:

“O you people who believed with your tongue, and Iman has not yet entered your hearts, do not backbite the Muslims, and do not search for their weaknesses. For he who sought the Awras (the defects) of the Muslims Allah would follow his, and he whom Allah follows his Awra (defect), He would also expose him even in his own home”, narrated by Ahmad from Abu Barza Al-Aslami.

Islam forbade the spying, torture and the indiscriminate whipping in the streets, this is rather the speciality of America’s unsavoury partners in the ‘war on terror’. Countries such as Egypt, Syria and Uzbekistan spend vast amounts of money in spying on its own people through the Mukhabarat (security services) – imprisoning individuals deemed threats to the state, using torture to extract information, detaining them without trial or charge. In Uzbekistan more often than not the last time a family will see their father, mother, son, daughter is in a coffin delivered to them after they have been killed by the State. It is America that claims to uphold Human Rights, yet she is more than willing to turn a blind eye when the violators are its own allies/puppets. Human Rights is like the Desert mirage, seemingly impressive when viewed from afar, but empty when scrutinised.

4. Islam stunts technological progress

A writer in the International Herald Tribune wrote, “Islamic society, the West’s equal at the time of the European Renaissance, failed to make the transition to a modern society…Islam since 1914 has failed to make a serious intellectual response to the modern West. Culture and intelligence, not power, decide the quality of societies.”

The Muslims throughout the history of the Khilafah excelled in science and technology, but they reached a point in time whereby the West’s renaissance was so visible and posed such a challenge they were unable to meet the challenge in a credible manner. Those who espoused secularism and were enamoured with the Western way of life claimed this reality to be evidence that Islam was holding back ‘progress’.

There is a difference between the hadharah (civilisation) and the madaniyah (material progress), the distinction between the two caused severe problems for the Muslims of the past and still plagues the minds of the modernists who mistakenly assert Islam is not able to solve new problems.

Hadharah – The Civilisational aspects of any nation determine the shape of any society. These are the embodiment of the ideas which answer – rightly or wrongly – the viewpoint of life. Whether it be Capitalism which side steps the existence of the creator be leaving this as a personal issue, whilst ensuring man is arbiter for good and bad in life and society (secularism).

Madanniyya – This refers to the universal technological and scientific discoveries that do not directly emanate from the Capitalist or any other foreign foundation. This means technological discoveries such as the printing press and the telephone which were outlawed by the Uthmaniyya Khilafah due to the misunderstanding of their nature at the turn of the last century were incorrect stances to take towards technology which is universal. These are aspects of progress which do not stem a particular way of viewing life.

Islam never held the Muslims back in seeking technological and scientific progress, the Islamic History testifies to this. A cursory glance on the period in which Islam was applied practically in society was even by the standards of Western Academics ‘a golden era’. This highlights the fact that Islam never caused the Muslims to lag behind, it was only when Islam was divorced from life and secular law was applied upon the Islamic lands, carved up after the First World War colonial gold rush did they fall behind in all areas of life through leaders subservient and dependent upon the West in all realms of life.

5. Islam cannot be applied on Non-Muslims – Treatment of Non-Muslims, Islam spread by the sword

It is argued by those who are devoid of original thought that all conflict stems from religion. Such a blanket statement means that the application of Islam upon a people is an impossibility which if tried leads to severe conflict. How can Islam be applied upon Non-Muslims? surely the application of Islam is built upon the prerequisite of the governed being Muslim? This stems from a misunderstanding of Islam, of course Islam is a complete way of life revealed by the creator, Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala), who gave man the practical tools to reach the truth – The Aqal (The Thinking Mind). Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) legislated that nobody should be forced to accept the Aqeeda of Islam, but this does not mean that non-Muslims cannot live under the system of Islam.

Indeed the Message of Islam is universal and its system of laws and regulation are just as valid upon the non-Muslim as it is upon the Muslim, this is because the application of such laws is not preconditioned upon the acceptance of the Islamic basis i.e. accepting Islam as a belief system, as these laws are practical solutions to societal problems. This is different from forcing a non-Muslim to Pray the Salah (prayer) or the Siyam (fasting), as these are pre-conditioned upon the acceptance of Islam as the Islamic basis therefore making that individual a Muslim – as forcing an individual to accept Islam his/her religion is forbidden this is not included in a discussion of Non-Muslims living under the system of Islam in the Khilafah State.

Islam grants non-Muslims who hold citizenship, the full rights and duties that Muslims have. They enjoy the same equality before the law as Muslims and are subject to the same accountability as them. Furthermore, every single citizen, whether they be a Christian, Jew, Hindu, Sikh or an Atheist enjoys rights that even a Muslim living abroad who holds no citizenship does not enjoy.

Indeed the Messenger (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) forbade in the strongest terms possible the harming of the Ahl-Dhimma (People of contract, the non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic State).

The Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam) said,

“He who harms a person under covenant, or charged him more than he can, I will argue against him on the Day of Judgement”, narrated by Yahya b. Adam in the book of Al-Kharaaj.

‘Umar bin Khattab (Radillahu Anhu), the second Khaleefah of the Muslims said,

“I recommend to the Khaleefah after me to be good with those who are under the protection of the Messenger of Allah (Sallallahu Alaihi Wasallam), he has to fulfil to them their covenant (oath), to fight for protecting them and to not be charged more than they can afford”, reported by Yahya b. Adam.

Imam Qarafi also summed up the responsibility of the State to the dhimmi when he said:

“It is the responsibility of the Muslims to the People of the Dhimma to care for their weak, fulfil the needs of the poor, feed the hungry, provide clothes, address them politely, and even tolerate their harm even if it was from a neighbour, even though the Muslim would have an upper hand. The Muslims must also advise them sincerely on their affairs and protect them against anyone who tries to hurt them or their family, steal their wealth, or violates their rights.”

The greatest lie that has been written and assumed to be a fact in the annals of human history is that Muslims spread Islam by the sword. Islam forbade the forced propagation of the Islamic Aqeeda.

Christian missionary, T.W. Arnold in his book ‘The Preaching of Islam’, clarified this myth when he wrote “…of any organized attempt to force the acceptance of Islam on the non-Muslim population, or of any systematic persecution intended to stamp out the Christian religion, we hear nothing. Had the caliphs chosen to adopt either course of action, they might have swept away Christianity as easily as Ferdinand and Isabella drove Islam out of Spain…”

Also, historian De Lacy O’ Leary wrote:“History makes it clear, however, that the legend of fanatical Muslims sweeping through the world and forcing Islam at the point of the sword upon conquered races is one of the most fantastically absurd myths that historians have ever accepted.” (Islam at the Crossroads, London, 1923, p. 8.).

Therefore we can discount such fantasies, being the product of orientalist propaganda fuelled by a perverse want to legitimise the crusades and stop the ‘onward march of the rampaging Arab infidels’.

Due to the strength of Islam as an idea, as a result of its divine origins, there is no need to force people to accept its creed, for when they witness and live under a system which regulates the affairs of humankind, dispensing justice and tackling problems which exist throughout the world without seeking to economically and politically subjugate and colonise populations, they will ‘enter Islam in crowds’.

Also Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) has endowed the human being with the discerning mind and provided His signs manifest in Man, Life and the universe, from the complexity of the human body, the sophistication of the animal kingdom, to the wondrous spectacle of star constellations and the alignment of planets. In everything we witness order, and such order requires organisation. The one who organises must possess attributes not present in the creation, such as the qualities of perfection, eternity and infiniteness. The principles such as cause and effect establishes that this order stems from a creator without whose existence disorder and chaos would manifest itself over the natural universe, and in this case the existence of life on earth and in the universe could not be explained away as mere chance.

Islam looks upon the subjects under its authority from a purely human viewpoint, regardless of the sect, race, or sex. The ruling policies designed for them would be founded on this basis, so that the ruling is for the benefit of humanity, thereby taking the people out of the darkness into the light. The citizens are thus equal in terms of rights and duties related to the human in his capacity as a human, as far as the implementation of the divine rules on everyone is concerned. When the judge settles the disputes and when the rulers rule, they do not differentiate between people, they treat them as equals in their quality as citizens and nothing else. This is because Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) has addressed all people with Islam in their quality as humans and nothing else. He (Subhanhu Wa Ta’aala) says:

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ قَدْ جَاءَكُمْ بُرْهَانٌ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ وَأَنزَلْنَا إِلَيْكُمْ نُورًا مُبِينًا

“O you people, a proof has come to you from your Lord, and we have revealed to you a shining light.” [TMQ An-Nisa’a: 174]

And He (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) also says:

قُلْ يَاأَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنِّي رَسُولُ اللَّهِ إِلَيْكُمْ

“O you people, I am the Messenger of Allah sent to all of you.” [TMQ Al-A'raf: 157]

The scholars have agreed, especially the scholars of Usul (foundations), that the divine rules are addressed to every sane person able to understand the speech, whether he is Muslim or not, male or female.

Therefore the basis for calling peoples to Islam and/or to live under its System is founded upon a divine obligation that all of humanity should be invited to truth, in essence brought out of the darkness of organising life’s relationships by other than what Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala) revealed – under the light of Islam.

T.W. Arnold goes on to explain this when he writes “…the treatment of their Christian subjects by the Ottoman emperors (Khulafaa) at least for two centuries after their conquest of Greece-exhibits a toleration such as was at that time quite unknown in the rest of Europe. The Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania, and the Unitarians of the latter country, long preferred to submit to the Turks rather than fall into the hands of the fanatical house of Hapsburg; and the Protestants of Silesia looked with longing eyes towards Turkey, and would gladly have purchased freedom at the price of submission to the Muslim rule…the Cossacks who belonged to the sect of the Old Believers and were persecuted by the Russian State Church, found in the dominions of the Sultan the toleration which their Christian brethren denied them.”

The Non-Muslims are allowed to practice their religions in the Khilafah, to the extent that the Khaleefah is obliged to set courts for Non-Muslims that will deal by their religious texts on issues such as marriage and Divorce.

The World today yearns for a system to free them from the tired, stale solutions which have failed to deal with the manifest problems the world faces.

How we must react to such attacks

It is not allowed for the Muslims to present Islam in a manner contrary to its true reality in the hope of winning the pleasure of the disbelievers. Islam is a trust (amanah) on the necks of the Muslims and Allah (Subhanahu wa ta’aala) will account them for this trust on the Day of Judgement. Likewise, it is not right for the Muslims to abandon any part of Islam in order to save themselves from the pressure being placed upon them. This is because abandonment of a part is abandonment of the whole. If the Muslims hold onto their Deen then Allah (Subhanahu wa ta’ala) guarantees to increase their value and raise high their status, even in the sight of the disbelievers.

Asad Latif, a writer for the Straits Times wrote in an article following a discussion of the realities of the Islamic State as propagated by numerous Islamic groups and parties,

“Today, there are two possible paths ahead for Muslims. One is for them to expend political energy trying to set up an Islamic state in order to revive the umma in its pristine form. Their attempt will place them in a position of hostility with the non-Islamic world. The other path ahead is for Muslims to ponder the broader political message of their religion in a way that is applicable to them no matter what kind of state they inhabit.”

There are two paths, the path which obeys Allah’s commands and seek to apply them in life by re-establishing the Khilafah, or to remain idle in witnessing the fruits of the pre-eminence and dominance of Kufr upon the World.

This war against Islam masquerades as ‘a war to fight terrorism’, the entire Islamic Ummah must be acquainted with the insidious effects upon our lands and people of ‘the war on Islam and Muslims’ whether that be physically and intellectually, they both must be resisted, but knowing that only the re-establishment of the Khilafah will redress the balance that has propelled the western nations to the arrogance which has reached Pharonic proportions. It is time to burst that bubble and deliver mankind from this ‘fools salvation’.

“I believe that if a man like him were to assume the dictatorship of the modern world, he would succeed in solving the problems in a way that would bring the much needed peace and happiness. Europe is beginning to be enamoured of the creed of Muhammad. In the next century it may go further in recognizing the utility of that creed in solving its problems.” (George Bernard Shaw – A Collection of writing of some of the eminent scholars, 1935).

There was once a civilization that was the greatest in the world. It was able to create a continental super-state that stretched from ocean to ocean, and from northern climes to tropics and deserts. Within its dominion lived hundreds of millions of people, of different creeds and ethnic origins

This kind of enlightened leadership — leadership that nurtured culture, sustainability, diversity and courage — led to 800 years of invention and prosperity. In dark and serious times like this, we must affirm our commitment to building societies and institutions that aspire to this kind of greatness. [Carleton S. (Carly) Fiorina, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Hewlett-Packard Company, September 26 2001 in a speech titled, "technology, business and our way of life: what's next"]

Conclusion to the Series ‘Did Islam fail in Afghanistan?’

What occurred in Afghanistan and with the present regimes cannot be termed a failure of Islam, although the Taliban were not by any stretch of the imagination comparable to the present Qazibeen (liars) who rule over systems of Kufr, nonetheless they did not establish the Khilafah for all of the Muslims. As previously mentioned the learned Ulema have defined the Khilafah as being: ‘The General Leadership (Wilayah Amma) over all the Muslims, in the whole world, whose responsibility it is to implement the laws of Islam, and to convey the Islamic Message to the whole world’.

The quick defeat of the Taliban and their inability to stand firm had clear reasons:

1- Taliban had not been established by itself. It had been established by the state of Pakistan on the orders of America. It was linked completely to Pakistan. Taliban used to receive weapons, money, provisions and instructions via Pakistan. When America decided to strike Taliban she coerced Pakistan into allying with her against the Taliban and al-Qa’idah. Thus, Pakistan placed her land, airspace, bases and intelligence at the disposal of America and closed her borders with Afghanistan. And hence the lifeline, which used to extend life to the Taliban was cut. This was a failure of lack of political awareness, the alignment with the corrupt regimes last as long as the puppet master allows, and because Pakistan was encouraged to nurture the Taliban their intentions were not to further Islam but to please its masters in Washington. When the Taliban decided to sever any links to the US, the US decided to decimate their presence in Pakistan.

2- Taliban did not declare the establishment of the Khilafah so as to unite the Muslims. Also, the tribal Pashtun had dominated their membership. This incited other elements from the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazarah Shias and others from the population of Afghanistan, even some other Pashtun clans. They displayed hostility towards them and many fierce battles took place between them. In this way the Taliban made many enemies from the country’s inhabitants. This made it easy for America to buy up these elements and give them money, weapons and provisions and use them to fight Taliban and demolish its strongholds.

Not to mention the isolation of Taliban. They did not establish any links with the Muslims in the Islamic world due to their lack of political awareness. As a result Afghanistan is on the road to secularisation, any Islamic character will be seeped away under the watchful supervision of America’s keeper Hamid Karzai, a man who so fears for his life that he has asked of America to send him bodyguards. It is America who has said it will remain indefinitely in Afghanistan, and it is her bombs which strike the bodies of the Muslims there and then she denies she killed innocent civilians, claiming a Wedding congregation were ‘terrorists’.

What happened is a serious lesson from which one must learn because these actions the Taliban undertook were a fatal error. This will not happen in the Khilafah state when it is established by the permission of Allah (Subhanahu Wa Ta’aala).

Yusuf Patel

12 August 2002

Fighting to Establish the Islamic State

A Translation of Study No 11 Vol. 1 p 288-322 from the Ph.D. Thesis Jihad wal Qitaal fil Islam.

Abstract:

This study includes:

1- The opinions of Muslim writers around the thought of fighting to establish the Islamic State.

2- The evidence of those who allow or do not allow “fighting to establish the Islamic state” and its discussion showing the position we put forward.

3-Fighting to establish the Islamic state (by the ones who adopt this method), is it Jihad in the way of Allah by its shariah meaning?

Firstly: The opinions of the Muslim writers regarding the thought to establish the Islamic state

The division of the opinions of the Muslim writers regarding this first issue into two directions. They are:

A- A position that refuses the thought of fighting or a physical revolution or the use of weapons to establish the Islamic state.

It is noticeably seen that the upholders of this direction will not necessarily use the clause “Islamic state” when exhibiting the evidence for there ideas. In fact, many of them seem to hide this term (for some reason or other) using the phrases “changing the Islamic society” or “changing the present situation”, and what ever closely resembles them……. Fair enough. These phrases (and what ever is similar) though when used by those who are active in the Islamic dawaa can be summarised with the term “Islamic state” i.e. The authority that stands on the basis of Islam in establishing its laws and spreading its message.

B- Then their is the other direction that calls for the use of  fighting or a physical revolution in order to establish the Islamic state.

We will summarise in this first issue the opinions of a number of authors that hold either position , and we will quote form their books the parts that exposes there views that they propagate. We will leave the discussion of their opinions to the second part.

A- The first position: The refusal of physical struggle, or the use of weapons to establish the Islamic state.

This position is put forward by a number of authors including:

1- Professor Abu Ala Al Mawdudi.

This Muslim writer, who was the amir of Jamat Al Islamia in Pakistan, at the end of a lecture entitled (( The Duty of Muslim Youth today)) that was presented in Mecca Al Mukarramma in the days of Hajj, the year 1381 A.H. says:

((Brothers in Islam……I will like to put forward to you an advice (at the end of this lecture). It is that you do not establish secret organisations to achieve your goal and that you should avoid (at all costs) using a physical struggle or weapons to change the position (we are in). Because this method also is a means of hurrying (to quickly) that will result in no fruitful gain. The attempt to achieve your goal by the shortest route possible…….and the correct revolution………is that you propagate your dawa publicly , correcting the hearts and minds of the people as much as you can……But if you hurry up with this issue and work to  establish the authority ( by a coup de ta) bya physical means and in fact you succeed to a certain extent, then (the position) will analogous to the wind that enters the door to leave by the window. This is my advice that I have given to all those who are active in the Islamic Dawaa”[1]

And (another) from the authors who uphold this opinion is:

2- Sheikh Muhammad Nasr Al-Deen Albani:

And this is with his commentary with regards to Aqueedat Al Tahawiya, clause 72 “ And we (ahl ul sunnah wal Jammah) do not see that we should revolt against our rulers or governors even if they become tyrannical . Nor do we call against them or remove our hand away from their allegiance……” Sheikh Albani comments on this and says:

“ I say: and with this (statement) their is an indication of the method to end the injustice of the rulers that are from our community and speak our language. That is, that the Muslims should seek forgiveness from their creator, correct their aqueedah, and bring up their families and themselves on the correct Islam confirming the words of Allah : (( …..Allah does not change the condition of the people until they change what is within themselves))[2] .

And with this one of the current propagators of Islam said: (( Establish the Islamic state in the heart and it will be established in reality)). Nor is the method (to remove this injustice) as some imagine a revolution with weapons against our rulers by means of a military coup de ta. It (in fact) is one of the bidaahs of this period of ours as it goes against the shariah text that orders us to change what is within ourselves. Because of this it is essential that we correct the basis before we build upon it….”[3]

And from the Islamic writers that walk along this direction, propagating it include:

3- Dr Muhammad Said Rahmadan Al Buti:

And it is possible that we understand his position from a large number of signs that are noted in his booklet:

(( This is the way we propagate in Islam)). From this (booklet) his comments “ The establishment of the society on the principles of Islam, its laws, and its organisation is only but a reward from Allah who creates it from a (a position) that is expectedor not expected as a result of (the Muslims) establishing Islam on themselves and on their families and children first, then secondly on those that are closest to them, then. on the majority who remember Allah and draw closer to him. Thirdly (the Muslims) then should seek refuge from Allah (to change the situation).”

It is this collection, (of signs) to establish the Islamic society as a result of it being a reward from Allah who creates it for the Muslims, if and only if they increase there remembrance seeking refuge from Allah, that is an evidence in the refusal offighting to correct the situation we are in and establishing the Islamic society.

Their is also (another) confirmation of this direction that refuses to fight to establish the Islamic society – the advice of the author to the Muslim that he ( the Muslim) should concentrate his efforts on the propagation (of Islam) not concerning himself with other issues. Because the reason of change is in the hands of Allah himself(alone). He( Buti) says regarding this “ If the Muslim fulfils the obligation that is upon him with regards to the dawaaa, then he should leave the results to Allah, leaving the issue to him. Nor should he tire himself with things Allah has not given him authority for. And he should not work (with an objective in mind) regarding this issue like those who imagine that everything is in their hands. Rather he (Allah) is the one who knows the reasons, comes out with the results and changes the situation…..”[4]

This is the direction of the first point of view with regards to fighting in order to establish the Islamic state in this period of ours or as some put it “ the establishment of the Islamic society and changing the situation (we are in)”.

B- The second direction : The call to fight to establish the Islamic state

Probably the Jihadee group in Egypt is the clearest with regards to this position from all the Islamic movements in the last few years and the writings (of this movement) have spread (information) as a result clarifying their position. They also defend themselves with the evidences before them attacking the other position that forbids using violence to establish the Islamic state, accusing them of two things either ignorance in Islam or cowardice…….as will be shown

Dr Muhammad Amarah says “ This situation is in fact a situation of the sword and the use of physical struggle and revolution in order to establish the Islamic state because this issue is from the issues of the Khilafa and the Jihadee movement has given importance to the reply of all the objections that have spread and are spreading in the use of fighting and struggle as a means to establish the Islamic state and returning of Islam to the Muslims”[5]

Their is no objection in putting forward these objections with there replies in summary which will clarify more the position of these two camps in this issue.

The first objection: comes from those who call for Islamic work from an Islamic political party that propagates its views within the laws that are present in the society. Hence they refuse the thought of fighting to establish the authority putting Islam in the position of control.

The Jihadee group replies to this with the reasoning that any system will not allow any possible means to destroy itself , and if the goal is the destruction of the present corrupt system then it is not possible by the means of the allowed tools be it with a political party or a parliament. For those who say “ That it is upon us to establish an Islamic party among the current parties” (the reply is) that it will not lead but to an increase in the number of parties!! Plus the party will not be able to establish the goal that they set out for and that is the destruction of the Kufr state. In fact the opposite will happen. It will  share in the building of the Kufr state! For it results in  the association with them in opinions and taking part in the legislative system that rules without the authority of Allah !![6]

I say ( Dr Khair Haykel): That it occurred before that Mawdudi took this position that the Jihadee movement warned against . In fact he says “ Our taking part in the parliament that is not correct nor believing in our principlesresults in us associating to get closer to our goal for the wrong reasons because practical experience confirms that an action like this will no have any fruitful results . In fact those that have authority in ruling are the ones who draw the domestic aswell as the foreign policy establishing it when it suits their whims and desires. As for those that take part with the intention of an honourable goal in front of their eyes, they in fact need to discuss with (those in authority). This means that at the end of it they become a mouth piece for them, toys in their hand to do with as they wish using them as they want”[7]

The second objection- This is put forward by a group that says according to the (jihadee) author that they are now in a state of weakness. They hence call for removing themselves from society making Hijra from it with the hope of getting strength to return to establish the Islamic state.

The Jihadee movement replies by saying that these people should save the effort on themselves by establishing the Islamic state and coming out as conquerors .  Dr Amarah continues to say “and an example is like those who say that they should migrate to the hills, then they will return to meet Pharaoh as Moses did and Allah will destroy pharaoh and his army!! All these thoughts did not come about except by leaving the correct shariah means to establish the Islamic state. This way Allah has shown by the ayah (( And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevail Allah’s deen altogether and everywhere))

The Third Objection- This is put forward by a group that stops Islam at the limits of correction, fear of Allah, matters of ritual worship and isolation in religious devotion. They say that politics grows in the heart a hardness that prevents remembranceof Allah. The Jihadee movement replies that jihad, and they mean by this, the fighting of a ruler in the Muslim lands and taking authority from them to establish Islam, is a political action and is the highest of all matters of worship in Islam, “ and whosoever wants to really work with the highest forms of worship then he should do Jihad in the path of Allah”, without ignoring the other pillars of Islam. In fact the prophet describes Jihad as the sword of Islam[8].

And these people that say: that taking part in politics hardens the heart and keeps someone busy away form the remembrance of Allah seem just to forget the saying of the prophet “ The best Jihad is the saying of truth in front of a tyrannical leader”[9]

The fourth Objection put forward by those that do not put forward fighting to establish the Islamic state is the fear of failure.

The Jihadee movement replies to this group by saying that it falls into two mistakes.

Firstly: The deficiency in carrying out the act of Allah’s law by establishing the state for the Muslim is asked to carry out the order without looking for results!!

Secondly: The inability to see the attractive nature of the justice of Islam that pulls towards the nation a lot of supporters even from those that did not have knowledge of Islam before!

Then the reply to those who say “ we fear that the nation will be established then after a day or two there will be a rebuttal destroying what we have succeeded in establishing” The Jihadee movement replies:

“The establishment of the Islamic nation is the carrying out of Allah’s command and we are not required to produce results. In fact the one who holds this opinion that is of no benefit does nothing but to further establish among the Muslims the will to do their duty from the Shariah by establishing the authority of Allah. (This person) forgets that with the fall of the Kafr Regime everything will be in the hands of the Muslims making it impossible for the Islamic state to fall. Plus the Islamic laws are not deficientnor weak in removing every corruption on the earth that is not within the bounds of the authority of Allah added to the fact that the Islamic laws are all so just that they will have only the response of willing acceptance from those who even do not knowIslam.”[10]

These are the most important objections that the Jihadee group has put forward against the opinion that they put forward and that is “fighting to establish the Islamic state” with their reply to them.

We hope that by showing the different opinions of both sides in this issue we have successfully stopped at distancing the thoughts of each side.

And from here we go onto our second part of the study and it is:

Secondly: The evidences of those that legalise or forbid fighting to establish the Islamic state with their discussion and the clarification of the opinion that we have weighed up with its evidences

A- The Evidences of those who Forbid Fighting to Establish the Islamic State

The upholders deduce this direction by a number of evidences that include:

1- The First Evidence:….They point to the fact of harm that results with the use of weapons. Harm is forbidden by shariah with the saying of the prophet “ Their is no harm or harming (in Islam)” [11]

After warning against the use of weapons or any physical means to change the situation we are in ,Mawdudi comments “ This method is the worst barrier and causes more harm then any one can picture”

Mawdudi indicates to the harm by following this pathway and from which one may understand from him a fear that the opposing force may stand in the face of change that is established by force. It seems as if he is indicating to the fitnah and bloodshed that could result from this. He also says that the success that will result in this change by military strength if established will only be temporary. If we want to clarify what Mawdudi is signalling, and he is silent in further clarification, then he is saying that the opposing force will not be silent!! They will hit out against this success resulting in theimpediment of the Islamic dawaa, the killing of its men, the expulsion of its youth, and the unravelling of its effort pushing back the progress a number of years! The situation will not just stop at this but also insult and dishonour will be placed on those who have tried to change the situation by force resulting in cowardice and the removal from themselves (i.e. the Muslim youth) the ability to stand!!

2- The second evidence: This is established on the fact that ones in power today in the Muslim lands are like the rulers of the past who became corrupt and tyrannical. The ruling with regards to these rulers is patience as has been previously shown in another study[12] . This evidence is upheld by sheikh Muhammad Nasr Al Deen Albani in his commentary in Aqueedat Al Tahawyia which states “ And we will not go out against our ruler, nor our governors even if they become tyrants..”

Sheikh Albani in his commentary about this says “ In fact with patience against them their is repentance against our sins. For Allah had not allowed them to have authority over us except for the corruption of our actions and the resultant from the types of actions. Hence it is upon us to exert effort in repenting to Allah, having the correct upbringing, and correcting our actions. Allah says  (( Thus we make the wrongdoers turn to each other because of what they earn))[13] For if the flock wants to get rid of the corruption of the rulers today then they should leave their corruption”. [14] The words of the sheikh in this commentary refers to the rulers today owing to the fact that he is referring this issue to the Military coups against the Muslim rulers in this period of ours. From this he has forbidden it with the excuse of patience.

3- The third evidence: That is the military coups today are from the bidaahs of this period[15]. (It is forbidden) as the shariah has forbidden Biddaahs and innovations by his saying “ Beware of every innovation for every innovation is a bidaah and every bidaah is a misguidance”[16]

4- The Fourth evidence- It is that the shariah has limited the way to change our situation and that is by changing what is within ourselves i.e.(( Allah does not change the situation of the people until they change what is within themselves))[17] . Changing the situation by other then this means goes against the Shariah text [18]. These are the most important evidences of those that refuse fighting to establish the Islamic state.

B- The evidences of those who allow fighting to establish the Islamic State

The ones who uphold this opinion have a number of evidences which include

1- The First Evidence- The evidence of apostasy.

This is because “After the removal of the Caliphate in 1924 and the removal of all the Islamic laws replacing them with laws put in by the Kafrs” Apostasy happened with both the nation and the ruler. “ The nations apostatised today from the Shariah when it replaced the laws with the Western codes of the Kafr and as a result the rulers today have apostatised from Islam because they rule by other than what Allah has revealed. They also where brought up as the plan of colonialisation be it the crusades or the socialists. In fact they do not carry anything from Islam except their names, even if they prayed or fasted or and called themselves Muslims”. Hence as a result the Dar(land) has become legislated by the canons of Kufr even though the majority are Muslim, for peace is to the Muslims and war and Jihad-by the meaning of fighting- on the Kafir nation and the apostatised rulers! And it is essential that the Muslims wake upto fighting(this Kafr regime) so that they can change this despicable Kafr situation!.”[19]

i.e. : It is as if the authors of this evidence want to say that it can be said that the Islamic nations today and its rulers can fall under the ruling of the nations that rebelled from Islam and stopped implementing it at the time of Abu Bakr[20]. At that time many people rebelled from Islam under his authority but even if the majority of the people today are Muslim that have not apostatised the ruling will be the same. The Muslims will not be fought but rather the Apostatised nation and the rulers(will be fought) so as to return the land to Dar Al Islam and hence as an Islamic state.

2-Second Evidence: The Islamic principle “What leads to a wajib(duty) is wajib in itself”[21].

This is because Allah has made it a duty upon us to have the legislative authority of Islam which cannot be achieved except by the means of an Islamic state. Therefore the law regarding the Islamic state becomes wajib following from the principle “what leads to a wajib is a wajib in itself”. Also the establishment of the Islamic state cannot come about except by the means of fighting. Hence it becomes wajib by using the same principle “What leads to a wajib is a wajib in itself” [22]

3-The Third Evidence : The evidence of the Fard(duty) of Jihad on every Muslim in every Muslim nation that is occupied by the enemy.

“ For the enemy with regards to the Muslim land mass is actually settled in their lands. In fact this enemy has authority over every issue. This enemy, who is the leadership, has forced the reigns of authority away from the Muslims. From here the Jihad against them becomes an individual obligation (upon every Muslim)”, like salah, and sawm(fasting). As Allah says in the Quran (( Fasting has been prescribed for you))[23], he has also said with regards to the issue of fighting that (( Fighting has been prescribed for you))[24] [25] i.e. it is a duty to fight the enemy that is occupying our land so that we can remove the authority from him and establish the Islamic state.

4- The Fourth Evidence: It is the evidence of clear cut Kufr(disbelief) which if it appears then the ruler has no right to be heard and obeyed by his flock taking into account the hadeeth “ Their is no rebellion from the authority ofthe ruler except if you see clear cut disbelief that is confirmed by a clear cut proof from Allah”[26]

Dr. Muhammad Amarah says “ And the Jihadee group sees that Kufr(disbelief) refers to the sins, and from its opinion it has found that the rulers today should no longer be heard or obeyed by the flock and they (the jihadee group) take this ruling from thesaying of Qadi Iyad (476-544 a.h/1083-1149 a.c) “ If he is adamant on Kufr, (and)[27] in changing the shariah, or on innovation, then his obedience is invalidand it becomes a duty upon the Muslims to revolt against him, removing him and placing a just Imam (ruler) in his place if possible”[28] . Thus  the removal of the rulers today that hold the military strength and are adamant in their rule is not possible except by a revolutionary struggle. For their is no way except to remove these rulers and to establish the Islamic state”[29]

These are the evidences put forward by those who hold the legality of fighting to establish the Islamic state. From here we finish from presenting the evidences of the two sides around this issue and move onto their discussion

C- Discussion of the evidences that endorse the peaceful procedures to establish the Islamic state.

1- The Discussion of the evidence of harm.:

It is a wonder that the ones who hold this opinion are a lot that have drowned in the sea of pessimism and despair, Then one seems to just feel the extent they have drowned themselves, not even having a heart beat   of desire or will to stand to change the misdirected position they are in or even  hoping for change; when it comes from these men that have believed in their creator, who have sold themselves to him, ready for the victory of their lord so that Allah may write with the work of their hands the honour of Islam(in history) establishing the state, the prevention of any action(to change the situation) with the excuse of harm. And with this excuse they wish to prevent others to do any form of work(as well)!!!!!

Their is no objection to the Islamic principle “ The prevention of harm is of more priority then receiving benefit”[30]. Nor to the hadeeth “ Their is no harm or harming in Islam”[31] Allah forbid. May Allah cause disappointment, destruction and dishonour on those who reject something from Islam. But the objection here is based upon placing the Islamic ruling in the wrong place and situation, and objection is also placed on those whoexaggerate the paranoia,  fear and worry in the people so that the harm can be possibly imagined as a fearsome beast that is absent from (peoples) sight but is ever present like a ghost ready to strike on those who wish to undertake activities, that the ones who object, fear!!

This fear of harm is the reason that a passive position is taken with regards to the issue of fighting to establish the Islamic state. Let this position be( the actual reality)!! Then if it becomes probable that benefit or interests come from taking a positive stance in this issue then this positive stance must be allowed legally.

Then: one should return the issue to outweighing the position in this area . When it becomes probable that it will cause harm then the position becomes forbidden and when it becomes probable that it will cause benefit and interest then it should become legal.

I say( Dr Haykel) : If those who have upheld this evidence of harm in forbidding the use of weapons in this issue guided the evidence along this line then it would have been closer to the logic of the evidence itself that is being deduced. But to continuously (say) that the use of weapons in this issue is labelled to have the smell of harm forever goes against reality itself!!!

Yes! If a shariah text that we accept came in this issue to prevent the use of weapons then we would have said “ on my head or eyes”[32] and benefit and all forms of benefit comes from Shariah and harm and all forms of harm is in what the Shariah has forbidden-even if our limited rational understanding thought otherwise! This is because our view in this issue is a limited view, whereas the view of the shariah is not limited. Upon this we will reiterate the saying of the companion Rafih Ibn Khadij in another issue” The prophet forbade an issue that was beneficial to us but obeying Allah and his messenger is more beneficial to us and more beneficial generally!!”[33]

This, not taking into account the simple use of the evidence of harm by itself without (looking at) any other shariah evidence, will result as previously mentioned and that is the prevention of the use of weapons when it probably will cause harm by its use, and its legality, in fact its obligation! When the use of weapons probably will cause  benefit or even if not using it will cause harm! Their is no objection to this. But their is objection to this evidence when it is always used to prevent the use of harm. This specific point is what we need to emphasis here.

Nor do we want it to be understood here that we see the legality of the use of weapons in this issue if it probably will cause benefit rather then harm because we have our own opinion in this issue  that we will lead to at the end of the discussion of the evidences Allah willing.

2- The discussion of the evidence that the rulers today are like those before who became corrupt or tyrannical…..and that the Islamic ruling for these people is the duty of patience as came in Sharh Saheeh Muslim by Imam Nawawi regarding the hadeeth“There will come after me rulers and governors that you will hate. They said “ Oh prophet of Allah what shall we do?” “ Give the justice that is due and ask Allah that for the justice that is your right” Imam Nawawi said in his Sharh “ In it is advice that we should hear and obey our rulers even if they are corrupt or tyrannical. Hence Justice that is their due should be given to them with regards to obedience and not revolting against them. Nor is he(the ruler) to be removed but one should rather ask Allah to expose his harm, prevent his evil, and correct him”[34]

I say(Dr Haykel): the duty of patience with regards to the legally appointed rulers that have become corrupt or tyrannical and the prevention of revolting against them is established on a legal evidence, and we have solved this issue in a previous discussion but should we consider the rulers in the Muslim nations today who do not rule by what Allah has revealed like thoserulers who are legally appointed where it is a duty to be patience and not lift up arms against them?

I see that the issue is different between those rulers and the rulers today and because of this it becomes essential that the ruling is different.

I mean that the evidence that encumbaces upon us the duty of patience and the prevention of military revolt in the position of corruption or tyranny came with regards to those rulers that took the authority of Imama ( leadership) legally then from this position resulted the corruption indicated to. The taking of authority legally came about as a result of a pledge of allegiance that resulted from a choice and willing approval on the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet, as was indicated to in a previous discussion. When these two things, they being acceptance and choice in taking authority with the establishment of the laws on the authority of the book of Allah and the Sunnah of the prophet, are not fulfilled, then the leadership does not become legal. As a result its owner ( the ruler who does not satisfy the two conditions) does not deserve to be heard and obeyed. Nor is the duty of patience and the prevention of lifting up arms applied to this ruler as compared to the one who is legally appointed.This is because the shariah text gave this right to the leaders that are called “A’ima” as in the hadeeth “ There will be after me “Ai’ma” that will not be guided by those who advice (the truth)…….”[35]

Maybe the reason for the duty of patience with the owners of the hadeeth comes from another hadeeth that says “………..I advice you to fear Allah, to hear and to obey(the ruler), even if an Abyssinian slave is established in having authority over you( Ta’mur Alekum)……”[36]. This hadeeth avoids, as can be understood from its apparent meaning, the issue of choice and willing acceptance as well as relating the issue of hearing and obeying to ruling by what Allah has revealed.

The reply to this first point is in more detail in the study “fighting Against those who take Authority by Force”[37]. We said that the word “Ta’mur” here means he became a ruler by being given authority from a previous ruler or by choice and willing acceptance. But it does not mean “to force oneself into authority by force and strength[38] .

The reply to the second point is also mentioned in detail in the study “ Fighting against the corruption of the ruler”[39] that prevents me from repeating it here. Plus the Usuli principle in placing the unrestricted text over the restricted text[40] obliges the restriction of hearing and obeying to the leader who rules by what Allah has revealed. This is because to understand the unrestricted nature of the text in the hadeeth “…. and even if an Abyssinian slave is established in having authority over you…” one must place this

unrestricted sense in correlation with the hadeeth that is narrated restricting it, like the saying of the prophet “….even if an Abyssinian slave with a raisin head is established over you. So hear and obey him, as long as he legislates among you with the book of Allah”[41] i.e. if he does not establish among us the book of  Allah then we will not hear or obey him ! I say(Dr Haykel) : We calculated in this discussion of the duty of obeying the ruler and the governors and the forbidiance of going out against them, we calculated that we would guide this evidence in the direction of those who do not rule by what Allah has revealed without giving the legality of going out against them or the use of weapons to remove them so as to establishthe Islamic state because this issue, as we have previously mentioned, has an opinion that will be revealed at the end of this discussion.

3- The Evidence that says that the use of  Military coups to change the situation (we are in) is one of the Bidaaahs(innovations) of this period. I.e. “and the most evil of things is innovation and every Bidaah is a misguidance”[42]

I say(Dr Haykel): We will not be dragged into making this issue(fall into the discussion) of “whether it falls under the label of Bidaah or not!!”

And what is the shariah definition of Bidaah? And does it apply to the use of military strength to establish the Islamic state or not?

Yes! We will not be dragged into it, because the issue does not fall into this context.

The reality of a military coup is the use of weapons to reach authority so we can accomplish a specific goal when we receive it. In this issue of ours : The goal in receiving authority is ruling by what Allah has revealed and the establishment of the Islamic state. This is thereality of the situation. So we will not fly off . when their is no airport[43], and get involved unnecessarily in this issue of ours with the issue of Bidaah!!??

The issue is then: The use of weapons to establish the rules of Islam that will not be reached except by this method, is their a shariah evidence that will give us the green light so that we can move along this path legally? Or will their be a red light that will prevent us from moving along this pathway? This is the issue and as long as the owner of the evidence of Bidaah has not addressed it in its proper place then their is nothing around which we can discuss. Hence we will now go onto another evidence

4- The discussion of the evidence that the Shariah has specified the way to change the situation(we are in) in a specific manner. This is by (the people) changing what is within themselves as proclaimed (in the ayah)       (( Allah does not change the situation of a people until they change what is within themselves))[44]

Upon this, touching upon changing the situation by other than this method goes against the Shariah text. I say(Dr Haykel): Preventing the scope of some of the shariah texts from taking there full broad legal meaning will result in the mistaken legal verdicts; by which these texts guide to, in solving what needs to be solved in this situation.

Another thing: Touching upon the Shariah rulings regarding the actions of man must come by the way of specific texts, that are connected with the specific actions, to extract the Islamic ruling. If one does not find a specific text that is related to this action, nor a specific cause, nor an Ijma(consensus) that encompasses this specific action- Then(and only then) do we go to the general texts like this ayah.

Even this ayah that is considered the greatest and most truthful basis for all foundations of change in the world of psychology and sociology; how can it be understood from it the illegality of removing the material barrier, that is standing in the way of change, by a sufficient strength that will remove it a sufficient distance away from its path? How?

In fact the presence of this wrong understanding in our society which is “ The illegality of the destruction of a strength by another force to correct a situation that most people require”.The presence of this incorrect understanding is what prevents the change that is pointed to. So if the people of this society do change this incorrect understanding that is “in themselves” to the correct understanding which is “The essentially of breaking this opposing material force by a capable material force, that is in the way of change” and allow this correct understanding to guide their conduct. Then from this they will (begin) to ask for a material force that will be able to overcome this material barrier that forces upon them this situation that they are in, and support them in correcting the situation. I say( Dr. Haykel): If this change in understanding does occur in the psychological world, then a change in the external situation will occur confirming the truth of the ayah ((Allah does not change the situation of a people until they change it within themselves))[45]

On this, the ayah then takes its proper natural broad understanding- according to the laws of grammar-and the way of Allah will call toanother direction in this issue of ours and it is “The use of weapons to establish the Islamic state”. This is because the preposition “Ma”( “what is”) in the ayah ((Allah does not change the situation of the people until they change what is within themselves)) indicates generality[46] but within the natural limits of the psychological self and the external reality from the situations(in the external reality) that have a characteristic of resulting from the psychological self.

This, and the external situation are of not just one type (i.e. Aqueedah) but in fact different types that are judged by different laws. For it(the external situation) being characterised as a resultant of the psychological self, that causes it to be realised or a change so that it canbe realised, must then essentially result in these matters of psychology being different as well.

So whoever wants to change the prevailing ignorance to knowledge among the people, and these are two external situations, then it is upon him to change what is in the people in terms of the acceptance of the reality (they are in to a situation in) which they have disgust for this ignorant reality so that they wish to gain knowledge. If this change does happen in the people then there will be a push to gain knowledge in the centres of learning, and as a result their is a change in the external reality from ignorance to knowledge!

-And whosoever wants to change the sickness that is spread between the people to health, and again they are two external realities, then it is upon him to change what is in the people in terms of acceptance of this reality to a situation of disgust of the sickness in it, making it essential that the acquired health is achieved. If this change does happen in the people, then their is a push towards health in the appropriate centres.

By this way the result is a change in the external reality from sickness to health!

In summary: Anything can be reached by the natural reasons that aid in achieving that state. This is what the ayah points towards by tying the relation between the world of psychology and the external reality. The external reality in terms of political understanding has two aspects that cause the misguided situation:

The first thing: The acceptance of this misguided reality or being apathetic regarding change.

The second thing: A force that protects this reality

Changing this external reality comes about by changing the natural reasons that result in change i.e. by two means in the world of psychology, that have a natural connection to what is present in this external reality.

Firstly: There will be a change by instigating the disgust of the misguided position(we are in) giving importance to this change, and increasing public awareness of an alternative to hold onto.

Secondly: It is necessary to have belief in the necessity of a provision of force that will aid this change which will be of sufficient strength to remove the insurgent force that is protecting the reality we want to change. It is essential then that effort should be given to provide this force that could be used in procedure of change or made ready to be used if the situation requires it.

-If we just isolate the change to the first stage (mentioned above) and it is the change from the acceptance of the reality to a disgust of this situation with the hope for an alternative, then the resultant will only be a change in the corresponding reality i.e. a change in opinions and wants with individuals remaining as individuals in this situation.

-If though their is a change corresponding to the second stage in the psychological self and that is the belief in the necessity of a provision of force that will aid in change that will be of sufficient strength to remove the opposing force from its path, and this in reality happens- then there is the second change and it is:

-Either the opposing force avoiding conflict, fearing this new force like in Medina  when the force of shirk was faced with this new threat from the Ansar. Here this force changed to a group that tried to avoid conflict fearing from it a decisive blow if it got in its way!!

-But if conflict does occur then Allah will judge between them by his wisdom . So if the result was a victory for the people of change then by the will and help of Allah following on from his order he will writ for them this victory!!

-And if victory was for the other side for a reason that Allah desires then there is a delay in change . So whoever from the people of change has met his Shada(martyrdom), then with martyrdom he is happier!! And it is upon the rest to walk along the road that has been legalised until Allah allows victory. For everyone their is written reward!!

This is what has to be said in the discussion of those who forbid fighting to establish the Islamic state. We will now move onto a new section.

D- The discussion of the evidences who hold the positive position regarding fighting to establish the Islamic state.

1-The evidence of Apostasy

i.e. To put forward that the nations in the Muslim world today, as well as the current rulers, are in a situation of apostasy, not including the ruled Muslim masses. So the people of apostasy will be fought to establish the Islamic state by the method that was detailed previously.

The discussion of the evidence has two points:

-Will the rulers of the Muslims become apostates if they rule by other then what Allah has revealed?

-Is it allowed for a group from the Muslims to kill or be killed in fighting the party of apostates even though they do not have the legal power?

The reply to the first point:

The basis of those who say this is the ayah ((………and whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed then they are the disbelieves))[47]

The truth is that those who do not rule by what Allah has revealed have been described by three characteristics in the following ayahs ((…………..they are the disbelieves))[48], ((…………..they are the oppressors)),((……….they are the corrupt))[49]

It has been narrated from the companions and the scholars the specific details on thespread of these characteristics on those who do not rule by what Allah has revealed. In summary: Whoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed rejecting what Allah has sent down, or doubts the correctness of the law, or even thinks that ruling by other than what Allah has revealed is better, then this ruler becomes a disbeliever. He is then an apostate even though he has the characteristics of Islam.

-if the ruler who does not rule by what Allah has revealed believes in his authority, but he does not rule owing to his corruption or fear of those who will oppose him, then he becomes a corrupt oppressor and not a disbeliever.[50]As a result these rulers will not be considered apostates in Islam if they establish the authority on this basis. Anyway it is essential that one must have a definite evidence that gives solid conviction(Yaqin) that the ruler is not from the Muslims ruling by other then what Allah has revealed doubting the benefit of Islam in legislation, or believing that their is a better system then Islam. It is this and anything similar that will bring him out of the fold of Islam. This is when we can say that the ruler is an apostate. Without this, it is not allowed to apostasies the people nor the rulers built on a doubt or a probability becauseof the hadeeth  “…….only if you see clear cut disbelief in which you have evidence from Allah”[51] Evidence here means the definite proof that is established by definite belief[52]

As for the reply to the second point i.e. is a group from the Muslims allowed to be killed or to kill a party of apostates when they do not have the authority?- which is the establishment of Hudud(the capital punishment) and from this the punishment of apostasy, which is death  because of the hadeeth “ whoever changes his religion then kill him”[53] unless they repent. I say(Dr Haykel): All these duties are for but the Imam. It is not allowed for anyone nor a group from the people without the permission of the Imam to carry out these punishments[54]

This is because taking care of the affairs of the ummah according to the Hukm Shari from which the Hudud is carried out, and the other issues of fighting, came with a text that specifies it to the Imam by the evidence of the prophet “The Imam is a shepherd and he is responsible for his flock”[55] , unless there is an evidence that allows the individuals to adopt some of the these responsibilities without the presence or a need for referral to the Imam. An example is the application of the punishment of zina by the master on his slave without theneed to go to the authority in power[56].

There has been no proof (as an exception) with regards to apostasy, and their killing by individuals. Hence the responsibility is left to those in power.

As a result a Muslim group that acts by carrying of weapons against those in power because they are apostates even if their is definite evidence to say that they are disbelieves, I say they acting upon this without the authority legally or without getting power is taking the responsibility of the Imam, because the Imam or whom ever he appoints alone is allowed this authority.

We will now leave this discussion on apostasy with two realities

-The speed in giving the ruling of apostasy on those who rule by other then what Allah has revealed without a definite evidence is an action that is not allowed.

-The killing of apostates is a ruling that is the responsibility of the Imam who is legally appointed and it is not a method to establish the Islamic state.

2-The evidence of the Islamic principle “What leads to a duty is a duty in itself” and its discussion

i.e. Ruling by what Allah has revealed is a duty and this cannot be achieved but by establishment of the Islamic state hence its establishment is a duty based on the principle “What leads to a duty is a duty in itself”

I say: The use of the Islamic principle to reach the ruling for a specific issue without looking at the specific texts that the authority for this nor looking at the other principles of Islam when their is no text that is specific, I say that this behaviour in the extraction of Islamic laws will lead to chaos. In fact it will lead to rulings that are contradictory even in the same issue.

For example in this issue i.e. the use of weapons to establish the Islamic state, it is possible for some to say that using weapons against the Muslims is forbidden because of the evidence of the prophet “Whosoever lifts a weapon against us(the Muslims) is not one of us”[57]. But the establishment of the Islamic state is a duty and it cannot be established except by the use of weapons which are forbidden. Here the legal and illegal have come together in the same issue and the Islamic principle states “whenever the legal and illegal come together in one issue then the illegality will override the legality”[58] i.e. One must then act on the illegality of the ruling and that is the illegality of the use of weapons.

Also some people may say: The establishment of the duty which is the application of the rules of Allah is a benefit and doing what is forbidden which is the spillingof the blood of the Muslims is a corruption. The Sharia( the legal system of Islam) states that “ Blocking the means of corruption is more important then achieving our benefit”[59]. As a result panic and chaos will spread in the extraction of the Islamic rules and the reason for this is:

-The presence of the ruling in the minds of people before and from this one searches for evidences that suit this ruling

-The lack of skill in the extraction of the Islamic rulings from its related evidence among some others.[60]

-As the reason might be to others the difference among the schools of thought in the principles of Usul and the means of extraction. This will lead to the difference in ruling in one issue.

We do not mean here to show the reasons of differences among the scholars, but what we intend to show is that the use of the principle “What leads to a duty is a duty in itself” will only be considered if their is no difference of opinion in the issue that is required to be established and it cannot not be achieved except by a means that in itself is legal[61]. It then can be said “What leads to a duty is a duty itself” i.e. The legal action that has been specified as a means to the duty becomes a duty in itself.

But if this duty will not be reached except by something which in itself is forbidden like the use of weapons in this issue that we are discussing – Will we then allow it to establish that duty with the excuse of this Islamic principle? By Allah No!. Of course as long as  this duty is not overshadowed by another principle “necessity makes the forbidden legal”![62]

Yes! If their is a shariah text that regards specifically this situation i.e. Fighting in order to establish the Islamic state- and prevents it from falling under the general illegality of the use of weapons- then the evidence is the exceptional text andnot the Islamic principle “what leads to a duty is a duty in itself”

Though here we are not going to go into the details of this issue- fighting to establish the Islamic state- But rather we are here to discuss the correct usage of evidence.

In summary: Depending on the principle “What leads to a duty is a duty in itself” as an evidence by itself in the legality of fighting to establish the Islamic state- without looking at other specific evidence in this issue is something that we cannot not accept from its advocate.!!

3- The discussion of the evidence on the duty of Jihad upon every Muslim when the enemy occupies their land, and the consideration that the rulers today are the enemies of this nation that are occupying our lands, taking the authority in it. Hence it being incumbent to call for Jihad (against them).

I say: These words are built upon the basis that the Muslim rulers today are apostates because they are ruling by other then what Allah has revealed as was clarified when we showed the views of those who saw this. Let us even follow this through- Does the situation in the Muslim lands become like the position of the enemy occupying our lands? And as result the call to rally the people to purify the lands from occupation?

I.e. Does this or that nation from the Muslim Ummah become like Palestine which is currently being occupied by the Jews? Fighting to purify the lands from the Jews that are occupying Palestine is something that no differs from?

The answer according to those who hold this opinion is yes, as clarified by what they have already mentioned.

And the answer with me is that the Shariah laws are more specific then this to allow these two situations to be the one and the same, hence resulting in the same ruling and that is the legal allowance to fight to establish the Islamic state

What will happen in the Muslim nations if the ruler apostates after he was Muslim, that is if we agree he has apostatised, is his removal as noted by the legal text related to this issue that connects his removal with clear cut disbelief. As Qadi Iyad has said as noted before

“ And if the situation continues with the ruler showing disbelief…………it is a duty for the Muslims to revolt against him and remove him, if possible”[63]

But nobody has said that the ruling regarding these leaders is the same as that of the disbelievers occupying Muslim land, and that the means to liberate the lands from this occupation is the proclamation of Jihad in it being a characteristic of being anindividual obligation on every Muslim, in these nations that have the authority of a ruler who does not rule by what Allah has revealed. In fact the reality here differs from the reality of the lands that have fallen under the occupation of the colonising imperialistic foe. For the nations here in the instance their ruler apostasies still remain lands that are in the hands of Muslims, who will protect it against any foreign invasion. If it has happened that some non-Muslims have taken some authority then these illegalities have their ruling in the legal system. But we will not turn a nation from it being a Muslim nation that is independent to a Muslim nation that is occupied or in reality under the authority of colonialisation! As for the nations that are under the occupation of our foes, they have no longer become lands owned by the Muslims- that is according to the reality-, and no longer are the Muslims defending it against foreign invasion. In fact what has happened is that ownership- that is according to the reality – is with those occupying foes. They are the ones who take responsibility to defend their colonialisation against others be they Muslim or not! Here fighting against these foes becomes fighting against the colonialists and it is a type of Jihad in the way of Allah.

In summary: To say that the Muslim nations today are occupied by enemies because the ones in authority are not ruling by what Allah has revealed and say that Jihad has become incumbent on every individual who is a Muslim whose land is been occupied- I say: To consider the situation in the Muslim lands on this understanding is a description that is not an accurate representation of reality!!

We will now move onto the last evidence of those who take a positive stance regarding fighting to remove the authorities that rule by other then what Allah has revealed, and establishing an Islamic state.

4- The discussion of the evidence of clear cut disbelief

This evidence is probably the strongest evidence used by those who support the idea of fighting to establish the Islamic state. This is because of the clarity of the legal aspect in revolting against the authority with the appearance of clear cut disbelief like with the evidence “ And do not go out against the order of the ruler except if you see clear disbelief where you have from Allah clear cut evidence”[64] and other proofs noted in the study “fighting against the corruption of the ruler”[65] so their is no need to repeat it here. It also occurred to us in the previous study where we discussed this evidence, and we saw that this text “…….except if you see clear cut disbelief” does not apply to the Muslim nations today that show clear cut disbelief. This is because the context of the hadeeth that indicates the legality of fighting is with the changing of authority that rules along the lines of the Islamic legal system to a situation where clear cut disbelief appear. This specific situation is the context in which the legality of fighting is approved.

But if the authority of clear cut disbelief remains and this continue and the situation does not return, then the texts of clear cut disbelief cannot be applied to a situation like this that is continuing in a means that has been detailed in a specific study on this issue so we will not repeat it[66]

From here we finish the discussion of the evidences of the two sides: the passive and the positive approach to fighting to establish the Islamic state.

It can be generally noted that all these evidences extend there hands to encompass this issue, but they fail to grab hold of it as it is to far away. From here it cannot solve it in a way like the one who in fact holds something in his hand so that he can look at it moving it between his palms, extracting the appropriate rule for it!! Even though this is one of the most dangerous issues that Islam addresses in the society and in ruling and that is: the issue of the Islamic state and the method to establish it in this life so that we can rule by what Allah has revealed.

From here we go into putting forward the opinion that we have outweighed in this issue showing the evidence that specifically relates to this issue. The suunah of the prophet has described in a way that it can become a robe for this issue that will not be suited except for it nor will it be suited except with this robe.

D-The opinion that we hold and its evidence

The prophet says “Pray as you have seen me pray”[67]

And he also says “take from me the step by step procedures…….”[68]

And Allah says in a text that includes Salah and Hajj as well as other issues related to all the rulings of Islam ((We have indeed in the apostle of Allah a beautiful pattern of conduct for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the final day))[69] [70].

Building upon what was previously said: As we are supposed to pray like the prophet did and establish Hajj like the prophet did, it is also our duty to establish the Islamic state like the prophet did. This is because the Shariah text has specified for us the direction in every issue of our lives including the establishment of the Islamic state.

How did the prophet of Allah establish it? And did he allow any use of force in order to establish it or not?

This is the issue at hand and this is the only way we can go about it. From here we will touch upon the evidence.

We do not need to study in detail or stop to discuss the issue of the legality of the Islamic state before discussing the method, because its legality is an issue where there is no argument to give that may make sense intellectually nor any evidence to given that is acceptable (which would doubt this).

Professor Fathe Al Duraini has replied to those modern writers[71] who tried to put doubts in this issue. He said “ Politics in Islamic Law is not an issue that is contradictory that inthe situation was resorted to as a means to solve the issues of the Muslims in their new society in Medina after the Hijra. In fact it was a continuos process that started in Mecca before the Hijra with the public stage of the call to Islam. What confirms this is the first and second pledge of allegiance[72]. Both where in fact historical contracts that were in reality between the prophet and the party from Medina from which the Islamic state was established. The migration of the prophet was in fact part of was resultant from it by the order of Allah  (i.e. it was based on wahi or revelation from Allah)…….As for after the hijra(migration) we saw, from the appearance of the structure of the state from a practical point of view, the confirmation of the establishment of the Islamic state in actuality. Nothing is more clear and evident from it aspects : from the society, and the legal system, the nationality, and the ruling authority. In fact is has not been established that their was anyone other than the prophet who had authority in this new society or anyone who organised the authority of power…..”[73]

Hence, the legality of the Islamic state is a matter in which their is no disagreement, and we are note here to research it in detail! We are in fact here researching the matter of the way in which we should establish the Islamic state, and are we allowed to use force or be ready to use force so that we can fight( if necessary) to establish it? Or are we not (allowed to do this)?

The words of Dr Fathi Al Duraini indicate that the Islamic state came about as a result of the allegiance in it being described as a contract between the Prophet and the party from Medina in Aqaba.

He also says in another book of his discussing the text of the Major pledge of Aqaba:

“…………..And it can be extracted from the context of the text that the prophet established, hence it became a legal basis established by the consent of the prophet[74]- a beginning of utmost importance and danger that we will show as follows:…..(then he says): sixthly: The major pledge of Aqaba as was established became a key for victory…….and the formation of the Islamic state after a small period. This contract and vow has become a reality on the necks of every Muslim across the centuries and for every generation to the day of judgement…..”[75].

Hence if the Major pledge of Aqaba- as Professor Dr. Fathi Duraini said- was a key to victory and a key to the establishment of the Islamic state-then the meaning of this is that the means to establish this state could be possibly found in the (text) of the pledge. From here it is upon us to look in what it has brought to us: Does it(the text) indicate the use of war and fighting to establish the state?

Then, we must return to the interactions that occurred in the pledge of Aqaba, and the points that the pledge was based upon so that we may search for the legal ruling in this issue of ours

1-It has come in Zad Al Ma’d, by the Ibn Qayyim, :

“ On the authority of Jabir: that the prophet spent ten years in Mecca following up the people in their homes in Muasim, Majna[76], and Aqath[77] saying “Who will help me who will give me support so that I can proclaim the message of my Lord, and for him is Paradise? But he would not find anyone to help him, nor to strengthen him, until a man who would travel from Mudair or Yemen to Dhi Rahma would be approached by his people saying “Be wary of this man of Quraish so that he may not give you any tribulations”, and he(the prophet) would walk between these men calling them to Allah, and they would point with fingers to him. This continued until Allah sent us from Yathrib a man who would come to him and believe in him. So the prophet would read and teach  him the Quran. Then this man would go to his family who would become Muslimas a result of him. This went on until there was no Dar(tribe)[78] from the Dur(plural) of the Ansar except that it had a group of Muslims showing their Islam. Allah sent us to him and we got together and said : “Until when will the Prophet of Allah be pushedto the mountains of Mecca fearing for himself”. Then we travelled to him in Mausim and we promised the pledge of Aqaba. Then his Uncle Abbas said “ Oh son of my brother I do not know who these people who approached you are ? I am one who knows the people of Yathrib?. So one or two of us got together with him, and when Abbas saw our faces he said “These are a group we do not know. There are youth!! So we said “Oh prophet of Allah on what shall we give allegiance to you? He said “That you give the pledge that you will hear and obey, in periods of activity and rest, and in aiding me be it in times of ease or difficulty, That you will support me if I come to you, and you will prevent for me what you prevent for yourselves, your wives, and children. Then for you is paradise. So we all got up to give him the pledge when Azaad Bin Zurarah took hold of his(the prophets) hand and he was the youngest of the seventy and said “Patience oh people of Yathrib! We will not give him the pledge of obedience until we all know that he is the Prophet of Allah and that his departure today will result in the split from the Arabs completely and the killing of the best of us. The swords will bite into you but you should have patience. So take onto him and your reward is from Allah, but if you fear for yourselves then leave him as this is a better excuse for you with Allah. They said “Oh Azaad move your hand away, for by Allah we will not leave this pledge, nor resign from it. So we got up one man after another and he took from us the pledge with the condition that he will give to us paradise.”

It came in conformation of this text: It has been narrated by Ahmad Baihaqui, and Hakim. Hakim has verified the text and Dhahabi agreed with him. Ibn Kathir also says in the Seerah that the chain is good on the conditions of Muslim. Ibn Habban has also verified it.[79]

2- It has also come in the Seerah of Ibn Hisham

“ Ibn Ishaq has narrated :In the pledge of war- when Allah allowed his prophet to fight- their where conditions that he put them other then the conditions of the first pledge of Aqaaba……and this was because Allah(at that period of time) did not allow his prophet the legality of war. But when he allowed this for him, and the prophet gave them the pledge in the last pledge on the fighting of the red and black, he took it upon himself and put the condition to the community before his Lord and he gave them on acceptance of this the promise of Heaven.”

Then he narrates from Ibaada Bin Saamit who was one of the leaders in the second pledge of Aqaba: “The prophet of Allah gave us the pledge of war…….on hearing and obeying, in times of difficulty and ease, in times of activity that we liked or hated whatever the effect on us might be, that we do not object to the ruler appointed over us, that we say the truth were ever we may be, not fearing in Allah the pessimism of the negative person(among us)!”[80]

3-It has also in some of the narration’s what Azaad Bin Zurarah said in this pledge speaking to the prophet “………. You have called upon us, and we are a group that has honour and the ability to withstand(anyone), so that no one in his selfish desire wishes to put man in power over us, that his people have chosen, or his uncles have given power to, and this is a position that is extremely difficult but we have replied and accepted this from you.”[81]

These are some of the texts that have come regarding the pledge of Aqaaba with the points that are connected in this issue of ours which is “ The establishment of the Islamic state and the ruling regarding using force to achieve this?”

We will extract from what has proceeded a number of things which include:

1-That the prophet in the pledge in Mecca was asking for support from the Arab tribes and its men that were coming to hajj. So that he could give his call to the people, that would be able to hold onto it not fearing tribulation or persecution

2- The seeking of support to further the Islamic call was replied to by some of the people who had the sufficient strength and ability from the people of Yathrib, as a result they supported the Islamic call in their land while the prophet stayed in Mecca , This message of Islam spread so quickly in Medina with the environment suiting the Islamic call “Until their was no Dar from the Dur of the Ansar except that it had a group of Muslims showing their Islam” As was mentioned in the first narration. This expression does not mean that the people of Medina all became Muslim nor does it lead to the conclusion that the majority were Muslim. In fact this only shows that the environment in Medina that totally confirmed to the Islamic call.

3-The feeling of the Muslim representatives in Medina, from the people of strength and ability, that they could bring the prophet to their lands with the ability to protect him[82] giving support to the call and establishing the Islamic state in their lands even though they are not from the famous leaders. In fact the uncle of the prophet Abbas characterised them- and he was experienced regarding the people of Yathrib and its people of influence- “These are a group we do not know. They are youth!”. Despite this he felt the accent of truth in their language and the wilful determination in themselves, ready to accept what they were to come for even if the biggest and most honourable of their leaders were killed!

4- The accomplishment of the contract of support with the prophet being characterised as the leader of Medina i.e. by being characterised as the leader of the Islamic state that will legislate according to the Islamic legal system starting from the time of arrival of the prophet in Medina “…and that you support me if I come to you” i.e. from the time of the establishment of the Islamic state in Medina.

5- This pledge was called the pledge of war because of what was included within the text on the duty of war and fighting against all those who would oppose the new situation that was to be established in Medina even if the opposing force to this new situation would include the red and black among the people. It has come in the Seerah Halabia: “i.e.: In fighting those who fought him from the Non-Arabs or Arabs”[83]

6- The taking of the contract from the people of strength and ability that were ready to carry weapons in order to protect the new situation. I say: The taking of the contract upon themselves to hear and obey the new authority not objecting to the peopleput in authority over them who would be chosen by the prophet, or chosen by the Muslims to rule taking the position of leadership even if they were not from the Ansar- i.e.: That they do not object to the people of authority with the excuse that they have priority in being chosen for leadership because of their support in the establishment of the Islamic state and their willingness to die to give victory to the Islamic call. “The prophet of Allah gave us the pledge in the pledge of war……..in hearing and obeying, in times of difficulty and ease, in times of activity that we liked or hated whatever the effect on us might be and that we do not object to the ruler appointed over us…”[84]

These are the issues that the Islamic state has been established upon in the time of the prophet. From what was mentioned before, it clearly states the legality of fighting and the use of weapons against all those who stand in the way of its establishment after reaching and taking the pledge in taking the leadership in the country that was chosen to have the Islamic state established in it

It is correct that not a drop of blood was spilt when the Islamic state was established but thisis no reason to prevent the issue of fighting to establish the Islamic state. For the legal texts connected with the pledge of Aqaaba has confirmed the legality in fighting with regards to this goal giving no possible means to doubt this legality

What in reality happened was when the opposing force saw that the carpet was pulled from underneath them without them realising it and that the new authority in the nation were determined in the destruction of any movement or any opposing force and in fact determined to stand against all the Arabs! To fight the red and black from the people if they opposed the Islamic call and the new nation!

I say: When the opposing contingency sensed this firm stance from the new authority of the state- they suppressed their will, and isolated themselves hiding their beliefs in the deepest parts of their sick black hearts. They then started officially to support the new call and the new authority. This new power knew of them, and what was within their hearts- but they honourablypardoned them with every generosity as long as they did not show what they hid in their hearts nor move in any activity that would endanger the new Islamic call!!

Built upon this- the method to establish the Islamic state today after it has been removed from sight for a long period of time, is the method that the prophet followed in order to establish it. This is done by a number of procedures

1-The presence of an environment in a land from among the Muslim nations that would reply to the Islamic call sothat it would have a general opinion that would believe in this call, asking for what would be required from thoughts and authority, with the readiness to support it with martyrdom if necessary.

2- If this happens or if the reply to the Islamic call was present in any nation that had the resources to form a nation as was the position in Medina during the time of the prophet with regards to conditions of that period- Then and only then their would be a search for the people of support that are able to givethe authority to the one who receives the pledge of allegiance in him being characterised as the leader of the Islamic nation. By this way the force that the people of support have would be able to destroy any attempt at the new situation from the insideand block off any force externally that would possibly try to hit this new situation.

3- If the people of support are collected then the pledge is taken from them by the one who is chosen as leader. Then the Islamic state is officially announced with the change of the current authority making it an Islamic system with the force of the people of support ready to hit decisively anyone who puts it on himself to fight the authority that rules by what Allah has revealed which the general consensus wants.

And here:

-If the other forces are silent regarding this new situation giving its allegiance to it- then the coup becomes safe as was the situation with regards to the coup that occurred in the time of the prophet. Then everyone remains in his place with regards to the people of position with the light of the Islamic legal system and the benefit of the Islamic state.

Here a question may arise in one’s mind and that is:

Military divisions may stand in the face of the Islamic state being ordered By its generals to fight. In these divisions there may be Muslims. So what is the ruling regarding fighting in its ranks or fighting against it?

The answer: Fighting in its ranks is forbidden because it is a rebellious force that has gone out against the Sultan of the state and because of this it is upon every Muslim in these divisions to withdraw from it. If they are adamant on staying then he should not play any role that would lead to the spilling of Muslim blood from the people of justice that are standing in the ranks of the Islamic nation. This is owing to the illegality of spilling Muslim blood without any legal excuse that allows it. “For every Muslim the blood, progeny, and money of another Muslim is forbidden”[85]

-As for fighting against these divisions the ruling regarding it is that it is duty because it is the fighting of the rebellious that have gone out against the obedience of the Imam, as was discussed in the study “Fighting the people of rebellion”[86].

If their is no danger in discussing with them so as to pull them towards obedience then the messengers of peace have travelled between them and the nation. If their is danger in delaying the solving of this issue then it must be solved by fighting them[87]. Then whoever dies among them from the Muslims dies as Muslim nut sinful if he knew the truth but fought against it. And whoever dies from the people who supported the Islamic nation that has been established then he is from the martyrs of the day of judgement as was specifically discussed in the study “The fighting of the people of rebellion”[88]

With this we finish the second part of this discussion “fighting to establish the Islamic state”. From here we go onto the last issue and it is:

3- Is Fighting to Establish the Islamic State Jihad in the way of Allah by its Legal Definition?[89]

The answer to this differs depending on the differing directions that will move to strike the Islamic state when it announces itself.

-If these directions are local and hold onto the religion of Islam then fighting against it is a type of “fighting against the rebellious”. We have shown before the difference of opinion in describing this type of fighting outweighing the opinion that it is not Jihad in the way of Allah[90] by its legal Definition[91]

-If the directions that moved to strike the Islamic state are local but non-Islamic who are in fact citizens of the Islamic state from the Ahl ul Dhimma( the protected people) that have removed their obedience from their necks to fight this new state so as to return the situation to its old position of not ruling by what Allah has revealed then this has been covered in the study of fighting the Ahl ul Dhimmah[92].

But if this fighting of the Islamic state comes from international directions then:

-If the directions are from the other Muslim nations i.e. from the lands of the Muslims, then the ruling regarding it is like the ruling regarding those who had revolted locally i.e. the ruling is the same like the Muslims who have revolted locally and the ruling is also the same like the one in which the non-Muslims have revolted locally (depending on who attacks). This is because the Islamic state considers all the Muslim lands as one nation as it also regards taking care of the affairs of the other nation the same as taking care of the affairs of the local population. So it will then work to bring these nations together under the circle of influence of this new born Islamic state. This is because Islam obliges on every Muslim from every different nation to have the pledge of allegiance on its neck as verified by the saying of the prophet “Whoever dies without the pledge of allegiance(to a Caliph) dies the death of Jahiliyaah( the death of ignorance of the pre-Islamic period)”[93]. Hence it is upon the Muslims to send their allegiance or to proclaim theirauthority to the new Caliph. This means: the joining to this Islamic state. As for the nations that refuse to join then they will be treated as the people of rebellion i.e. the messengers of peace try to correct the situation between them and the new Islamic state before commencing to the military option with it.

-If the external direction that has started to fight this Islamic nation is in fact a state from the states that are non-Islamic i.e. From the nations of the Disbelieves that are colonisers then fighting against hem becomes Jihad in the way of Allah by its legal definition because it fits with the legal definition of Jihad which is

“Fighting those who do not have the contract of citizenship from the Disbelievers to heighten the word of Allah”[94]

Is taking part in a non-Islamic government a legal method to establish the Islamic state.

Evidences of those who consider it a legal method :[95]

They are listed as follows:

1- The position of prophet Yusef with the Egyptian government.

2- The position of the prophet with Najashi

3- Umar ibn abd al Aziz taking authority from a non-Islamic Ummayed Kingship.

4-Masalih al Mursala

5- The Agreement of fudul

6- War is Deception

7- If we cannot implement something totally, we should not be prevented from implementing it partially.

1- The position of prophet Yusef.

This is taken from two ayahs:

-{ Yusef said “ Set me over the store houses of the land: I will indeed guard them as one that knows there importance” }[96]

-{……….He could not take his brother by the Deen( Law) of the King except that Allah willed it so……}[97]

From these two ayahs the following points are made:

a- That Yusef despite saying {…… the authority is for none other then Allah……}[98]put forward a request to have authority over the store houses and as a result took part in a non-Islamic government.

b- That Yusef, with the will of Allah, managed to play a trick to allow his brother to be judged under the Laws of Yaqub. So from the understood meaning of the text one can put forward that Yusef ,with the exception of his brother, ruled by the laws of the king.

If some say that this was an exceptional rule for Yusef, then those who uphold this evidence would reply and say that the Text is general unless indicated otherwise, especially as these past historical accounts of the prophets are taken as examples for us to follow.

If some say that we do not take the authority of the prophets before us, as was the position of a number of scholars including Imam Nawawi and Imam Amidi[99], then they would reply that this is an issue of aqueeda and not of ruling. As aqueedah does not change we can not say that this rule is abrogated (owing to Yusef apparently going against his own confession, that the authority was for none other than Allah)or that it is not an authority for us.

2- The position of the prophet with Najashi:

The following evidences are taken as an authority for this point.

A- It is narrated that when the people heard of Najashi’s conversion to Islam they revolted against him  saying “You have left our religion” …….when he needed  to face his people, he wrote in a book, his testimony of Islam with the confirmation that Isa, the son of Maryeum, was the slave, the prophet and the soul of Allah. He put the book under his clothes( near his chest) on his right side…..and went out to speak to his people saying “ What is wrong ?” The people replied “You have left our religion and have stated that Isa is a slave.” “ And what do you say about Isa” retorted Najashi, they said “ That Isa is the son of Allah”. Najashi then put his hand on his chest, over the book (that was hidden), and reassured them that Isa was the son of Maryeum and that he would not add to it anymore. What Najashi intended was what he had written in his book that he put his hand on ! But the people understood him to believe what they said and as a result of this recant his belief in Islam. From this the people became satisfied and dispersed ![100]

B- The prophet wrote to the different kings inviting them to Islam. He wrote to Najashi sending the document with Umaru bin umayyah al -dumarih. When he arrived, Najashi said to Umaru “ I testify by Allah  that he i.e. Mohammed is that awaited prophet of the people of the book…………….but my support in Habasha is small so leave me until I get more support and soften the hearts(to Islam)…….and when he died the prophet prayed for him in Medina….[101]

C- The narration of the prophet “Leave the people of Habasha as long as they leave you”[102]

NB- It is narrated in Muslim on the authority of Anas ibn Malik “That the prophet of Allah wrote to the head of the Romans, Persians, to Najashi and to every authority calling them to Islam, and not to the Najashi that the prophet prayed  for” As a result of this narration the scholars have differed whether the Najashi that accepted Islam was the same one who allowed the Muslims to migrate to his land( Najashi is a title for the leader of Ethiopia.) Ibn Hazm says that the second Najashi mentioned in the Hadeeth did not become Muslim. So the prophet might have sent the emissary to the first one.[103]

From these narration’s the exponents of this view put forward the following points:

A- That the Najashi, who accepted Islam, continued to rule by the local customs of the region with the consent of the prophet after he sent the emissary. Hence the excuse of Najashi seems to be valid as the prophet said “Leave the people of Habisha as long as they leave you.” and because he prayed for him when he died.

B- As a result by analogy we can apply this to taking part in the government and using non-Islamic laws.

3-The position of Umar Ibn Abd Al Aziz-

This is a strange one put forward by Rashaad al Ghanochi in the book “Power sharing in Islam”. It seems that he thinks, that after Muawwiayah died, and gave the reigns to Yazid, the system changed from an Islamic one to a monarchy. Umar ibn abd al aziz despite this took hold of power from this “non-Islamic system” and as result became part of it !!!

4-The authority of Masalih Mursala.

It being a foundation or Usl for the rules of Islam is a well known one  (whether it is correct or not is another issue). It is based on the hadeeth(and other hadeeths) of the prophet  “Their is no harm(in Islam) or anything that harms (in Islam)”.[104]. This is the position of Imam Malik(among others) but this is disputed by Imam Qurtubi[105]. As not taking part in the government can result in not enjoying good or forbidding evil preventing any corrective movements that can be taken, when one is in authority, one then could be in fact doing some harm. As the hadeeth goes against this, then taking part in the government is allowed, if not obligatory.[106]

5- The agreement of Fudul-

This agreement occurred before the prophethood of Mohammed by 20 years. In summary it was an agreement first put forward by Zubair ibn abd al mutalib owing to an incidence that occurred with a businessman from Yemen. This man with his goods came to Meccaand sold them to a man by the name of Al  A’as Bin Wa’il Al Suhaimi. In the end though, this man from Yemen did not get what was his right (i.e. he didn’t get his money!!). So this man went to a group, who were called al Ahlaff, ( a sort of freemason group where the members aid and pull strings for one another) and asked them for assistance. They refused as AL A’as was from Bani Sahl, a part of there group. As a result of this, the man went to the mount of Abi Qais and shouted out poetry, so as to bring the attention of the people of Mecca to his plight. Zubair, hearing this, formed the agreement to protect the rights of those deprived of justice i.e. the agreement of Fudul,  and replied to the plea of this man. They (i.e. the ones who formed this agreement) then went to A’as and gave the man back his right.

The prophet is quoted to have said that “ I witnessed in the dar of Abdullah bin Jadan an oath (i.e. the agreement initiated by Zubair) that if I was called to now (during this period of Islam), I would have accepted ………)[107].

The exponents of sharing power then, I assume, interpret it to mean associating with non-Muslims to get a just goal in the end. Sharing power is similar in the sense that by taking some authority one can get some good  for Islam.

6 – The prophet is reported to have said that “ War is Deception”[108]

As the ones in authority are not ruling by Islam and are in fact working against all those who wish Islam to be in authority, I assume the ones who use this evidence then say that it is like a war in which taking part in the government is a deceptive wayof getting some of the things that are required for the cause of Islam.

7-If we cannot get all of the laws then this does not prevent us from getting part of the laws

Some people say that if we cannot rule by Islam(completely) then we should take part in the government so at least we can apply some Islamic laws. Just because we can not totally implement Islam, this does not mean we should abstain from partially implementing some laws. Simply put, If we cannot implement it in totality then we should implement it partially.

Discussion of the evidences that Allow Power Sharing in Islam

1- The issue of Yusef taking part in the government.

A: Yusef said: “Set me over the store houses of the land : I will indeed guard them, as one that knows.”[109]

As mentioned before, it seems that those who uphold the view of taking part in the government assume that Yusef when he asked the King to look after the store houses, he ruled by non-Islamic law[110]. Hence the issue at hand is whether Yusef in fact ruled by Islam with the permission of the king or not. What do the classical scholars have to say about this ayah?

In the Tafseer of Ibn Kathir[111]) he (Ibn Kathir) points out that Yusef described himself as a guardian i.e. a trustworthy person(over the store houses) that was knowledgeable i.e. over what he was about to take responsibility. He then quotes Shu’aiba bin nuama as saying that Yusef was a guardian over what he was given responsibility for and knowledgeable of  the years of drought. Ibn Abi Hatim also narrates that Yusef asked for this job knowing his ability, and what benefit that it may give to the people in terms of what was more better and more just.

Imam Shokani[112] says that this could mean that Yusef asked to have authority in the land that the king ruled i.e. Egypt or that it could mean that he asked to look after the store houses in the land, these being the places that money is stored. He goes on to say that Yusef asked him this to allow him to spread justice and remove corruption.

Imam Nasafi seems to be the most clear on this, with regards to our topic[113]

“…..i.e. allow me(Yusef) to have authority with the storehouses; Egypt (the explanation for the next clause in the ayah) ( I will indeed guard them) , I am trustworthy and will look after what has been given to me ( ..as one that knows) i.e. knowledgeable in the means of distribution”. Nasafi continues “ Yusef described himself as being trustworthy and able as a request from the king who had authority over him. He said this to allow the king to give him authority to establish the rules and regulations of the creator (in Egypt) and to allow him to spread truth and justice. This gave him the opportunity to do what the prophets had been sent for, with the knowledge that nobody else will be able to do this except him. His request from the king was to satisfy his Lord and not for his love of the king and this life.

Nasafi continues (as if he knew that this controversy would come up) and says that the scholars have deduced from this the evidence to allow one to take authority from the hands of the sultan, continuing to say that the salaf took positions of authority as judges in  corrupt authorities(judging by Islamic law!). If the prophet (Nasafi continues) or scholar knows that their is no way to establish the laws of Allah or blocking injustice except by requesting from the non-Muslim or corrupt rulers, then he is allowed to do so. Nasafi confirms this with the next ayah (Thus did we give established power to Yusef in the land to take possession……..) and says that the king used to authorise on the opinion of prophet Yusef . He was thus, a ruler that was subordinate to his authority.

In fact some scholars have said that the king in fact accepted Islam[114]

From this it is very difficult to see how the exponents of this view allow one to enter the parliament in an a non-Islamic government. This means most certainly swearing by oath to uphold the constitution and the authority in power(which is the custom with those regimes that allow one to participate) and as a minister implementing non-Islamic law. Then they have the confidence to assume that they are spreading justice and removing corruption as prophet Yusef did !! In fact from the ayah their is no indication by an Amarahah(sign) or an understood meaning of the text ( or rational as the prophets are known to be infallible in Shariah matters) that prophet Yusef, when he took authority of Egypt or the storehouses, ruled by non-Islamic law!! Rather the ones who uphold this ayah think of it, if I may say so, as follows:

Yusef said “ Set me over the store-houses of the land: I will indeed guard them, as one that knows their importance (by Non-Islamic means)!!!!

This rational interpretation (T’awil Aqli) is obviously from the mind rather than being indicated by the text. This, of course, is forbidden by the agreement of every single scholar of Islam.[115]

What one can conclude from this ayah is the allowance to request (and not to take part) from the authority ( if it is implementing non-Islam or doing injustice) to give the power to the ones who are capable, so as to spread truth and justice by implementing the laws of Islam. That is if we allow “the shariah of the people before us” to be an Usul (foundation for Islamic law). We now move onto the second ayah

(…….. He could not take his brother by the law of the King except that Allah willed it so…….)[116]

Before we go on to discuss the ayah let us see what the classical scholars have to say about this.

Ibn Kathir says[117]that he ( Yusef ) would not punish him (his brother Benjamin) under the authority of the King (which was the prevalent law before prophet Yusef came unto the scene) of Egypt.  Ibn Kathir also narrates that  Al-Dahaq and others have said that Allah restricted him to hold unto his brother by the method that they held, knowing that this was from the Shariah of Yaqub. That is why Allah praised Yusef by saying in the next part of the ayah (……………..We raise to degrees (of wisdom) whom we please………….).

Imam Shokani[118] says something similar. He goes on to say that Yusef would not take his brother Benjamin in the Deen (Law) of the king. It was the rule of the King that the Thief would get punished ( beaten) and return twice what he stole without being made a slave for a year, as prescribed by the Law of Yaqub.

Imam Nasafi[119] also says the same thing i.e. that Yusef did not judge his brother by the law of the king, where one has to return the amount stolen without being made a slave, and as a result because of the will of Allah, he was lifted in degrees of wisdom.

This is what the commentators have to say about this ayah. Those who uphold this evidence, I presume, interpret the ayah by its understood meaning. This among the scholars is what is known as Mafhum Al Laqab ( the opposite understanding owing to a name or noun, in this case his brother ). To make this more clear let us take a more simple sentence, “I saw Zayd”. From this understanding, one can imply that “I did not see anybody else except Zayd”.  So in the case at hand, the ayah (………..He could not take his brother by the law of the king except that Allah willed it(so)……..) would by this understanding mean, with the exception of his brother, Yusef ruled by the Law of his King. In fact this is one of  weakest forms of implied meanings that is possible. To such an extent that Imam Shokani (who agrees in using the opposite understanding of the text, but by other means, such as understanding the text by using a time period, or a condition etc… ) comments on this, and says that those uphold this view, who are in fact the minority of scholars, have no excuse whether it be linguistic, or legal (by shariah means), or rational. He goes on to say “ It is known from the tongue of the Arabs that whoever says that I saw Zayd  will not be implying that he did not see other than Zayd but if their is indication in the text that this meaning is correct then the evidence is by the indication( rather than the understood meaning) which is outside the scope of discussion”.            In this case their is no indication from the explicit text !! Some scholars such as Abu Bakr Al Daqaq, and Ibn Faroq have upheld this understanding[120]. Fair Enough. But even these scholars put conditions to using an understood meaning as a legal evidence, and one of these conditions is that it does not contradict explicit text or a definite evidence. For example, if we look at this verse

(……..But force not your maids to prostitution when they desire chastity………..)[121]

From the understood meaning of the text ( this type beingcalled Mafhum Al sifa ( understanding by the way of a characteristic) i.e. chastity) we can say, if they do not desire chastity, then we can force them into prostitution!! Obviously this is not the case as this is contradicted by evidence such as the explicit ayah ( Nor come near to Zina……)[122].

How does this relate to this topic ? From the discussion above those who allow a person to take part as ministers in these regimes have fallen into the same mistake. By the implied meaning they have reached a conclusion that one is allowed to rule by non-Islamic law as a minister but they have contradicted the explicit texts such as:

( …….And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed they are the disbelievers.)[123]

(………..The authority is for none other than Allah……..)[124]

Another problem also arises. Why have the people who have taken this as an evidence, isolated the understood meaning of the text to the first part of the ayah? I have surely the right to an answer. Let me make this more clear. From the first part of the ayah in consideration, as I have mentioned before, one can understand, that for other than his brother, Yusef implemented the King’s laws. But if we continue on to the next part (…..We raise to degrees (of wisdom) whom we please….) , and we know for sure that this refers to Yusef, when he applied the laws of Yaqub in preferance to the King’s law as agreed by all the scholars of tafseer[125]. Then by the opposite understanding, Allah would have not lifted Yusef degrees of Wisdom if he implemented other than the law of Yaqoob for other than his brother. What further confirms this is another ayah in the same surah, (  He said: “Allah forbid that we take other than him with whom we found our property : Indeed (if we did so) we would be the oppressors”  )[126]. How is this confirmation achieved ?  It is in fact established by two evidences. First by the opposite understanding called Mafhum Al Hasr[127] ( the restricted understanding in which the understanding is rotated around the phrase “except” or “other than”). For example if I say “No one got up except for Zayd” by this understanding one would say that Zayd was the only one that got up i.e. the understanding would rotate around the word “except” and not the noun “Zayd”. Hence from the verse, if you take the person whom you have found to have the item as a slave then you are not the oppressor. This verse can also be understood by another understanding called Mafhum Al Muafaqa ( The corresponding understanding, or the clear cut analogy asunderstood by some scholars ). For example Allah says in the Quran ( Whoever has done a particle’s weight of good, he shall see it; and whoever has done a particle’s weight of evil he shall see it ). Then by the understanding mentioned above what is greater than a particle’s weight of evil is a greater sin[128]. Similarly in this case if one takes the wrong person as a slave he, as mentioned in the ayah is an oppressor, but if he does not take anyone as a slave in the first place if an item is stolen i.e. he implements the law of the King, then he is even a bigger oppressor. It could be said that this is specific to Benjamin and to Yusef’s clan. This in fact makes matters worse because they have accepted Mafhum Al Laqab and hence one can say that if one takes the right person as a slave for other than Benjamin or his clan (it is here where this understanding is used) then he also is not an oppressor   ( i.e. he would be an oppressor if he did not take him as a slave). They can not reject this because if they do, they destroy their basis for showing that Yusef did not rule by Islam. Secondly they can not make this statement in the first place because they would reject the well known principle “ The ruling is derived from the generality of the phrase and is not isolated to the reason in which the ayah was revealed”[129]. For example the ayah    (.…..Whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed are the Disbelievers ….. )[130] was revealed regarding the Jews[131]. Does this mean that only the Jews should rule by what Allah has revealed?!! They could also say that Yusef was only sent for his people unlike Muhammad hence this principle does not apply ( this is though an assumption as the prisoners that Yusef tried to guide to Islam where not from his immediate clan[132]) . If they do say this then they have handed the issue to us on a silver plate. This is because they have accepted the “Shariah of the people before us” and hence it would apply to all mankind. We would agree with this objection in fact and that is because our usul(basis) does not take the “Shariah of the people before us” as a basis in the beginning!!! Hence from these two understandings regarding Verse 79, one can conclude two points:

1- The condition for not being an oppressor is to rule by the laws of Islam (in this case the laws of Yaqub) i.e. this being derived from the opposite understanding called Mafhum Al Hasr.

2- If one does not rule by the laws of Islam (i.e. he rules by the laws of the king) he is even a greater oppressor then if he misimplements Islam i.e. in this case taking the older brother rather then Benjamin as the slave. This is derived from Mafhum Al Muafaqa

Which understanding do they take? Can I put forward that it is arbitrary? In fact it is not!!! This is because one of the conditions to take the opposite understanding is to ensure that it does not contradict a stronger understanding[133]. In this case their weak, in fact invalid, Mafhum al Laqab contradicts the two strongest understandings known i.e. Mafhum al Hasr and Mafhum al Muafaqa. Forexample the strength of Mafhum al Hasr is so great that the scholars debated whether it was even an opposite understanding!! In fact Imam Shirazi ,the Shafi scholar, and Imam Qurafi the Maliki scholar, have said that this understanding is not an understanding but in fact is from the explicit text itself!!!!![134]

The stronger opinion is that it is from the understood meaning but they all agree, even those who agree in using Mafhum al Laqab, that the two understandings mentioned above are much stronger. Any sane scholar would then prefer the stronger one. Why have they not done this?

Let us allow even this. Then this exceptional rule will only apply to Yusef and his time. Why? Because it is agreed among the scholars that the we cannot use “the shariah before us” if it contradicts any Islamic law (be it general or specific). For example, Zakariaya[135] was not allowed to speak to any man for three nights but it is narrated in Abu Dawood that the prophet did not permit one to be silent from the day till the night[136]. As the command of the prophet contradicts Zakariaya’s action, then it will be taken that Zakariaya’s allowance is abrogated. The answer to this is very strange indeed. To say that ruling by Islam is an aqueeda issue and hence one that cannot change, showsthe ignorance of the other side. It is well known that their is a difference between the belief in a law and the law itself. For example if I believe that Zakah is not Fard, then I according to the agreement of the scholars have left Islam. But if I fail to pay Zakah, I am considered to be sinful. Hence how can abrogating the law of Yusef contradict the Aqueedah of Islam?!!! And why is this not possible?!!! I do not think a satisfactory answer can be given. We will now go onto the next topic

2- The position of the Muslim Najashi-

The position of Najashi seems to be similar to the position of many generals and influential people in the world today, that have different ideals to the regime they are living under. Yet they are afraid to take any action or show their belief owing to the fear of being killed. It seems that Najashi was in a position that was so dangerous that he was willing to hide his belief  in Islam!!!

This understanding can be indicated from the saying of Ibn Hisham that the people desired to revolt against him, and what happens, as is usual of the cases of revolution, is the immediate death of any member of the ruling party. In this case the eminent death of Najashi himself!!! Can one apply this analogy to taking part in a government that does not rule by Islam? Certainly not. In most, if not all, of the cases the Muslim activists have the choice of putting forward nominees for elections. If we wanted to find a correct analogy then we must look into a circumstance where one, out of his freewill, (with the consent of the prophet) chose to rule by non-Islamic law and to hide his belief in Islam. I can guarantee that if any one asks these people whether one is allowed to hide his belief in Islam, which would obviously mean removing any public obligations such as Friday prayer, Allah forbid, out of FREE CHOICE, their would be an uproar with an emphatic “NO!!” thrown at one’s face. To such an extent that suspicion would be cast on the person asking the question. Yet they still allow this analogy ( with an Illah ((cause necessary for analogy)) from their mind) to occur, with regards to ministerial jobs. But they prohibit ( I hope so!!!) anyone to hide his belief ( pretending that he is from another faith) out of free choice.[137]

What we can correctly deduce from the evidence, is the allowance of anyone in position of authority, be he a general in the army or a convert to Islam, to hide his belief and desiresbecause of fear of death(that is guaranteed), until he gets enough support to allow him to cause any change. This can be deduced from the reply of Najashi to the emissary of the prophet “…… but my support( in Negus) is small, leave me until I get enough support and soften the hearts( to Islam)” .

Another point must also be given and that is the quotation of Ibn Taymiah as an authority for taking part in non-Islamic governments. It is something to note that people seem to continuously misquote Ibn Taymiah on many strange opinions that they hold. For example the allowance of having more than oneIslamic state[138], the allowance of Interest in the current banking system[139], the quotation that Ibn Taymiah also only allowed defensive Jihad[140], and the quotation that Ibn Taymiah forbids the removal of the leader by force even if he does not rule by Islam, kills Muslim activists, and allows American forces to occupy Muslim land as long as he is not a Kafir[141]. Here yet again the procedure is the same. What did he actually say ?

This covered in great detail in Majmoo Al Fatawaa Fatwaa of Ibn Taymiah,[142]. The background to this topic seems to be on the disagreement between the different schools of Aqueedah ( the Mutazillah, the Ashayria, and the Sifatia i.e. Ibn Taymiah’s school of thought) on the position of the Mujtahid who exerts the effort in deriving an ijtihad. Is he sinful if he goes against definite text(or indefinite text) out of lack of knowledge, or his inability to know? Ibn Taymiah using the ayah (…….Allah does not burden the soul except what is within its capacity…) goes on to show that the Mujtahid is not sinful owing to this ayah(and many other evidences), puting forward Najashi as an example. It is here that he puts the conditions that allowed Najashi not to rule by Islam (the conditions would obviously be applied to the current upholders as well, I assume)

1- He does what is within his capacity (i.e. it is not impossible as in the case of one, in Wudu, washing his arm upto and including the elbow when it is amputated!!!) as can be understood from the ayah.

2-It is impossible to do hijra from Dar Kufr to Dar Islam.

3- Not being able to show his religion publicly

4- That he does not have access to anyone to teach him Islam (as was the case of Najashi)

To such an extent, Ibn Taymiah then goes on and says that it was narrated that Najashi did not do Hijra, Jihad, Hajj, the five prayers, nor fast Ramadhan or pay Zakat, as he could not show his religion publicly.

To apply this situation as explained by Ibn Taymiah to taking part in the Government is sheer ignorance, as this would be tantamount to saying that one does not need to pray while one is a minister. If one is, then the case of comparing to Najashi becomes invalid, as the main cause (illah) for not implementing Islam publicly, was his lack of knowledge and his fear of death i.e. (…….Allah does not burden the soul beyond its capacity….)[143]. Now onto the next topic.

3- The position of Umar ibn Abd Al Aziz.

Before embarking onto this topic it must be emphasised that no scholar of Ahl ul Sunnah wa Jammah has used a Tabii as a foundation for Islamic ruling, rather we can use them as examples to follow similar to, say, Salahadin al Ayubi. I am answering this point in order to remove a charge like this from such a great man.

To assume first that this argument is valid we must obviously consider the Umaayad dynasty after Muawiayiah to be a non-Islamic dynasty. Was this the case?. Their are many narration’s of the prophet that indicate that their will be rulers that will act in the most indecent way! The prophet then advises the companions not fight unless they show clear cut Kufr[144]. What does this mean? Imam Nawawi narrates from Qadi Iyad that the caliphate will not be given to someone who is corrupt in the first place but if the caliph becomes corrupt then some say that he should be removed, but without Fitnah or War. The majority of Ahl Sunnuah wal jammah from the fuquha, Muhadatheen, and Mutakalamin say that he will not be removed if he is corrupt and removes the rights of people, and that they are not allowed to go out against him.Qadi Iyad also says that Abu Bakr bin Mujahid claims that their is an Ijma on this, but some have replied to him with the revolt of Hassan, Ibn Zubair, and the people of Medina against Bani Ummayaiah, and when a large number of Tabiaeen revolted against Hajjaj bin Yusef. The Majority have replied that their revolt against Hajjaj was not for corruption but for what he changed from the Shariah.[145]

It seems from this that the Ummayad Dynasty generally were corrupt rulers except in the case of Hajjaj bin Yusef (even this is debated), that ruled by Islam. Hence the Islamic position regarding them would be one in which  patience was preferred owing to the hadeeths of the prophet that prevent revolt unless their is a change in Shariah[146] It is from this, that Umar Ibn Abd al Aziz took Power. Rather his position was of one who took power from a corrupt Caliph that ruled by Islam to assume authority as a just ruler. To claim that the Ummaayad dynasty is a non-Islamic regime is tantamount in accusing many of the sahabahand great scholars like Imam Malik,who all agree that if a Muslim ruler changes the shariah then he should be removed (some of whom became judges e.g Abu Yusef ) of all staying silent and allowing (legally) the rulers not to implement Islam. Going, against the command of the prophet[147] to remove them if they change the Islamic laws!!! ( the exception of Hajjaj bin Yusef taken into consideration, assuming that he did not rule by Islam). Thinking along this line can easily allow one to enter into many a dangerous area. If Umar Ibn Abd Al Aziz or any of the great men did not rule by Islam as ministers then evidence needs to be given as this is a serious accusation!! If he never did, which is in fact the case, then this can provide no authority for the case at hand. We now move unto the next topic.

4- Masalih Mursala.

Imam Ghazzali, Amidi, Ibn Hajib have reported an Ijma on not acting on general evidence before looking for specific evidence[148]. It is the agreement of the scholars that when we are faced with a new situation we first look for a specific evidence then a specific Illah (cause), then a specific Ijma(consensus), then a general evidence, and then we finally ( if this Usul is taken) go onto principles like Masalih Mursala. Or else we end up in chaos!! For example, if we need to collect money to build a mosque but the only possible means is by acquiring a mortgage, we could say that building a mosque is a good thing as it gets the youth of the street, so having a mortgage is allowed based on the principle, Their is no harm or harming ( in Islam)[149]. This is a wrong way to go about things, as it is clearly forbidden in the ayah ( Allah has permitted trade and forbidden Interest……….)[150]. Hence our interests should be in line with the Islamic code of life and this is the best way to remove any form harm in our society. From this we get the correct understanding of Masalih Mursala as put forward by Rafi Ibn Khadij regarding the issue of sharecropping  “The prophet forbade us in an issue that was beneficial for us but following Allah and his messenger is more beneficial to us and more beneficial generally!!”[151] We now go onto the next topic

5- The oath of Fudul-

This is probably one of the weakest arguments possible. How can forming a treaty ,even if it is with non-Muslims, to uphold Justice as defined by Islam ( in this case giving Tradesmen their due) be considered as ruling by non-Islamic law!!!! The prophet approved this oath as it goes along with the principles of Islam and not because it was a treaty in which non-Islamic law was applied.!!

6- War is deception

If the evidence above is weak, check this one out!! How can taking part as a minister in a non-Islamic regime and ruling by un-Islamic laws be considered a state of war!!! And which scholar allowed us to do haraam because of war?! No comment!!

7-If we cannot implement it totally then we should implement it partially

We finish we the weakest argument of all. How can it make sense to say that we implement some of the Islamic laws by ruling by un-Islamic laws?!! If they mean by this that we can get some benefit by allowing some laws to be applied then this has been answered under the issue of Masalih Mursala. To put it bluntly one cannot get some benefit for Islam if it is done by un-Islamic means.!!!!

Is forming many Islamic States a Method to Establish The Khilafah

It would seem strange to include the topic of the legality of multiple Islamic states as an issue of importance related to the method. But since it has been included under this topic it then must be addressed. Firstly the opinions of the classical scholars and the modern scholars shall be put forward. Secondly the evidences will be discussed and finally a conclusion will be reached on its legality.

The opinion of the classical scholars:

There seems to be a general agreement of the classical scholars on the illegality of more than one Islamic state. To quote all the scholars who hold this opinion would lead to an endless list. It will suffice to quote the following:

• Imam Qalqashandi in his book Subhl Al-Asha says “It is forbidden to appoint two Imams at the same time”[152]

• Ibn Hazm in his book Al-Muhalla says “It is permitted to have only one Imam in the whole world”[153]

• Imam Sha’rani in his book Al-Mizan says “It is forbidden for the Muslims to have in the whole world and at the same time two Imams whether in agreement or discord”[154]

• Imam Jozairi says in his volumious work, Al-fiqh Ala Madhabi Al-Arba’a “ The Imams of the four schools of thought agree that the imama is an obligation…….It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Imams in the world whether in agreement or discord”[155]

But their is seems to be an opinion that seems to allow this. Imam Mawardi says in his his book Al Ahkam Al Sultanyia “It is not allowed for the Muslim nation to have two Imams at one time, but a group has deviated and allowed it”[156]. Imam Nawawi has also discussed this, “The scholars have agreed that it is not allowed to give the contract (of the pledge) in the same period of time even if Dar- Al -Islam spread (extensively) or not. Imam Haramain said in his book Al Irshaad “Our scholars have said that it is not allowed to have the contract (of Allegiance) with two people in one area and their is an Ijma on this.” He also says “If the distance between the two Imams is seperated and the area between them is enourmous then their is a possibility to this position..”. Imam Nawawi goes on to say “…This is a corrupt position against the (agreement) of the salaf and Khalaf, and the apparent wordings of the hadeeth”.[157] From this we can derive three points

1- That an isolated group in the period of Mawardi (364-450 A.H, 974-1058 A.C.) held an opinion that it was allowed

2- That Imam Al Haramain said that their was an ijma on it being forbidden. It must be understood that the Ijma must have come from the period afterwards as Imam Mawardi came in a period preceding Imam Al- Haramain ( 419-478 A.H , 1028-1085 A.H).

3- Imam Al-Haramain considers it a future possiblity that the allowance of more than two leaders, if the distances are extremely great, may be allowed. It must be noted that he considers it a possiblity. It seems that he is leaving the door open for future research. Imam Nawawi though rebuttles this harshly and closes the door firmly with the statement “This is a corrupt position against the agreement of the salaf, khalaf, and the apparent wording of the hadeeths!!”

The door was opened again eventually with the position of Imam Shokani in his book “Al- Sail Al-Jirar” and Sadiq Bin Hassan Al-Kanooji Al-Bukhari, the author of the book “Rawdat Al-Nidia”. In fact Sadiq bin Hassan qutoes form Imam Shokani’s book in order to put forward his understanding. The text is as follows.

Imam Shokani says “ …..after the spread of Islam, the expansion of its area,…..for every part their was a Wilaya to an Imam or Sultan ,………and every area would not follow the orders or prohibitions of the (sultan) of the other ………..Their seems to be no objection to a number of leaders and sultans, and it is a duty to follow everyone of them after the pledge to that area which gives the orders and prohibitons.

Also if the leader of the other area has anyone that revolts against him in his area then the ruling is death if the person does not repent. Also it is not a duty for the people of the other area to obey him nor fall under his protection because of the great distances between these two areas. This is because (the people) will not be able to know the news of the Imam (in the other area) or the sultan owing to the distances between them, not knowing who dies or lives. As a result the duty of obediance, will be a burden beyond one’s capacity. This is known to anybody who looks at the position of the people and nations, for the people of China and India will not know the leadership in Morrocco let alone obey it…….know this as it is suitablile to the Islamic principles, corresponding to the evidences. So leave aside what might be said against this, as the position of the nations of Islam in its first period compared tonow is more clear then the sun in the daylight!!…….” [158].

The position of the Modern Scholars.

The position of the modern scholars and groups have split regarding this issue. From those who see the illegality is Shiekh Taqi-id-deen Al Nabahani, the founder of Hizb Al-Tahrir. In his book Nitham Al Hukm Fil Islam he says “ It is not allowed to have a multiple number of Khilafas, as it is not allowed for the Muslims to have two Khalifs in one period of time……”[159].

Regarding its legality a number of opinions have been put forward. Quamaruddin Khan in his book “The Political thought of Ibn Taymiyah” says “But this authority need not be one single unit Ibn Taymiyah for the first time in history endeavours to justify juridically that it may be divided…………..Ibn Taymiyah naturally does not use the modern terminology to express this idea, but he is very clear on this issue. In the beginiing of the Siyasah, discussing the famous verse of the Quran, dealing with the question of trust authority and obediance, he observes, “The ulema say: the first verse is revealed about the rulers; it is obligatory on them to return their trusts………”. Here obviously Ibn Taymiyah is considering the possibility of many rulers and not of one supreme ruler of the community”[160].

Again Abu Zahrah in his book “Islamic Unity” says “The political position regarding unity must be fulfilled by this meaning i.e. the five duties that have been mentioned previously-for it is the goal to have this unity. It is not necessary for this accomplishment that the nation be unified (as a single unit). In fact it will be fullfilled strongly if the state is not one. Hence as a result it should not be our intention from this unity the establishment of a unified Islamic state, that will include all the Islamic prinicpalities. This is because all the Islamic principalities are spread throughout the world…, nor is their a capital in the centre acting as a Qutb in which the Islamic rulings rotate around  from which the orders and prohibitions aresent……………..On top of this the distancing between the contienents …has lead to customs and habits…….and it is necessary that the system that takes this path be in accordance with this norm in agreement with the customs and habit, as long as they are good and do not contradict Islam. And even on top of this we cannot call for one nation so that the kings and presidents are not offended!!,…………..fearing that the crown will be lifted from their heads……….Hence the political union cannot be with one nation as this is not possible, and if it was possible it would not be easy to accomplish, and if it was easy to accomplish it would not be benefitical…..!!!![161]

Another upholder of this opinion is the poet Iqbal. He says “It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a league of nations which recognises artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for the facility of reference only and not for restricting the horizon of its numbers”[162]. It personally does not seem clear to me that Iqbal does support it but this seems to be the opinion of Mazeheruddin Siddiqi the author of the book “Modern reformists thought in the Muslim World[163]

Finally the group “Young Muslims U.K” seems to put forward this position in a way. I think this is where it relates to the method to establish the Islamic Khilafa. In one of its leaflets stating it objectives it says: “……..4-Building the Muslim state 5-Building the Khilafah, by gathering and unifying the Islamic Governments around the world, 6- Witnessing to Mankind, becoming the leader of humanity taking it away from the clutches of Shaytan” From this it seems they belive in the universality of the Islamic Khalifate but seem to legalise the presence of mulitple Islamic states to achieve this.[164]

The Evidences put forward by those who see the legality of Mulitple Islamic States

1-The evidence that the enormous distances between the states will lead the people to not know the leaders in the other Islamic states. As it is obligatory for the people to have the authority of Islam ruling over them and the pledge of allegiance to theruler owing to the hadeeth “Whoever dies without the pledge of allegiance(to a Caliph) dies the death of Jahiliyaah( the death of ignorance of the pre-Islamic period)”[165] and many other evidence. Hence if the distnces prevent the people from knowing the existance of other nations, let alone the leader, then it becomes a burden beyond ones capacity as washing ones arm upto and including the elbow for wudu when it is amputated!!!. This is because of the ayah (( ……Allah does not burden the soul beyond its capacity))[166]. Abu Zahrah also sees the impossibility owing to the rulers wanting the crown on their heads.[167]

2- The ayah (( O Mankind, verily We have created you from a male and female and made you into peoples and tribes to know each other…….))[168]. From this ayah Abu Zahrah deduces the legality of having different people and tribes and therefore I assume different nations.

3-The Ayah ((…..Help each other in rightousness and piety))[169]. Abu Zahrah I assume uses this ayah to show that the nations should cooperate on rightousness and piety. If they fight to take over each other to unite the Islamic nation, I assume they will not be working towards rightousness and piety I assume.

4- Having more then one Islamic state will not be benefitical and according to the hadeeth “Thier is no harm or harming in Islam”[170] It will be in fact Haraam!![171]

Discussion of the evidences

1- The evidence of ((…..Allah does not burden the soul beyond its capacity))[172]

The discussion of this evidence will centre on two points. First the issue of distance and allegiance. Secondly the issue of the “crown of the king”.

Their is total agreement that Islam does not burden one beyond one’s capacity, and that once someone does not have the ability to to what Allah has ordered owing to it’s impossibility then the burden is removed[173]. The disagreement is on placing this principle outside of its context. First the Muslim is required to obey what he hears from the Imam whether it is by direct link to the caliph or by the amirs that the caliph appoints to remove the difficulty of the wide expances. For these Amirs will be following the instructions of the Caliph and they will pass their orders to their subjects. This is confirmed by the hadeeth of the prophet “Whoever obeys me, obeys Allah, whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah. Whoever obeys my Amir Obeys Allah, Whoever disobeys my Amir disobeys Allah”[174]. Where is the impossibility in this ?!!! Imam Shokani may have had an excuse because of the technology of his time. But where is the excuse for the brothers now!!!!. Their is none. Rather with the televisions, radios,telegraphs,etc we are able to communicate witheach other even if one is in China and the other is in Morrocco. The Muslims may be in a bad technological state. But they are not this bad!!!! Secondly it is not a duty for every Muslim to directly cooperate in giving their allegiance to the caliph. This is confirmed by the Ijma of the sahabaa[175] that the Muslims fought in battles with the death of one caliph, only to contimue to fight without going back to give allegiance. Can we say that these Sahabaa died a death of Ignorance!! Rather it a duty on the nation as a whole if some do it, the sin is removed form the rest. That is the rest will obviously have their allegiance to the caliph but it need not be by direct participation. Finally whether our Kings and Rulers might object is really not an evidence. Pharoah objected to Moses. Would that have been an excuse for Moses to stop!!!! May Allah protect us from this pathetic pessimissim.

Hence from this since the cause was the “impossiblity of the action” then the ruling is removed. This is because of the principle that the cause encircles with the ruling, if it is removed then the ruling is removed[176].

2-The Discussion of the Ayah ((……and made you into people and tribes to know each other…..))[177]

Many a nationalist has used this ayah. But I would have not expected this to come from one of the Shiekhs of Azhar!!! People getting to know each other does not remove the responsibility of them being united. Thier is no indication by the explicit text or the understood text or by an indication or by a specific cause that we are not allowed to have one leader or in fact more then one leader as this ayah is totally unrelated to this issue. Secondly this ayah destroys the premise of nationalism by ending with ((………..Verily the most noble of you is the most God fearing and Allah is most knowledgable and aware)) . The most God-fearing is the one who wants to unite the Muslims and says that their is no difference between Arab and non-Arab except by Taqwaa[178].Thirdly the Salaf have defined knowing as knowing the various linages i.e. to know which tribe one is from[179] and not as knowing each other as separate nations with separate Khalifs.

3- The Discussion of the Ayah ((……..Help each other in rightousness and peity….))[180]

Their is nothing to discuss. It has nothing to do with the topic. It is like me quoting the ayah which I have chosen randomly  (( That the people of the book may know that they have no power……))[181]

4- The Hadeeth “Their is no harm or harming in Islam”[182]

Imam Ghazzali, Amidi, Ibn Hajib have reported an Ijma on not acting on general evidence before looking for specific evidence[183]. It is the agreement of the scholars that when we are faced with a new situation we first look for a specific evidence then a specific Illah (cause), then a specific Ijma(consensus), then a general evidence, and then we finally ( if this Usul is taken) go onto principles like Masalih Mursala. Or else we end up in chaos!! For example, if we need to collect money to build a mosque but the only possible means is by acquiring amortgage, we could say that building a mosque is a good thing as it gets the youth of the street, so having a mortgage is allowed based on the principle, Their is no harm or harming ( in Islam)[184]. This is a wrong way to go about things, as it is clearly forbidden in the ayah ( Allah has permitted trade and forbidden Interest……….)[185]. Hence our interests should be in line with the Islamic code of life and this is the best way to remove any form harm in our society. From this we get the correct understanding. This is just a copy of the answer to the same point in “power sharing”. It deserves no more. It is more harmfull to have more than one Islamic state. It is beneficall to have one . That is all their is to it.

Conclusion

As it can be seen the upholders of the issue of Mulitple Islamic states have not even a thread to hold on. But rather the statement of Imam Nawawi stays “ This is a corrupt position against the agreement of the salaf, khalaf, and the apparent wording of the hadeeths!!”. In fact Imam Nawawi was referring to Imam Al Haramain. At least he had an excuse!!. Rather in fact the Ijma remains the Ijma of the scholars to those who take this including Imam Shokani and Imam Al-Haramain as they only allowed this under certain circumstances, and the Ijma of the Sahahba. Yes! The Ijma of the sahaba. It is narratted that Al-Habbab Ibnu Munthir said:

“When the Sahabaa met in the wake of the death of the prophet at the saqifaa of Bani Sa’da, (they said) “One Amir from us and one Amir from you” (from the Muhajiroon and Ansaar) Upon this Abu Bakr replied “It is forbidden for the Muslims to have two Amirs for this would cause differences in their affairs and concepts, their unity would be divided and disputes would break out amongst them. The sunnah would then be abandoned , the bida’a would spread and the Fitna would grow , and that is in no one’s interest” (not even in the interest of Abu Zahraah!!!!) The Sahaaba heard this and consented. Hence it becomes a matter of Ijma.[186]

As for the hadeeths of the prophet they are numerous. I will quote some:

• The prophet said “When the oath of allegiance has been taken for two Khalifs, kill the later of them”[187]

• The prophet said “Whosoever comes to you while your affairs are united under one man, intending to divide your staff or dissolve your unity kill him!!”[188]

• It is narrated from Abu Hazim “ I was for five years with Abu Hurairah and I heard him narrate from the prophet that he said “The prophets used to rule Banu Israel. Whenever a prophet died another succeeded him, but there will be no prophets after me; instead there will be Khalifs and they will number many. They asked “What then do you order us? He said :Fulfill Allegiance to them one after the other. Give them their due. Verily Allah will ask them about what he entrusted them with”[189]

These Hadiths clearly show that we should give our allegiance to one Caliph after another, the key word being ONE!!.

To finish I would like to clarify a few points. First the so called fatwaa of Ibn Taymiaah.

I was shocked beyond belief when I read a book called “The Political thoughts of Ibn Taymiyah” by Quamaruddin Khan where he puts forward that Ibn Taymiyah allows mulitple Islamic states at one period of time!! He says on p122-123 “ But this authority need not be one single unit, Ibn Taymiyah for the first time in history endeavours to justify juridically that it may be divided………. Ibn Taymiyah naturally does not use the modern terminology to express this idea ( No Kidding!!!), but he is very clear on the issue. In the begining of the Siyasah discussing the famous verses of the Quran, dealing with the question of trust(amanah), authority and obedience, he observes, “The ulama say: the first verse is revealed about the rulers; it is obligatory on them to return the trusts to their owners…………..” Here obviously Ibn Taymiyah is considering the possibility of many Muslim states at a time; that is why he is talking of rulers and not one supreme ruler of the community.”!!!??? What utter rubbish!!!! By this understanding when I say parents refers to fathers and mothers, from the ayah “From what is left by the parents and those nearest related……..” Surah Al Nisah Verse 7, I have allowed “for the first time in history” a family to have more then one father and mother at the same time, be they divorced or not!!!??? . This makes most orientalist seem conservative!!. May Allah protect us from this.

Secondly it could be said that to have one Khalif is Fard, but one can have many amirs. That is correct but it is the Khalif who appoints the Amirs and the not the amirs who appoint the Khalif. I doubt anyone would say this as it is obvious and agreed upon by every scholar of Islam.[190]. But just in case ignorance will show its ugly head, I will Quote Imam Ashunahji (Al-Qurafi) In his book Al Farooq:

“ Whatever the prophet of Allah did on the authority of leadership it is NOT allowed for anybody to perform it except by the permission of the imam following the messenger of Allah because the reason of his work was in the capacity of a leader” and he continues

“……………….appointing judges and wali’es, dividing the booty…………are the responsiblities of the Khalifah…..or his assistants or deputy(that have been appointed), and it is not allowed for anybody except him.”[191]

The evidence for this is provided by the hadeeth of the prophet “The Imam is a shepherd and he is responsible for his flock”[192]. They could say their is no Khalif. The answer is go get one!!! Would anyone dare to say that he could not get married as it needed the condition of two male witnesses. The issue is the impossibilty of the condition. Only then can it cancel the ruling. Otherwise like marrige a condition does not abrogate a ruling. It is not impossible to get a Khalif therefore this arguement is invalid.

It could be said “What leads to a Wajib is a Wajib”. The answer is simple. What leads to wajib has to be halaal and not Haraam. Having more than one leader is haraam by Ijma. Finally it could be said that the hadeeths of the prophet refer to his locality and was only for his time. This is probably one of the most dangerous arguments. Not because it is strong but because it can destroy Islam. Specification of the ruling has to come from the text. This is from the mind i.e..

The prophet said “When the oath of allegiance has been taken for two Khalifs, kill the later of them”(If it is in my time or locality!!!)[193]

It could be said that we have to gradually implement Islam and this is a method. InshaAllah the discussion of the method of Gradual Implementationwill be discussed next. I will finish by saying that it is Haraam to to work to get the Khalifate by uniting numorous Islamic states as having these states in the begining is haraam and Allah knows best.

Gradualism as a method to establish the Islamic State

One of the most dangerous ideas put forward by any group is the concept of gradualism. An idea that is strange to Islam not heard of from any Muslim scholar. It is a concept if understood well, can be seen in the method of many groups that call to Islam. Some call to it intentionally while others use it subconsciously. Before proceeding to discuss this I will attempt to define it. The problem with this is that the upholders have not really given a definition. Gradualism can be said to be the implementation of Islamic law step by step with the ability to implement it fully yet avoiding this because of its difficulty. This procedure will go on until eventually the Islamic constitution is complete and the Islamic state is established. I have used the clause “with the ability to implement it fully” so as to exclude the excuse of impossibility, The term “impossible” or to use the ayah that supports this “ the …Burden beyond ones capacity” has been defined by the scholars so as to not be misused. A correct analogy would be as mentioned before to wash the feet during ablution when they have been amputated. But when one has the power to implement Islam fully but does not do so because of the excuse of difficulty or because of the excuse that the “aqueedah of the Muslims is not correct” then this is a totally different issue. Before discussing the evidences, I will put forward the opinions of those who allow it and those who forbid it. I do this to avoid the accusation of misquotation.

An example of those who uphold this comes from the group Young Muslims who’s view is presented in the Islamic journal “Al-Mizan”. In discussing the qualities needed for revival:

“ …….First of all we need to remind ourselves of some basic characteristics of Islam:

……4-graduality

We should also realise that the methodology for revival has always been started by preaching the message of tawheed. This was the method adopted by all the prophets at all times because it establishes and clarifies the relationship between the creator and the creation, and how man should relate to this physical world. Sayd Qutb writes “ The Qu’ran made this question the only subject of its message during the Meccan period and never discussed other subsidiary matters. These subsidiary topics were not mentioned until the all knowing Allah decided that matters pertaining to faith had been explained fully and had entered into the hearts of that select group of people who were to establish his religion and were to give it a practical form…..He did not deviate from this issue to describe the details of that system which was to be established on this faith or any laws for the organisation of the Muslim society”. Not only in the learning but in the application of Islam to society a gradual approach must also be followed, “…..Gradualness and teaching at intervals is desired, so that a living community based on its beliefs may come into existence, and not merely a theory…..The message bearers of Islam should fully understand that this is a divine religion and that its method which is harmonious with its nature, is also based on divine guidance. It is not possible to establish this religion without following its particular method”. These words of Sayd Qutb are substantiated by the following sayings of the prophet (saw);

“ The religion of Islam is a lenient one. So go into it with ease and patience. No one who attempts to storm his way into it will come out victorious” (Bukhari)

“ Aisha (ra) said (about the Qu’ran), The first thing to be revealed thereof was a Mufassal Surah, and in it was mentioned Paradise and the Fire. When the people embraced Islam the verses regarding Halaal and Haraam were revealed. If the first thing to be revealed was “Do not drink alcohol”, people would have said ; “ We will never give up drinking”, and if “Do not have illicit sex” was revealed they would have said “We will never give up adultery and fornication” (Bukhari)

The prophet (saw) said to Mua’dh Bin Jabl: “You are going to people of the scripture and when you reach them call them to witness that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger. And if they obey in that, then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them five prayers to be performed day and night. And if they obey you in that then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them sadaqah (Zakah) to be taken from the rich amongst them and given to the poor” (Bukhari)

Surely this methodology has a divine wisdom behind it, and if we are to revive our society form Jahiliyyah then our method must appreciate this method”[194]

And from those who disagree with this method is the group Hizb Al Tahrir, whose opinion can be seen in the book “Al Dawaah Ila Al-Islam” (The call to Islam). In fact the book devotes a whole chapter to the issue itself. It will suffice to quote a few lines that show clearly the position:

“…….And now after showing what gradualness means, and what it includes…..we move on to clarify the Islamic opinion that is correct …..

I say the opinion that is correct but I did not say the more correct opinion. This is because the thought of gradualness is not from the Sharh ( the Islamic Jurisprudence) and it is not allowed to attribute this thought to it.,…..”[195]

It will suffice to quote this to show the Hizb’s opinion. I will now move on to present the evidences of those who consider gradualism the method of the prophet (saw).

The Evidences of Gradualism

The evidences of gradualism include the following:

1-The Qur’an was revealed gradually

2-Alcohol was revealed gradually

3-Interest was forbidden gradually

4-The hadeeth “The religion of Islam is a lenient one…….”

5-The report of Aisha

6-The hadeeth of Mua’dh Bin Jabl

7-The prophets were sent gradually

8-All the prophets started with the message of Tawheed first.

9-Allah forbade slavery gradually.[196]

These are the evidences that have been put forward by those who see it fit to establish Islam by the means of gradualism. Other excuses have been put forward like the issue of difficulty or the gradual growth of a plant, but this has either been already answered or is not worthy of being put forward as an evidence to be discussed. We now move on to the representation of the evidences.

1-The Qur’an was revealed gradually

The evidence for this is taken from a number of ayahs which include the following:

A- “It is a Qur’an which we have divided (into parts from time to time) in order that thou mightest recite it to men at intervals: We have revealed it by stages.”[197]

B- “Those who reject faith say: “Why is not the Qur’an revealed to him all at once ?”  Thus (is it revealed), that we may strengthen thy heart thereby, and we have rehearsed it to thee in slow, well-arranged stages, gradually”[198]

C- “It is we who have sent down the Qur’an to thee by stages”[199]

From this I assume they deduce that the Qur’an was revealed gradually, so as to strengthen the hearts ( in this case Muhammad but they probably would extend it to the others with the principle that the address of the communication to the prophet is also addressed to the Muslim nation unless proven otherwise with an external indication[200]). Hence from this one can deduce that the gradual implementation of Islam is a similar procedure. So if we do implement Islam comprehensively we will not strengthen the hearts of the people and end up in fact weakening Islam because we would be implementing Islam on those who are not ready.

2- The evidence that alcohol was forbidden gradually

This is derived from the following ayahs

A-They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say “In them is a great harm and some profit for men, but the harm is greater than the profit”…….”[201]

B-O Ye who believe approach not prayer with a mind befogged…..”[202]

C-O Ye who believe. Intoxicants and Gambling………Are an abomination of Satan’s handiwork…”[203]

From these three ayahs they concluded that alcohol was first legalised but Allah started to prepare the Muslims for the future so that he could completely forbid alcohol. So first Allah described it as having harm, then he forbade it during prayer, and eventually alcohol was finally forbidden. So Allah gradually forbade alcohol in this procedure because the Muslims would be stronger and more willing to accept the final ruling. So from this we should also implement Islam slowly so as to get the Muslims ready andwhen they are ready then we can implement Islam fully on them. By this procedure we have used the method of our creator which would result in the most likely success.

3-Interest was Forbidden Gradually

They derive this from four ayahs:

A- “And whatever you give in interest for increase in the wealth of other people …….”[204]

B- “Do not take interest doubled and multiplied……”[205]

C- “O Ye who believe Fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand”[206]

D- “Those who devour interest will not stand except as stands the one whom the evil one by his touch hath driven to madness……..”[207]

From these three ayahs the upholders say that Allah in his wisdom also forbade interest gradually. First he allowed it, then he forbade it in doubled and multipled quantities and finally he forbade what they had left and finally he forbade it completely.Similarly we should implement Islam gradually like Allah forbade interest gradually.

4-The hadeeth of the prophet “The religion of Islam is a lenient one . So go into it with ease and patience. No one who attempts to storm his way into it will come out victorious”[208]

From this they conclude that by implementing Islam comprehensively we are storming our way into Islam and we will not come out victorious. Rather we should take the leniency of Islam into account and implement it with ease and patience i.e. gradually.

5- The saying of Aisha “The first thing to be revealed thereof was a Mufassal surah, and in it was mentioned paradise and fire (until when) the people embraced Islam the verses regarding halal and haram were revealed. If the first thing to be revealed was “do not drink alcohol”, people would have said “We will never give up drinking”, and if “Do not have illicit sex “ was revealed, they would have said “We will never give up adultery and fornication”[209]

From this Aisha shows the wisdom of Allah implementing Islam “gradually”. Because if the Qu’ran was revealed gradually to strengthen the hearts of the believers then obviously if at the first instance they are asked to give up drinking then they would have refused. Also if they were asked to give up adultery they also would have refused. Similarly by analogy if we implement Islam on those who are not ready we then the people will refuse and say that they do not want to have Islam implemented on them comprehensively. So we first must get the people ready by gradually implementing Islam and then we can proceed.

6-The prophet (saw) said to Mu’adh bin Jabal: “You are going to people of the scripture; and when you reach them call them to witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger. And if they obey in that, then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them five prayers to be performed day and night. And if they obey you in that then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them sadaqah to be taken from the rich amongst them and given to the poor”[210]

From this they deduce that Mu’adh bin Jabal adopted the gradual approach to the people of the scripture ordered by the prophet (saw). What makes their argument interesting is that they can use the opposite understanding called “Mafhum Al- Shart” (opposite understanding owing to a condition)[211]. This is because the prophet (saw) said “and if they accept”. This means it is forbidden for Mu’adh bin Jabal to go on to the issue of sadaqa until they accept and act upon the prayer. Hence the condition for sadaqa becomes the acceptance of prayer and the knowledge of prayer. In other words if a Muslim is learning his salaah then he cannot not pay the sadaqah or Zakah as the condition for Zakah is the knowledge and acceptance of prayer. Similarly I think they assume therefore that we should implement Islam gradually with all its laws. So we would for example first put into order the punishment of Adultery and if they would accept i.e. the people then we would proceed unto the another Islamic ruling and so on. Also it could be said by others and in fact it has been said by others that we must teach the people about their aqueedah first, then we must teach them about salaah. What they are trying to say is that it is forbidden to implement Islam on a people who do not have the “correct aqueedah” or on people who cannot pray properly or do not pray at all.

7- The prophets were sent gradually.

They might probably have said that if the method of Allah was not gradual then he could have sent one prophet and one message to all mankind from the beginning and obviously in his infinite wisdom he would have protected the message. But instead Allah decided to send many messengers, and each time a Rasul was sent then Allah would “upgrade” the religion until finally this ended with Muhammad (saw). From this they also conclude that the procedure Allah would prefer would be gradualism.

8- The first thing the prophets taught was Tawheed.

They and others who seem not to uphold this process of gradualism (but who fact have fallen into the same trap) deduce this from a plethora of evidences from them:

¨       That the first thing to be revealed where the Mufassal surahs which were related mainly to issues of aqueedah

¨       That the prophet sent emissaries such as Mu’adh bin Jabl and others to preach Islam in many lands. The first thing that the prophet asked to be mentioned was aqueedah and not the comprehensive implementation of Islam followed by the Ibadaat such as salaah

¨       The first thing that the prophet (saw) delt with was the issue of Aqueeda in Mecca. Rather it is said commonly the prophet preached the aqueedah for thirteen years before proceeding onto other issues.

¨       Today the lands are full of shirk and Bidaah (according to their point of view) such as worshipping the graves of the saints, such as using the prophet and other Awliya for intercession when asking for anything from Allah, such as denying the attributes of Allah, denial of the punishment of the grave, denial of the use of Khabar ahad into Aqueedah, such as denying that Allah has any direction and that he his “above” his throne in the literal sense, the belief in “whadaat Al Wajuud”, the ignorance of the different types of tawheed such as the Asmaa wal Sifaat, the Rububyiah, Uolohiaya e.t.c. . In fact the list is endless.

¨       The ayah which promise those who believe and do good actions that they would have power in the lands (the Islamic state), and the ayah which will only allow a change if the people change what is within themselves (i.e. their aqueedah) [212]

From this understanding a number of points are deduced:

1- The Muslim Ummah is in a state of decline because

2- There is a lot of deviancy in terms of aqueedah  flying about

3- From the first and second statement which is an understanding of the reality, we deduce that the problem of the Muslim Ummah is the “incorrect Aqueedah”

4- We hence have to deal with the ummah as the prophet (saw) dealt with the Mushrikeen and the others i.e. he first dealt with their “aqueedah”

5- So we must similarly deal with the aqueedah before we can proceed onto anything else such as the comprehensive implementation of Islam.

From these points two conclusions have been reached. One group makes the “correct aqueedah” a condition for the establishment of Islam i.e. the Islamic state. The other group takes this gradual procedure as a green light for the gradual implementation of Islam. It must be noted that the first group does not believe in the gradual implementation of Islam if they were to receive power but rather think that correcting the aqueedah of the people is a condition to implement Islam. In this way they are gradual.

9-The closure of the doors of slavery gradually.

In the early stages of Islam slavery was allowed no procedure was revealed to allow the slave his freedom. Gradually though slavery was to be abolished by procedures such as Mukatabah and Al -Itq which were revealed at a later stage. From this they also deduce therefore using this wise process we can implement Islam gradually.

These are all the evidences that have been mentioned so far regarding the topic of gradualism. It can be said that this idea is so prevalent among the Muslims today that many a Muslim would have heard one of these argumentsin some form or the other. I will now proceed on to discuss each evidence in more detail

The Discussion of the Evidences of Gradualism.

1-The Qu’ran was revealed gradually

I will list the three ayahs again:

A- “It is a Qur’an which we have divided (into parts from time to time), in order that thou mightest recite it to men at intervals : We have revealed it by stages.

B- “Those who reject faith say: “Why is not the Qur’an revealed to him all at once? Thus (is it revealed), that we may strengthen thy heart. Thereby, and we have rehearsed it to thee in slow, well-arranged stages, gradually.”

C- “It is we who have sent down the Qu’ran to thee in stages”

From this they say the following points

1-The Qu’ran was gradually revealed

2-The wisdom behind this was to strengthen the heart of the prophet

3-Therefore we can Implement Islam gradually and strengthen the hearts of the Muslims by this procedure.

Before I go on I must emphasis that the Qur’an being revealed stage by stage, which is the correct understanding as it was all collected in the Lawh Al Mafhus before revelation, is a totally different topic to implementing Islam gradually. In the first instance we have the absence of the command of Allah with the Muslims. Then it was revealed from which thepeople implemented it straight away. On the contrary we have all the commands of Allah with us now. We then, obviously like the prophet and companions,  must implement every single law to the letter when we receive the command. The key word here is receive.

So now that I have shown they are two different topics the first and the third ayah cannot be an evidence. This is because they talk about the Qur’an being revealed in stages. We cannot deduce from the first and third ayah either by their explicit meanings, or their understood meanings, or by a meaning indicated by Isharital Nass ( the signifing meaning) that we can gradually implement Islam. This is because the ayahs have nothing to do with the topic at hand. Therefore the argument

1- The Qu’ran was revealed gradually

2-Therefore Islam can be implemented gradually

cannot apply because their is no evidence to say the clause “therefore” because the ayahs are not talking about the gradual implementation of Islam. I challenge any one to take these ayahs to an ordinary Arabic speaker and ask him does the ayah “It is we who have sent down the Qur’an to thee in stages” mean “We have gradually implemented Islam” He would say No!!. Therefore only the first argument remains which was mentioned in the first part of this discussion i.e.

1-The Qu’ran was gradually revealed

2-The wisdom behind this was to strengthen the heart of the prophet

3-Therefore we can Implement Islam gradually and strengthen the hearts of the Muslims by this procedure.

The basis for this argument is the second ayah, which is  “Those who reject faith say: “Why is not the Qur’an revealed to him all at once? Thus (is it revealed), that we may strengthen thy heart. Thereby, and we have rehearsed it to thee in slow, well-arranged stages, gradually.” Let us see what Ibn Kathir has to say about this ayah

“ Allah says describing the various objections of the Kufaar …….( “Why is not the Qur’an revealed to him all at once?”) i.e. Why has not the book that has been revealed to him come down as one piece like the other books that were revealed such as the Torah and the Injeel………So Allah replied to them that it was revealed during these twenty three years depending on the circumstances and events that required the rulings of Islam so as to strengthen the hearts of the Believers with this………That is why he said  (“That we may strengthen thy heart. Thereby, and we have rehearsed it to thee in slow, well-arranged stages ((gradually))” Qutaada said that (in describing what rehearsed it to thee in slow, well-arranged stages means) it means “we have clarified it clearly”.[213]

So Ibn Kathir is telling us that the hearts of the believers was strengthened by Allah because every time their was a new event their was an Islamic ruling for it. So what strengthened their hearts was the implementation of Islam for every event. Yet those who say that we should implement Islam gradually say that for every event we should not always implement Islam!! This is because we have not strengthened the hearts of thebelievers when we implement Islam for each event!? They have got the whole situation in reverse. Let use assume that they have not reversed the event. So how have they arrived at this conclusion? Is it from the explicit text? No! Is it from the understood text? No! Is it from the Isharaat Al Nass!! No! Is it by analogy? Maybe. What they have in fact have done is an analogy based upon the Illah “That we may strengthen thy heart”. To make this more clear let use take an example of analogy which is quoted many times:

1- Alcohol is forbidden because it is an intoxicant

2- Cocaine is an intoxicant

3-Therefore Cocaine is forbidden

Here the cause is intoxication. They have done a similar think with the illah (cause) “strengthening of the hearts”. Their argument then would be

1-The Qur’an was revealed in stages to strengthen the hearts of the believers which is obviously a good thing

2- By Implementing Islam gradually we result in strengthening the hearts of the believers

3- Therefore Implementing Islam gradually is a good thing as well.

Their are many things wrong with this analogy. In fact when we have finished with discussing all the faults with this we will have found that this is an analogy that is forbidden by consensus. For the Illah to be valid it must be a Wasf Dabit ( a regular objective quality or cause) which does not change for every situation and every person.[214] For example to make this more clear let use take this analogy.

1- We can shorten our prayer on a journey because of hardship (in other words we can change the ruling of Islam)

2-We find hardship when we don’t have sex with a good looking girl

3- Therefore we can have sex with a good looking girl.

Obviously this analogy is totally invalid because it uses the Illah “hardship” which can change from person to person, from situation to situation. As a result it is impossible to be an indication for the ruling as it is subjective. Similarly “Strengthening the hearts of the believers” is subjective because the judgmentof the strength and the strength itself will vary from person to person. To make this clear let use take this topic into consideration. One can say

1-The Qu’ran was revealed stage by stage to strengthen the hearts of the believers

2- Implementing Islam comprehensively strengthens the hearts of the believers

3- Therefore we should implement Islam comprehensively

One can also say (in fact he can’t but let us give it anyway)

1- The Qu’ran was revealed stage by stage to strengthen the hearts of the believers

2-Implementing Islam gradually strengthens the hearts of the believers

3-Therefore we should Implement Islam gradually.

We have arrived at totally two opposite conclusions!! This is obviously a subjective illah i.e. it is ghayr munadabit (latent and irregulat). Let us allow this. Their is an agreement among the scholars that for the illah or the cause to be extendible to the ruling it must be sensed.[215] For example for us to give the ruling of Haram to Cocaine we must be able to sense the cause “Intoxication” or else we cannot extend the ruling. I ask these Brothers how in the world are they going to sense the Hikmah “strengthening the hearts”? What are its standards? When is this standard reached?

In fact it is impossible for it is from the knowledge of things only known to Allah. Only Allah knows what is in the hearts!!. Let us allow even this (Allah forbid!!). Then this is an inextendible illah because it is one of the attributes of Allah!!! For only Allah strengthens the heart, only Allah knows when a certain procedure strengthens the hearts!! And only Allah is the one who changes the hearts!!. This is obvious but let me add this hadeeth anyway

A bedouin came to the Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) and said, “You (people) kiss the boys!  We don’t kiss them.”  The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said, “I cannot put mercy in your heart after Allah has taken it away.”[216]

I think the Hadeeth is clear. By extending this illah to other rulings by analogy we have in fact taken on board an attribute of Allah. This because we are saying if we do this then the hearts of the believers will be strengthened and if we do this their hearts will not!! We cannot say this because only Allah knows this!! And for us to say this we need an evidence from the text. I think this is clear enough to show that this analogy is very dangerous indeed!!

In summary they cannot use any of these ayahs to show that we should implement Islam gradually. This cannot be shown either by explicit text or the understood meaning of the text, or an Isharaa from the text, or from an analogy from the text. We now moveonto the next topic

2- The evidence that Alcohol was forbidden gradually

Let us list the three ayahs again

A-They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say “In them is a great harm and some profit for men, but the harm is greater than the profit”…….”

B-O Ye who believe approach not prayer with a mind befogged…..”

C-O Ye who believe. Intoxicants and Gambling………Are an abomination of Satan’s handiwork…”

In reality the argument is derived from the first one. In the first argument it was said the Qu’ran was revealed gradually and in the second argument a detail of this was picked up and it was said that it was revealed gradually. Of course, if they consider the Qu’ran to be revealed gradually then they must also consider alcohol and all the other rulings to be revealed gradually. That really has been answered in the first point. What needs to be addressed here is the question whether the prohibition of alcohol was gradual in the sense that it was made haraam and from their the prophet and his companions gradually implemented this prohibition. The answer is an obvious no!.

Ibn Kathir narrates an interesting tradition involving these three ayahs. The first ayah to be revealed was the one showing alcohol to be of more harm than good, but despite this alcohol was allowed. This did not seem clear to Umar Ibn Khattab so he raised his hand in supplication and asked his Creator to show him a clear complete solution to the problem of Alcohol. Then Allah revealed the second ayahforbidding them to pray while they are in a state of intoxication. So Umar again raised his hand up in the air and repeated his call. Then Allah revealed the third ayah finishing with the clause “Will you not then abstain” So Umar after this ayah then said “ We have finished, we have finished.” i.e. he was satisfied now. If one also looks closely one can also see that alcohol was never forbidden until the third ayah. This is because the second ayah has to do with the condition of prayer. It forbids one to be in an intoxicated state when one is praying. It does not prohibit one to drink. So it is clear that alcohol was hence only made forbidden in the third ayah. From which the prophet and his companions implemented immediately. Another incident happened which really in a sense rebuttals the idea of gradualism totally. The prophet used to receive a gift of Khamr every year. When it became forbidden and a new Muslim came to give the prophet a gift he refused it saying that it was forbidden. Then the new Muslim asked whether he could benefit from it and sell it. The prophet replied that the Jews were cursed for getting benefit from what was forbidden for them from the fat of the cattle and sheep. If Islam could be implemented gradually on those whose hearts where not so strong like those who just entered into Islam because “Islam was a lenient religion” (see later for the discussion of this hadeeth) why did the prophet forbid this new Muslim to even sell it!!? Surely if Allah gave him the Rukhsa to allow the man to develop his religion gradually he would have said Yes!![217] This in fact never happened in the time of the prophet or the companions. So what makes us so special to allow it? So it is clear that the second point which is the gradual implementation of Islam when the ruling exists never occurred. So the evidence of the gradual prohibition of alcohol can not serve them. Rather it is an evidence against them.

One more point needs to be mentioned. If they claim that they can gradually implement Islam. Should they not do this by the procedure that Allah gradually revealed the Qu’ran? For surely that is the best example. Hence should they not pray to Jerusalem first? Should they not make alcohol forbidden first, then forbid intoxication during prayer e.t.c? If theanswer is Yes! Then they have used abrogated verses to make a ruling. This is forbidden by the agreement of the scholars, and the Ijma of the sahabaa. We now move onto the next topic

3-The prohibition of Interest Gradually

I will mention the four ayahs again:

A- “And whatever you give in interest for increase in the wealth of other people …….”

B- “Do not take interest doubled and multipled……”

C- “O Ye who believe Fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for Usury”

D- “Those who devour interest will not stand except as stands the one whom the evil one by his touch hath driven to madness……..”

If we look at these ayahs clearly with respect to what the classical scholars have to say such as Imam Razi, Imam Ibn Kathir, Imam Qurtubi, Imam Shokani, Imam Tabari[218], and all the other scholars we find that the position they put forward goes totally against the reality of how interest was forbidden.

Regarding the first ayah, the topic that was at hand had nothing to do with interest at all.In fact the subject was not to do with interest but to do with the topics of gifts. What the ayah actually means is that whosoever decides to give gifts to people so that in return he would get something of much greater value then this person will not get any increase in reward with Allah on the day of Judgement. This is because the word riba can have two meanings. One means the Usury which is forbidden and the other means an increase in terms of gifts or sadaqaa. That is why the prophet (saw) said:

Allah’s Apostle (peace_be_upon_him) said, “If one gives in charity what equals one date-fruit from the honestly-earned money – and Allah accepts only the honestly earned money – Allah takes it in His right (hand) and then enlarges its reward for the person (who has given it), as anyone of you brings up his baby horse, so much so that it becomes as big as a mountain.”[219]

The Arabic word for enlarges or increase in this hadeeth is Yarbee which comes from the source word Ribaa which is the increase. But in this hadeeth it is not taking about interest but about the increase in reward. Also Imam Qurtubi says that Ibn Abbass said regarding the ayah “And whatever you receive in interest(now it should mean gifts) ” refers to the gifts a person gives so he can receive something better. This person will not receive the increase in reward promised by Allah but their is no sin. Also Ibn Kathir says something similar and says this is the opinion of Ibn Abbas, Mujahid, Dahaaq, Qutaadah, Aqraamah, Muhammad Ibn Kaab, and Al-Shabii. Ibn Abbass also said that their are two types of Ribaa. The Ribaa which is not legal i.e. Usury, and the Ribaa in which their is no sin and that is the Ribaa of the gift that a man gives so as to get an increase in return.[220]

As for the second Ayah, if one looks at the reason for revelation one finds that it has nothing to do with the legality of small amount of interest and the prohibition of large amounts. This is because the ayah is referring to the loans that were given out during the Jahaliyaa times that would increase in massive quantities owing to the inability to pay the loan in the first instance. So for example even if the interest on it was small the quantity would reach a disproportionate amount because of the time factor involved and not becauseof the amount of interest. That is why Allah is forbidding us to be involved in loans in which we would end up receiving doubled and multipled amounts. But what really finishes the argument is that the prohibition of interest in small and large amounts occurred before this ayah was revealed!! In fact the ayah  “Those who devour interest will not stand except as stands the one whom the evil one by his touch hath driven to madness……..” which was in Baqaarah was revealed before this ayah which is Al-Imraan. Even the smallest amount of interest was forbidden as in the hadeeth of the prophet (saw)

“ Ribaa consists of seventy parts, the smallest is the same as a man fornicating with his mother”

As for the third ayah “O Ye who believe Fear Allah and give up what remains of your demand for Usury”, the reason for revelation was because of a number of tribes such as Bani Umarau and Bin Umair who had transactions involving Interest in the period of Jahaliyaa. So when Islam came then Allah ordered them to leave the contracts they had involving interest.[221]

The final ayah was in fact the first ayah to be revealed and this has been already discussed. The point is then that Interest was forbidden in the first place and did not take the gradual approach that they have assumed. They are just simply wrong to use this evidence! Now onto the next topic.

4-The hadeeth of the prophet “The religion of Islam is a lenient one . So go into it with ease and patience. No one who attempts to storm his way into it will come out victorious”

Where from the text of this hadeeth can we understand that we can gradually implement Islam. The explicit text does not say this, nor does the understood text say this, nor does even an indication of the text mentions it. In fact the meaning of this hadeeth has been narrated in different versions and we then can easily see what the prophet intended compared to the meaning that the upholders of gradualism have constructed.

The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said, “Religion is very easy and whoever overburdens himself in his religion will not be able to continue in that way. So you should not be extremists, but try to be near to perfection and receive the good tidings that you will be rewarded; and gain strength by worshipping in the mornings, afternoons and during the last hours of the nights.”[222]

Once the Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) came while a woman was sitting with me. He said, “Who is she?” I replied, “She is so and so, and told him about her (excessive) praying.” He said disapprovingly, “Do (good) deeds which is within your capacity (withoutbeing overtaxed) as Allah does not get tired (of giving rewards) but (surely) you will get tired and the best deed (act of Worship) in the sight of Allah is that which is done regularly.”[223]

Their many other hadeeths regarding this but these will be enough. From these hadeeths it is clear that the leniency and the ease the prophet is talking about is Islam itself. The prophet is trying to indicate to us that Islam is enough for us. We do not need to do any excessivechores by for example praying all night continuously, or not marrying, or overburdening ourselves with acts that are not fard. That is why the prophet (saw) described this as one who storms his way into religion. This because he takes to much on board trying to do what is impossible. Implementing Islam comprehensively is not a burden but a Fard!! And surely it is not impossible!!. How can Allah in his infinite wisdom order us to do something which is impossible to do. In fact the majority of scholars have agreed that this can never be the case. Let me ask these Brothers, can I use this hadeeth to say that Adultery is allowed because Islam is a lenient religion? Can I say that Shirk is allowed because Islam is a lenient religion? They would jump up and say No! Then why have they made the exception for implementing Islam comprehensively. This hadeeth as can be clearly seen has nothing to do with the topic.

5-The saying of Aisha “The first thing to be revealed thereof was a Mufassal surah, and in it was mentioned paradise and fire (until when) the people embraced Islam the verses regarding halal and haram were revealed. If the first thing to be revealed was “do not drink alcohol”, people would have said “We will never give up drinking”, and if “Do not have illicit sex “ was revealed, they would have said “We will never give up adultery and fornication”

Aisha is obviously talking about the “gradual” revelation of the Qu’ran. We have already shown that this cannot extend by analogy to the topic of implementing Islam gradually but I will discuss this hadeeth anyway. Ibn Kathir narrates this incidence. It seems that the response of Aisha was with regards to the request of a Muslim from Iraq who asked her to show him the Qu’ran so that he could organise his Qu’ran in a similar manner. She replied what harm will come to you if you recite one surah before the other ? Then she continued with the reply mentioned above. It was well known as Ibn Kathir continues that the Iraqi people were known to ask questions that were irrelevant . He goes on to say that the first surah’s to be revealed where those mentioning Hell and Heaven, until when the people started to become Muslim then Allah revealed the ayahs regarding halal and haram one by one in a step by step procedure. From this he also deduces that the organisation of the surahs is a matter already established that cannot be changed.[224]

The cause for Allah revealing the surahs regarding halal and haram was as a result of the people becoming Muslim who had already received information regarding the punishment and reward. But why did Aisha mention this and then go on to say that if the first thing to be revealed was “do not have illicit sex” e.t.c.? The reason is because if the first thing to be revealed was “do not have illicit sex” without any mention of any punishment of hell, then people would have not been scared to do what was forbidden nor would they have any desire to do what was obligatory as their was no promise of any reward. Hence Allah in his infinite wisdom knew thisand as a result first revealed the surah’s regarding hell and heaven. So the cause of the people continuing to have illicit sex would have been the absence of these surahs and not the comprehensive application of Islam!! What makes this clear is the linguistics of the hadeeth. For the clause“until when” shows that the Mufassal surahs were the cause of the people becoming Muslim and the verses regarding Halal and haram were revealed because of the people becoming Muslim. It is also clear as is known among the scholars the cause encircles with the rule. The ultimate cause is the revelation of the mufassal surahs which prevented them from disobeying the commands of Allah., and hence with it’s absence the infarctions of Islamic legislation would occur. One hence cannot say that we then must implement Islam gradually to prevent these attitudes, because the Mufassal surahs are with us and the punishment of hell and the promise of paradise can be read, so we would have no problem if we implemented Islam comprehensively. They hence could only have the excuse if these surahs were not here but obviously this is not the case and it will never be!! We will now move onto the next topic

6-The prophet (saw) said to Mu’adh bin Jabal: “You are going to people of the scripture; and when you reach them call them to witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his Messenger. And if they obey in that, then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them five prayers to be performed day and night. And if they obey you in that then tell them that Allah has enjoyed upon them sadaqah to be taken from the rich amongst them and given to the poor”

This is a wonderful hadeeth in which a competent scholar could derive so many rulings. It is also a dangerous hadeeth in the hands of those who do not have the knowledge. From this evidence they derive the ruling that Muadh bin Jabl implemented Islam gradually on the people of the scripture after they had accepted Islam. First he would ask them to pray and if they accepted then Muadh Bin Jabl would ask them to pay the Zakah. From the opposite understanding called Mafhum Al Shart then if they did not obey him then he would have not taught them about Zakah. They would also probably comment that if Muadh bin Jabl was to implement Islam comprehensively, he would have asked them to pray and to pay Zakah at the same time.

First it is an assumption to presume that the order in which Muadh Bin Jabl gave the call to the duties of Islam is the same as the order in which the duties are to be performed. Imam Nawawi gives an interesting rebuttal along this line. Before going into the rebuttal itself a little background knowledge must be given.

A point of dispute arose between the Hanafi’s and Shafi’s. If a Disbeliever dies without becoming a Muslim does he get punished for his disbelief alone or does he get punished for his disbelief and for missing the actions a Muslim performs such as prayer. The Hanafi’s said that he only gets punished for his disbelief. They in defence of their case used the hadeeth of Muadh Ibn Jabl claiming that the declaration of belief is a condition for the fard actions that followed. Hence these actions cannot be valid if the condition is not fulfilled and as a result these actions would not count on the day of Judgement. Imam Nawawi gives a sharp reply by saying the Mafhum Al Shart (opposite understanding according to a condition) does not apply here because if it did then the Salah would be a condition for Zakah. Hence if a new Muslim was learning to pray and the time came topay Zakah then he would not be obliged to pay it. He goes on to say that none of the scholars have said this i.e. that the one who does not pray will not be obliged to pay Zakah.[225] The Hanafi’s might reply and say only the first part applies owing to other evidences which is beyond the scope of this discussion, but both the Hanafi’s and Shafi’s (in fact every scholar) agrees that this understanding does not apply when it comes to the rest of the hadeeth. What makes it even more clear is the hadeeth of the prophet in his discussion with a bedouin.

A Bedouin came to the Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) and said, “Tell me of such a deed as will make me enter Paradise, if I do it.”

The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said, “Worship Allah, and worship none along with Him, offer the (five) prescribed compulsory prayers perfectly, pay the compulsory Zakat, and fast the month of Ramadan.”

The Bedouin said, “By Him, in Whose Hands my life is, I will not do more than this.”

When he (the Bedouin) left, the Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said, “Whoever likes to see a man of Paradise, then he may look at this man.”[226]

Now if the action of salah was a condition for Zakah, then the Prophet would have been forbidden from mentioning all the actions that the bedouin needed to do. In fact he would have asked him to pray first. Then if the Bedouin prayed he would then tell him to pay the Zakah. Instead though the prophet said this all in one go i.e.

“Worship Allah, and worship none along with Him, offer the (five) prescribed compulsory prayers perfectly, pay the compulsory Zakat, and fast the month of Ramadan.”

Their are many versions to this hadeeth and one version ends with the prophet also telling him to do what ever he orders in addition to these fards and to abstain from what is prohibited. So it is clear here that this opposite understanding does not apply. This is because it contradicts the explicit text, and it is a well known principle that if the opposite understanding contradicts an explicit text then the explicit text overrides it.[227]

Finally to close this thing once and for all one must also look at the people who were being addressed. They were the people of the scripture who had no knowledge of Islam. So let us assume for the sake of the argument that the opposite understanding is valid. Then this would apply to those who have not received the knowledge that would require them to act on what is necessary. One cannot pray if he does not know how to. In this case we would teach them in this gradual approach. This cannot be extended by analogy to implementing Islam gradually, because their is no cause in the text to extend it. It must be clear that teaching is different then implementing Islamic law. Secondly this applies to those people who have no knowledge of Islam and not to the Muslims today who have all the Quran and the prophets hadeeths in their hands; the excuse of ignorance is no longer their anymore because as a Muslim by your very nature you have accepted to obey Allah and his prophet in every command including Salah and Zakah. Let me ask the brothers one question. If a sharp sinful Muslim comes to them and tells them he is not paying his Zakah and he is also not praying (place note on whether he is a Muslim if he does not pray). He then goes on to tell them how he has had a Homosexual relationship with another man. Understanding the point that they are trying to make with this hadeeth he then asks them whether he is sinful for having this relationship? Now if they reply Yes, then no longer does the obedience and application of Salah and Zakah become a condition for all the other aspects of Islam and no longer can they claim that one can gradually implement Islam. If they say No, then their is no comment. Now onto the next topic

7-The prophets were sent gradually.

So were the dinosaurs. Rational evidences are invalid especially if they contradict divine text. Now onto the next topic

8- The first thing that the prophets taught was Tawheed

The answer to this falls into two categories. First their are the traditional gradualists. The answer here is similar to the answers to the Qur’an being revealed gradually. Again it is just another detail. It has also been shown that one cannot apply the analogy to implementing Islam Gradually. Let us though approach it from another angle. Who did the Prophets preach tawheed to ? Who did Muadh Bin Jabl preach tawheed to? The answer is the Non-Muslims. So in this circumstance one can “gradually implement Islam” in the sense that the condition for all the fards is being a Muslim. Once they become Muslim then Islam is implemented on them comprehensively. As for the other angle which assumes that the condition for implementing Islam and forming an Islamic state is the removal of deviancy from the society, they to in a sense are gradualist but the approach to these people is different. Many a time I have heard people like them say “How can we implement Islam when we do not know where Allah is?” “How can we work to establish the Khilafah when people are worshipping graves?.” Let us take their argument in more detail.

1- The Muslim Ummah is in a state of decline because

2- There is a lot of deviancy in terms of aqueedah  flying about

3- From the first and second statement which is an understanding of the reality, we deduce that the problem of the Muslim Ummah is the “incorrect Aqueedah”

4- We hence have to deal with the ummah as the prophet (saw) dealt with the Mushrikeen and the others i.e. he first dealt with their “aqueedah”

5- So we must similarly deal with the aqueedah before we can proceed onto anything else such as the comprehensive implementation of Islam.

The first statement is really agreed upon by everyone. But as for the second statement this needs substantiate proof. If I see a Munkar in society, it does not necessarily mean that it is the only cause for decline, it could contribute to the decline but this does not mean that if we solve this problem the Muslim ummah will become revived. This is because for the revival of the ummah a solution must be provided that will solve the immediate problems and give an answer to the interactions between human beings as well as an answer to the individual acts. If one corrects the mistakes of an ignorant man then the man will become knowledgeable only in the matter that was corrected. It willnot follow that if a man is corrected and told not to do Tawaaf around the grave that he will then work to revive the society in terms of other procedures. He may correct others with regards to that specific act but that will be it. It is rather the incorrect understanding that leads one to think that the correction of an individual will correct the society. This is because the society consists of individuals their relations between each other ( i.e. a common bond such as Islam, Communism e.t.c) and the leader that has authority over them.[228] Now that I have shown that statement 2 is inaccurate, we will move onto the fourth statement. The first that were revealed were concerning the matters of Aqueedah mainly, that is correct, similarly it is correct to assume that the prophets started to preach tawheed but the society were Non-Muslims as mentioned before. One cannot by analogy apply this to Muslims. Secondly just because the prophet preached tawheed first this does not mean that we have to do this first, rather we should do all the actions. The prophet taught Salah before he taught Hajj. Does this mean that Salah is a condition for Hajj? Of course not. For a condition to be valid it must be derived from the linguistics of the text or by any other legal procedure that has been laid down by the scholars. I will obviously not go into the details of how an aspect of the prophets communication can be considered to be a condition for a certain topic because that is beyond the scope of discussion.

Let me close this discussion once and for all. I want to ask the brothers, was it forbidden for Imam Nawawi, Imam Izz Ibn Abd ul Salaam, Imam Qurtubi, Imam Ibn Assakir, Imam Ibn Hajr Al Asqalani, Imam Shokani, Qadi Iyad, Imam Shirazi, Imam Razi, Imam Ibn Tahir Al Baghdadi, Imam Nasafi, Imam Zanjani, Imam Abu Hassan AL Ashari[229] and many many other scholars like them to pray? If the answer is No, then one will proceed to say that all these scholars are considered to be deviants in terms of aqueedah. Why? Because they are all Ashari!![230] Now if they still accept that they should pray and do all the other fard actions, then really one should ask why have they only put the condition or priority for establishing the Islamic state. Their is a dichotomy here. Finally and probably the most crucial point can be demonstrated by the example of the man who is doing tawwaf around the grave. This man, though, is doing all the other actions that are required of him. Will we go and correct him only to tell him to stop praying? We have in fact made him deviant by another aspect. This will not achieve what we are looking for. Similarly if a man is deviant and working to establish the Islamic state, will we tell him to stop the work because he is a deviant? Allah forbid!! And we say this is the method!!??

As for the ayah talking about the change in oneself, then this has already been answered before.[231] As for the other ayah “Allah has promised ,to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that he will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power) as he granted it to those before them”.[232] Yes!! Allah will give victory and authority to those who believe and do good actions, but working to establish the state is a good action and part of the belief. Similarly not working for the establishment of the Islamic stategoes against the ayah as it is an evil action and hence Allah may not grant the authority promised. This ayah in no way says that the innovations one makes are a hindrance to one’s salah or the establishment of the state nor by its explicit text or its understood meaning or by an indication from the text rather it says the opposite because if you consider the innovations to be a hindrance to all the fards then you have committed an evil act by forcing the brothers into haraam. That is because they are prevented from doing the good actions. So in other words to improve the society we must call to good actions and the correct belief by preventing the good actions??!! Why? Because they do not have the correct belief!!! We now move onto the next topic

9-The issue of slavery.

I have left this argument to the last because it is the easiest. Slavery was never prohibited gradually. In fact certain procedures such as those already mentioned came later to allow slaves to become free. But when the reality of the situation comes again in which one can take slaves then slavery becomes again legal.[233]. So this argument provides nothing.

I have now finished the discussion regarding gradualism. It has been shown that the evidences they rely on are very weak indeed. But what has really happened in states like Sudan who are following this procedure? They partially implement Islam because of the excuse of gradualism and partially implement non-Islamic law. They have provided certain arguments for gradualism but they have not provided any arguments to establish the validity of implementing non-Islamic law at the same time.

I ask Allah to forgive me and all the brothers for all the mistakes that may have been done. For all that is wrong comes from me and all that is correct is from Allah. If I have made any mistakes then I would be grateful if they are shown. This in no way is a complete understanding of every method. No person can really claim to be like this. Rather this is what I have understood to be correct and I will continue in this way until a stronger evidence is provided.

[2] Surah AL Ra’d Ayah 11

[3] Al Aqueedat Al Tahawiyah- Explanation and commentary by sheikh Nasr Al -Deen Albani p 47.

[4] “This is the way we propagate Islam” By Professor Dr Muhammad Said Rahmadan AL Buti p 48-49

[5] The absent Fard by Dr Muhammad Amarrah p29-30

[6] Ditto p 35

[7] The Duty of Muslim Youth today by Mawdudi p25-26

[8] Ibn Maja: The Text of the hadeeth “ Will I not tell you of the most important of the issues, its pillar, and the best part of the sword? Jihad!!” no 3973/ Ch 2, 1314. Albani says it is Saheeh ( Saheeh sunan Ibn Maja no 3209)

[9] Ibn Maja: Hadeeth no. 4011-4012 Ch. 2/1329-1330 and Albani says it is Saheeh (Saheeh Sunan Ibn Maja no 3240,3241 Ch. 2/369.

[10] The Absent Fard  p38-39

[11] Narrated by Al Muwatta and by Ibn Maja, Darqatani, Hakim, and Baihaqui. Hakim says: Sahih by the conditions of Muslim.. (Jami al usul 6/644) Hadeeth no 4929 and it is in Sunan Ibn Maja no 2340 and Albani says it is Saheeh (saheeh Sunan Ibn Maja) No 1890 Ch. 2/39.

[12] Fighting against the corruption of the ruler Jihad wal Qital Vol. 1 111-137, Also see “Are the Muslim rulers Kafir or not?” by sheikh Omar Abd ul Rahman

[13] Surah Al Anaam ayah 129

[14] Aqueedat Al Tahawyiah p 47

[15] ditto

[16] Abu Dawood (Jami al Usul Hadeeth no 67 Ch. 1/279) Sunan Abi Dawood no 4607 Ch. 4/281 and Albani says it is saheeh (saheeh sunan Abi Dawood no 3852 Ch. 1/871

[17] Surah Al Rad ayah 11

[18] Aqueedat Al Tahawyiah p47

[19] The Absent Fard p21-22

[20] The Khulafa Al Rashidoon: Abd Al Wahab Al Najar: p48-49

[21] Usul Al Tashrih Al Islami: Ali Hasb Allah p317

[22] The Absent Fard p23-24

[23] Surah Al Baqarah ayah 183

[24] Ditto ayah 216

[25] The Absent Fard p27

[26] Bukhari and Muslim (Mishkat al Masabih Ch.2/1086) hadeeth no:3666. Hadeeth in sahih Bukhari no 7057 Fath al Bari: 13/5, Sahih Muslim no 1709 ch3/1470

[27] In the original thesis the particle is or. I have changed this to the word and as this is both in the book “The Absent Fard” and in Sharh Nawawi ala Sahih Muslim. (Translators note)

[28] Sharh Nawawi ala Sahih Mulsim:8/35.

[29] The Absent Fard p28-29

[30] Usul al Fiqh: Muhammad Abu Zahrah. P290 Usul al Fiqh Al Islami by Dr. Muhammad Mustapha Al Zuhali p98

[31] Narrated by Tabarani, Darqatani, Baihaqui, and Hakim and Albani says it is Saheeh (see footnote 11)

[32] Translators note; Don’t ask!! This is an Arabic saying if translated literally it has no meaning. What it actually means is “No Problem!!!”

[33] The hadeeth was narrated in forbidding sharecropping. Narrated by Abu dawood in this way, Hadeeth no3395 Ch. 4 p353. Albani says it is saheeh (saheeh sunan Abi Dawood) no2899 ch2/651

[34] Sharh Saheeh Muslim ch8/41

[35] Sahih Muslim, hadeeth no1838 ch3/1468

[36] Sunan Al Kubra by Baihaqui : 10/114. I put the Arabic for “established over you” in brackets as this is needed as will be shown later on.(translators note)

[37] Jihad wal Qital vol. 1/p165-186. In summary, he discusses the opinion of Imam Nawawi that allows a ruler to have authority even if he takes it by force as long as he rules by Islam. He then refutes it on a similarline (except in more detail) to what will follow. (translators note)

[38] As Imam Nawawi tried to show (translators note)

[39] see footnote 12. A point needs to be mentioned here. In Sahih Muslim some narrations end with the clause “…………unless he establishes the prayer” rather then ending with “……..clear cut disbelief”. Some brothers have then continued to go on andsay that Ibn Abbas interpets the prayer as the normal definition of prayer rather than the authority establishing prayer over the community ( in fact their are two narrations, one in which the end clause is “as long as he prays and fasts” and the other ends with the clause “as long as he establishes the prayer”. It is in fact the second one that Imam Nawawi in sharh saheeh Muslim (Vol 8) says refers to the establishment of  the deen of Allah, this is an important difference) . From this they go on to say that we cannot remove the rulers unless they stop praying!!! There are a number of problems with this. First there is agreement among the Salaf that the specification of a general text in one aspect does not abrogate the validity of the remainder of the general implication. In fact it has been said that thier has been no general text that has not been specified. Simply put, why does the specification of clear cut disbelief by prayer abrogate the remainder of the implication? Where is their legal excuse? Do they not know that they have in fact by doing this, destroyed Islam!! For taking the shahada to become a Muslim has been specified with the ayah ((No compulsion in religion)) making it illegal to force someone to become a Muslim despite the general implication that it is a duty to become a believer. Do we say that because the general text has been specified we then do not need to become Muslims!!?? Before they jump onto the band wagon and say this is a Mutazzilla argument, I would like to point out that Ibn Qayyim in his Mukhtasar Al Sawaiq Al Mursala while discussing the issue of metaphors in the Arabic language, uses a similar argument labelling those who do this as the Mutazzilla!!!! What makes it worse is that Ibn Abbass, as they very well know, has said that not ruling by Islam is a clear cut Kufr i.e. Kufr duna Kufr ( indicating here that the ruler does not become a disbeliver but this does not remove the obligation to remove him.) So it is very clear that Ibn Abbass has taken this general implication despite it being specified!!! By doing this they have gone against the salaf including Ibn Qayyim and Ibn Taymiaah with an argument that no scholar from the past has used to suit (intentionally or unintentionally) the present rulers. This is confirmed by the statement of Ibn Taymiaah himself “ If a group(in this case he is referring, I think to the Tartaar Horde who apparently accepted Islam but did not implement the Islamic law) withholds from some of the prayers, fasting………..taking Jizya from the people of the book for which their is no excuse for anyone in leaving or rejecting it- in rejection they become Kafirs- then this group should be fought even if it believes in these things and for this I see no difference of opinion among the scholars” He goes on to say that this way is the choice of the ummah and not the way of the Murjia( a deviant sect) which believes in following the leaders unconditionally(Vol. 28 p502-508 of Majmoo Al Fatawaa). He says something similar on p510 “ If a group goes out against the laws of Islam that are Muttawatir then it is obligatory to fight them by agreement of the ummah even if they say the Shadaatain and believe in it ( i.e. the shadatain) but do not pray……take Jizya from the people of the book…….or show bidaah like denying the attributes of Allah…….”  May we always stick to the salaf al salih (the pious predessors) as these very brothers wish to claim!!!  (translators note)

[40] Rawdat al Nathir wa Jan’at al Manather- By Ibn Qudammah al Maqdisi

[41] Sahih Muslim- Hadeeth no 1838 ch3/1468

[42] Muslim: Hadeeth no867 ch2/592

[43] Another metaphor. What it actually means is that we should not approach this “problem” from a wrong direction.

[44] Surah Al Ra’d ayah 11

[45] ditto

[46] Al Minhaj Al Usulia… by Dr. Fathi Al Duraini p510

[47] Surah Al Maida ayah 44

[48] Surah Al Maida ayah 45

[49] Surah Al Maida ayah 47

[50] See Ahkam Al Quran by Jassas ch4/92-94

[51] Fath Al Bari: 13/8, narrated by Bukhari and Muslim ( Mishkat Al Masabih: no 3666 ch2/1086). In Sahih Bukhari its number is 7056 and in Muslim it is 1709 ch 3/1470

[52] Dalil Al Falahin, The Explanation of Riyadh Al Salihin

[53] Bukhari, no 3017, Jami Al Usul no 1801 ch3/481, Fath al Bari: 6/149

[54] Al Muhathab (by Shirazi) 2/269, (translators note: Also see Imam Qurafi’s Al Farooq Vol2/206, Ahkam Al Sultaniya by Mawardi p18.

[55] Sahih Bukhari, Hadeeth no 2409 (Fath al Bari 5/69)

[56] Sunan Baihaqui 8/245

[57] Narrated by Bukhari, Muslim, and Tirmidhi (Jami al Usul, hadeeth 7517 ch10/56) in Bukhari no6874, Fath Al Bari: 12/192, In Muslim no100,ch1/98

[58] Nihat Al Sul Fi Sharh Minhaj Al Usul 4/503. Also in Usul al Fiqh by Zuhali. Amidi and Ibn Hajb say “The illegality will precede the legality because the importance put by the Sharh(the legal system of Islam) and those with wisdom is that blocking of corruption is more important then the importance of achieving benefit”

[59] Majalat Al Ahkam Al Adlia Topic 30 p10, Usul Al fiqh by Dr. Zuhaili p98

[60] It is noted in the book “ Public duties in Islam” by  Ibn Taymiaah p80-81 “ Whenever there is conflict or competition between the benefits and the disadvantages, between good and bad, it is necessary to prefer what is best on balance………………However the weighing up of relative benefits and disadvantages must be done within the scales of the Sacred Law. And when a person makes his assessment he should do so on the basis of the authoritative sources without deviating from them. Otherwise he will make a personal judgement based on knowledge of similar events and analogous cases. But the texts will seldom prove insufficient for one who is well versed in them and in the interpretation of them,”

[61] Ahkam Fi Usul Al Ahkam by Amidi 1/97, Rawdat Al Nathir by Ibn Qudammah Al Maqdisi p36.

[62] Majalat Ahkam Al Adlia; Topic 21 p 14, Usul Al Fiqh by Dr Zuhaili p98

[63] Sharh Sahih Muslim By Nawawi 8/35

[64] Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim. In Bukahri no7056 and in Muslim no1709 ch3/1470

[65] Jihad Wal Qital Fil Islam Vol 1 p113

[66] “fighting against the corruption of the ruler” study no 6 p113

[67] Narrated by Bukhari no 631, Fath Al Bari ch2/111

[68] Narrated by Muslim, Abu Dawood, and Nisai. In Sahih muslim no 1297 with the wording “you shall take from me your step by step procedures…….” ch 2/943

[69] Surah Al Ahzab ayah 21

[70] What also confirms that this method is an issue of revelation and not an issue of the Ijtihad of the prophet ( Even though the scholars who say that the prophet did Ijitihad, say that it is binding upon us!!!!!! See Irshad Al Fuhul… By Imam Shokani p428-429) is the narration in Fath Al Bari vol7/220 that is (P.T.O) narrated by Hakim, Abu Naim, and Baihaqi in his Dal’il with a hassan isnad according to Ibn Hajr Al Asqalani (and others) . On the authority of Ibn Abbas that Ali narrated to me, He (Ali) said “ When Allah ordered his prophet to put him self forward (so that they can give him allegiance) to the tribes, he left with me and Abu Bakr to Mina…….”. This order is obviously related to an obligation as the pledge of allegiance that will be shown later had an indication of the reward of heaven!!! What some brothers mean by the Ijtihad, I think, is that this issue is a worldly matter that the prophet left for us to decide!!!! I hope for the sake of those brothers that they do not go on and say that this order was specifically for the prophet hence hitting hard his universality!!!! (Translators note)

[71] e.g. Ali Abd Al Razzaq in his book “ Islam and the Basis of its Laws”

[72] Seerah of Ibn Hisham and its explanation p184-210

[73] Khas’is Al Tashri Al Islami Fi Al Siyassah Wal Hukm-Dr Fathi Al Duraini:p323-324

[74] The indication here is to the words of Abbas bin Ibadda Al- Khazriaji in the pledge of Aqqaba : “………You are giving him allegiance on fighting the black and red among the people” Seerah of Ibn Hisham (Rawadh Al Anfh 2/191)

[75] A study and research into modern Islamic thought(Arabic) 2/879

[76] Majna: A place, miles away, on the backskirts of Mecca where markets were present

[77] Aqath: A market in the desert between Nakhla and Ta’if. In it the festive of “Hilal Dhil Quda” used to occur for twenty days continuously in which the tribes of the Arabs collected to show themselves off and to recite poetry

[78] Dar in the old texts means a tribe and not s small living place or family as is currently understood today!! Hence this is an indication to the small number of Muslims in Medina compared to the non-Muslims. See Ma’lim Al Sunnan 4/15.

[79] Zaad Al Maad by Ibn Qayyim edited by Shuaib and AbdulQadir Al Arna’ot ch3/45-46

[80] Seerah of the prophet by Ibn Hisham, Rawdat al Anf 2/206

[81] Kanz Al Amal Fi Al Aqual Wal Afal ch1/326- Hadeeth no 1525

[82] In fact it has also come in another narration that when the prophet approached Medina, Abdullah Bin Sallool (the leader of the hypocrites) was about to take his sword out to kill him when he looked around and saw that Medina was surrounded by people in Tiger skins( the army uniform at that time!). He put his sword back in his sheath and said “This issue has been planned overnight!!”. It was not just a song and dance show as some would like to think!!! (translators note). (Tareqh Al Tabari (need page and verification of Isnad).

[83] Seerah Halabia By Ibn Burhan Al Deen Al Halabi: ch2/18-19

[84] Seerah of Ibn Hisham (Rawadat Al Anf 2/206)

[85] Sahih Muslim no 2564 ch4/1986. Also the same meaning has been narrated by Bukhari “………..your blood, money, and progeny is forbidden(for anyone else)…..” Sahih bukhari no1739 Fath Al Bari:3/573.

[86] Jihad Wal Qital Fil Islam Vol 1 p61-66 (translators note)

[87] Al Mughni by Ibn Qudammah Al Maqdisi 10/54

[88] I.e. they are not the martyrs of this life and the day of judgement like the Muslims who died fighting the non-Muslim in the battlefield to raise the word of Allah who are buried without being washed or being prayed for (Translators note)

[89] Some Brothers might say that the reason why the pledge of war was given was because of the ayah:

((To Those against whom war is made permission is given (to fight) because they are wronged and verily Allah is most powerful for their aid)) Surah Al Hajj ayah 29. This ayah was revealed during the migration of the prophet to Medina (see Tafseer Tabari17/123,Ahkam Al Quran by Ibn Arabi 3/1284) as mentioned by Ibn Hisham (see the text on the pledge of war). As the ayah was the first revealed regarding Jihad, then Jihad was used to establish the Islamic state. This is wrong on a number of counts

1- In fact this ayah was revealed to make fighting Mubah(permissible) and not Fard(Obligatory) as is the case. Ibn Arabi said:

“ Adhana( i.e. permission is given, this is the first Arabic word in the ayah): It has been made Mubah, in the context of the language, the legality of everything forbidden, and this is an evidence that Ibaahaah(permissibility) is from the Sharah(the Islamic legal system) and that their is no ruling before the Sharah ( i.e. Every action requires an evidence including the label of Permissibility. Because how can every action be Mubah by its essence if it requires an Islamic ruling first!! This is because this principle that every action is permissible until shown otherwise by the Islamic legal text is opposite to looking into the texts first to get this ruling of permissibility as shown by Ibn Arabi. Anyway see Ahkam Fi Usul Al Ahkam by Imam Amidi Vol 1) Not permissibility nor illegality except when the Islamic legal system has given a ruling regarding it and hence clarifying it…….”

The same thing is repeated by Imam Shafi in his Kitaab Al Umm 4/161. What I am trying to say is that this ayah did not come down to give the ruling of Jihad as a fardh action but came down to legalise fighting which was used by the prophet to legalise the issue of “fighting to establish the Islamic state” that is if the ayah was revealed prior to the pledge.

2- With the completion of Islam as a ruling system with the death of the prophet, this ayah came to include all forms of fighting that are allowed in Islam such as Jihad, fighting the people of rebellion and fighting to establish the Islamic state each of which have their specific different rulings.

3- The fact is though the ayah was not revealed prior to the second pledge of aqaaba as Ibn Hisham thought but in fact was revealed after, on the way to Medina!!(see references above). Secondly this confirmation comes with the reply of the prophet to the supporters when they said that they would attack the people of Mina if he wished with their swords and he replied that Allah did not order him to do this…..(Fiqh Al Seerah Al Nabawia By Dr Buti p184). So how did the prophet legalise fighting in the pledge but yet apparently forbid it ? The answer is that the prophet forbade it because Jihad was not yet legalised but fighting to establish the state, if neccessary was!!!! Each has its different ruling. One more point needs to be mentioned, Dr Buti after mentioning this went on to say that the reason why the prophet did this was because he knew that fighting in the future would be legalised. Their are a number of problems to this. Firstly the prophet would not make a ruling unless thierwas an indication from his Creator such as with the issue of inheritance and Jihad (see above). Secondly their is no indication in the text that the prophet thought this, so deriving a point from what we think that the prophet might have thought is not really an evidence. Thirdly the prophets sunnah is a form of revelation and hence from all this, the best way to understand this is by the method shown above. 

[90] Some scholars have said this is Jihad in the way of Allah. But the correct position is that it is not as is clarified by the narration of Saad Ibn Abi Waqaas. “ On the authority of Ibn Sireen, he said “When it was said to Saad Ibn Abi Waqaas “Will you not fight? You are from the people of consultation. And you have priority in this issue over others” He said “ I will not fight until you get me a sword that has two eyes and

two lips that knows the believer from the non- believer then I will do Jihad and I know what Jihad is!!” It says in the book Majmu Al Zawaaid 7/299 that its narrators are all Saheeh(verified as trustworthy). Hence from this narration which was in the context of the people of rebellion the difference between Jihad and “fighting the rebellious” is clear. For more details see Mughni Al Muhtaaj 1/351, Ahkam Al Sultaniya By Mawardi p61, Bada’i Al Sana’i by Imam Kasani 7/142 (translators note)

[91] see note 86

[92] Jihad Wal Qital Fil Islam Vol1 203-228. The answer is in fact Yes! This is because technically it is fighting the non-Muslims on the battlefield to raise the word of Allah. (Translators note)

[93] Narrated by Muslim no 1851. Ch3/1478. Their is point to make regarding this hadeeth. I have heard some ignorant people say that this is not a duty as the Caliph(the Islamic ruler) is not here and since this condition is not fulfilled then we do not have to do it. No scholar of ahl ul sunnah wal jammah has said that a condition abrogates an Islamic ruling. If this was the case then we would not need to pray as it has the condition of purification, nor would we have to become Muslims as it has a condition that one should not be forced into Islam as there is no compulsion in religion. May Allah protect us from this destructive ignorant understanding of a text. The only time one can do this is if the condition becomes impossible to fulfil as washing your feet in wuduu when your feet are amputated!!!!! In this case it is possible to get a caliph as this chapter demonstrates clearly. (Translators note)

Secondly it can not be said that the ruling regarding the establishment of the Islamic state is a collective duty that will be removed if some work for it. This is because it is well know that the collective duty is removed from the necks of the community if it is fulfilled which obviously is not the case here. Hence the only way to remove this collective obligation is work to establish this state as an individual responsibility. Their is a well known Islamic principle among the scholars of Ahl ul Sunnah Wal Jammah and that is “ A collective duty becomes an individual duty if this duty is not fulfilled” (need reference for this principle) ( translators note)

[94] Mujam Al Wasit: The topic “Jahad”. (Also see  Bad’i Al Saan’i By Imam Kassani 7/97 (translators note) )

[95] See “Power Sharing in Islam by Azim Tamimi”, also “Taking part in the ministries of the Jahalia Authorities” by Dr Muhammad abd alqadr Abu Faris( a member of the Ikhwan movement in Jordan) and al Waie magazine Rabi al Thani 1414 A.H p20-25

[96] Surah Yusef, Verse 55

[97] Surah Yusef verse 76 (Deen is translated as law as put forward by Ibn Kathir and others: see Tafseer Ibn Kathir Vol 2 p486, though others translate Deen to mean  slave hence it would read  (………He could not take his brother as a slave of the King except that Allah willed it so……) therefore his brother became his slave rather than the King’s. (see Al -Waie Rabih al thani 1414 A.H p20-25)

[98] Surah Yusef verse 40

[99] Irshaad Al Fuhul By Imam Shokani p398-400, Edited by Abi Musaab Muhammad Saied Al Bathari

[100] See seerah of Ibn Hisham, { Al Rawadh al Anaf lil suhaili Vol 2 p 90). This event seems to have occurred in the early periods of Islam, about 7-8 A.H according to Dr. Muhammad Abd  Alqader Abu Faris ( Taking part in the ministries of the Jahahlyia authorities p 51)

[101] Seerah al Halaabia ch3/279

[102] Seerah al halaabia 3/279. Also in Sunan Abu dawood with a similar meaning, hadeeth no 4302.

[103] Seerah Al-Hallabiah vol3/279

[104] Narrated in Nawawi’s forty hadeeths with a hassan isnad according to Ghimari ( al ibtihaj bi takhrij al minhaj p242

[105] Irshaad Al Fuhool by Imam Shokani p403-404

[106] See Dr Abu Faris’s book p 53.

[107] Seerah of Ibn Hisham vol 1 153-156

[108] Sahih al Bukhari no 3030.

[109] Surah Yusef Verse 55

[110] See Abu Faris’s book  and also the Tafseer of Maududi regarding this

[111] Vol 2 p482

[112] Vol 3 in Fath al Qadir

[113] Vol 2 p227 of Tafseer Al Nasaafi

[114] See Zad al Maseer Fi Ilm Al Tafseer by Abi Faraj Abd Alrahman Bin Al- Jawzi (597 A.H) but Allah knows best.

[115] Irshaad Al Fuhool By Imam Shokani p299-301 as well as many others!!!

[116] Surah Yusef Verse 76

[117] Vol 2 p 486

[118] Vol 3 p50 in Fath Al Qadir

[119] Vol 2 p232

[120] See Irshad al fuhul p 306

[121] Surah Al Noor verse 33

[122] Surah al Isra’ah verse 32

[123] Surah Al Mai’da Verse 44

[124] Surah Yusef  Verse 40

[125] See Fath Al Qadir, Tafseer Nasafi, Tafseer Ibn Kathir, and others

[126] Surah Yusef Verse 79

[127] See Irshaad Al Fuhul p309

[128] See Shafi’s Risala, Translation by Majid Khadduri, p308-309

[129] See Irshaad Al Fuhul p230

[130] Surah Al Mai’da Verse 44

[131] See Tafsir Ibn Kathir Vol 2 p58-59

[132] See Verse 36-42 of Surah Yusef

[133] Irshaad Al Fuhul p304

[134] Irshaad Al Fuhul p309

[135] Surah Marium verse 10

[136] Abu Dawood Hadith No.2867. It is narrated by Ali Ibn Abi Talib “ I memorised a tradition from the Apostle of Allah “Their is no orphanhood after puberty and their is no silence from the whole day till night.”

[137] Their are many evidences for this including Verse 44 Ch 15 Al Hajr (( Therefore Expound openly what thou art commanded….. )). Imam Shokani narrates from Al fara’ah that Expound means to show the religion publicly, see Fath Al Qadir Vol 3 p143-144

[138] I was shocked beyond belief when I read a book called “The Political thoughts of Ibn Taymiyah” by Quamaruddin Khan where he puts forward that Ibn Taymiyah allows mulitple Islamic states at one period of time!! He says on p122-123 “ But this authority need not be one single unit, Ibn Taymiyahfor the first time in history endeavours to justify juridically that it may be divided………. Ibn Taymiyah naturally does not use the modern terminology to express this idea, but he is very clear on the issue. In the begining of the Siyasah discussingthe famous verses of the Quran, dealing with the question of trust(amanah), authority and obedience, he observes, “The ulama say: the first verse is revealed about the rulers; it is obligatory on them to return the trusts to their owners…………..” Here obviously Ibn Taymiyah is considering the possibility of many Muslim states at a time; that is why he is talking of rulers and not one supreme ruler of the community.”!!!??? What utter rubbish!!!! By this understanding when I say parents refers tofathers and mothers, from the ayah “From what is left by the parents and those nearest related……..” Surah Al Nisah Verse 7, I have allowed “for the first time in history” a family to have more then one father and mother at the same time, be they divorced or not!!!??? . As for the fatwaa of Imam Shokani, and Imam Juwayani, it refers to when two Caliphs are ruling at extremely far distances from each other not aware of each others presence, or when the distance is so great that one cannot give allegiance to the ruler. They hence (in fact Shokani allowed it, whereas Juwayani only considered it a future possibility!) have allowed it on the prinicple that Allah does not burden the soul beyond its capacity (Surah Al Baqarah verse286). It is a well know priniciple that the cause ( the impossibility in this case) encircles with the rule. So when the cause is no longer their then the rule no longer applies. In this case I can confidently say that the cause is eliminated owing to modern communication where two caliphscan know of each others presence even if one is in Ulanbatten Mongolia and the other is in Iceland!!!! Hence this fatwaa cannot apply to the situation now. But rather the aggreement of the salaaf and khalaaf that only one ruler is allowed remains i.e. Ifanother caliph appears then kill him!!! Jihaad Wal Qitaal Vol 1 p323-365

[139] Imam Ibn Taymiah allows silver of unequal weight to be exchanged. He does not consider this Riba Al Fadl as long as one of the items is for example a silver necklace. In this case it is not interest as he recieves the excess silver in exchange for the Necklace, which is now a different commodity. Rashid Rida says the same can apply to the modern banking systems as the extra interest we receive is for the services rendered, i.e. allowing them to use our money in different financial enterprises. The difference between the two is obvious. In the first case one is paying for a tangible object whereas in the second case their is no tangibile object rather it is a vague term calles “services rendered”. So why cannot one charge interest on his loan, say 25%, for lending a sum of money, it is a “service rendered”. Hence the service rendered must obviously result in a legal commoditiy being given. In the case of Ibn Taymiaah it is the silver necklace, in the case of Rashid Rida it is interest that is given!!! Their is a point to note, in fact Ibn Taymiaahs fatwaa goes against the majority of the salaf and khalaf including the four schools of thought who consider even this a form of interest!!!!(See Economic concepts of Ibn Taymiaah p252, Fatawaa Al Kubraa Vol 3 p95-96 Dar Al Marifa Beruit, and The Reformers of Eygpt by M.A Zaki Badawai p110)

[140] Abu Zahrah in his book “Ibn Taymiaah” “ And Ibn Taymiaah deduces that fighting is to defend against trangressors from the Quran as well “Their is no compulsion in religion” Surah Baqarah verse 256. This is a general text and if fighting was allowed just because of the charecteristic of disbelief then this would have been compulsion in religion. He (Ibn Taymiaah) says: Their is no compulsion for anyone to enter Islam” and Ibn Taymiaah says “ The history of the prophet was that if anyone from the Kufaar threatened him, he would not fight him, and these are the books of the seerah, hadeeth,tafseer,fiqh, and battles that say this. This is Muttawatir from the history of the prophet for he did not start the fighting with anyone” (see Risalat Al Qitaal by Ibn Taymiaah p123 and “Ibn Taymiaah” by Abu Zahrah p380-381) In fact Ibn Taymiaah has said the opposite in his Risallah Al Qubrasia (Majmoo Al Ras’ail Almufida p255-256) “…………and the Christians say “If anyone slaps you on right cheek then turn and show the left cheek……”……..and if someone says “they fought us first” we would say this excuse is invalid with those you first started to assault  and fight but as for those who first started to fight you they are excused because Allah and his prophet has ordered him to do this…..!” (See also Jihaad Wal Qitaal Vol 1 p766-769)

[141] This is answered in Footnote 38 of “Fighting to Establish the Islamic State”. It is strange that they use the ruling of Ibn Taymiaah in Majmoo Al Fatwaa Vol 28 regarding corrupt rulers who rule by Islamic law for those rulers who do not rule by Islamic law especially when he specifically indicates otherwise in Majmoo Al Fatwaa“ If a group(in this case he is referring, I think to the Tartaar Horde who apparently accepted Islam but did not implement the Islamic law) withholds from some of the prayers, fasting………..taking Jizya from the people of the book for which their is no excuse for anyone in leaving or rejecting it- in rejection they become Kafirs- then this group should be fought even if it believes(Islamically) in these things and for this I see no difference of opinion among the scholars” He goes on to say that this way is the choice of the ummah and not the way of the Murjia( a deviant sect) which believes in following the leaders unconditionally(Vol. 28 p502-508 of Majmoo Al Fatawaa,)

[142] Vol. 19/218-219

[143] Surah Al Baqaraah verse 256

[144] See Fath Al Bari by Ibn Hajr Al Asqalani Vol. 13 p8.

[145] See Sharh Saheeh Muslim by Imam Nawawi Vol 8 p35-37

[146] See Fath al Bari by Ibn Hajr Al Asqalani vol 13 p 8, Majmoo Al Fatwaa Vol 28 p502-508, Sharh Saheeh Muslim 8/35 .

[147] With Hadeeths that reach the degree of Tawatur (see Fath Al Bari, Vol 13 p8, as changing the shariah is considered a Kufr action even if the ruler is Muslim.)

[148] See Irshad al Fuhul p240.

[149] See footnote 10

[150] Surah Baqarrah, Verse 275

[151] Narrated by Abu Dawood, hadeeth no 3395 and Albani says it is saheeh (saheeh sunan Abi Dawood, no 2899, Ch 2/651).

[152] Subhul Al-Asha Vol 9 p277

[153] Al-Muhalla Vol 9 p360

[154] Al Mizan Vol 2 p157

[155] Al-Fiqh Alah-Madhabia Al-Arb’ia Vol 5 p416

[156] Al-Ahkam-Al Sultanyia p 9

[157] Sharh Sahih Muslim By Imam Nawawi Vol 8/40-41.

[158] Al Sail Al Jiriar Vol4 /512

[159] Nitham Al-Hukm Fil Islam By Taq id Deen Al Nabahani p30

[160] The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah by Quamaruddin Khan p122-123

[161] The Islamic Unity By Shaikh Abu Zahrah p61-62

[162] Modern Reformist thought in the Modern Mulsim World p152-153

[163] He also says that this seems to be the position of Afghani, Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan and others see p144-161

[164] The leaflet entiltiled “The Characteristices of the Islamic Movement” by the Young Muslims U.K. For conformation of this leaflet a number of numbers can be contacted including e.g Inayat 0181-5545478 in London. This number was provided by the leaflet

[165] Narrated by Muslim Hadith 1851

[166] Surah Al-Baqarah ayah 286. This is provided by Imam Shokani see point 158

[167] “The Islamic Unity” p61-62

[168] Surah Al-Hujarat ayah 13. See “The Islamic Unity” By Shaikh Abu Zahrah p24

[169] Surah Al Ma’ida Verse 2. See “The Islamic Unity” p28

[170] Narrated by Al Muwatta and by Ibn Maja, Darqatani, Hakim, and Baihaqui. Hakim says: Sahih by the conditions of Muslim.. (Jami al usul 6/644) Hadeeth no 4929 and it is in Sunan Ibn Maja no 2340 and Albani says it is Saheeh (saheeh Sunan Ibn Maja) No 1890 Ch. 2/39.

[171] “The Islamic Unity” p61-62

[172] Surah Al-Baquarah Ayah 286.

[173] See Al-Jami Li Ahkam Al Quran Ch3/430, Also see Minhaj Al Uqul Fi Sharh Minhaj Al Usul By Al Badkhashi 1/170

[174] Sahih Muslim No:1835

[175] See Ahkam Al Sultanyia By Mawardi p15, Also See Jihaad Wal Qitaal Vol 1/382

[176] Usul Al Fiqh By Muhammad Zakariaah Al Bardesee p268

[177] Surah Al-Hujurat Verse 13

[178] Its meaning is reported by Abu Hurayrah and Ibn Saad.

[179] This is reported by Mujahiid. See Tafseer Ibn Kathir Vol4 p33 and Tafseer Soorat Al Hujiraat by Bilaal Philips p108

[180] Surah Al Ma’ida Verse 2

[181] Surah Al-Hadeed Verse29

[182] see footnote 170

[183] See Irshad al Fuhul p240.

[184] See footnote 170

[185] Surah Baqarrah, Verse 275

[186] See Al-Fasil-fil Milal by Ibn Hazm, Tariqh Al Tabari, Seerah of Ibn Ishaaq and others

[187] Narrated by Muslim

[188] Narrated by Muslim

[189] Narrated by Bukhari, Muslim and others.

[190] See Ahkam Al Sultaniyaa by Mawaardi, Akhaam Al Sultaniya by Imam Abu Ya’la

[191] Qawaid Al-Farooq Vol 2 p206.

[192] Sahih Bukhari, Hadeeth no 2409 (Fath al Bari 5/69)

[193] Narrated by Muslim

[194] Al-Mizan Vol 1 Issue 1 p 38-39

[195] Al-Dawah Ila Al Islam by Amah Al-Mahmood p 208

[196] See Al-Mizan Vol 1 Issue 1 p38-39 and Al-Dawah Ila Al Islam p195-216 for the list of all the evidences.

[197] Surah Bani Israel ayah 107

[198] Surah Al -Furqan ayah 25

[199] Surah Al-Insaan ayah 23

[200] Irshaad Al Fuhul p81

[201] Surah Al Baqaraah ayah 219

[202] Al Nisaa ayah 43

[203] Al Mai’da ayah 90

[204] Al Ruum ayah 39

[205] Aal Imran ayah 130

[206] Al-Baqaarah ayah 278

[207] Al-Baqaarah ayah 275

[208] Sahih Al Bukhari

[209]Sahih Al Bukhari, also see Vol. 4 of the Tafseer of Ibn Kathir

[210] Narrated by Bukari and Muslim, see also Vol. 1of Sharh Saheeh Muslim and Vol 4 p170 of Nayl Al Awtar

[211] Irshaad Al Fuhuul p307

[212] For evidences and clarification of those who see the “correct aqueedah” as a condition for the Islamic state, see Sharh Aqueedat Al Tahaawiya by Albani in his explaination of clause 72 regarding the leaders, also see Mabaahith Fi Aqueedat Ahl ul Sunnah wal Jammah p80-81 by Dr Nasr Al Aql

[213] See Vol 3 of Tafseer Ibn Kathir

[214] See Analogical Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence by Ahmad Hassan Chapter 11 p189-218, Also see Irshaad Al Fuhul by Imam Shokani p 353-355

[215]Ditto

[216] Sahih Al Bukhari

[217] See Vol 2 of Tafseer of Ibn of Ibn Kathir

[218] See Jami Al Quran by Imam Qurtubi, see Tafsir Al Kabir by Imam Razi, see Tafseer Al Tabari e.t.c

[219] Sahih Al Bukhari

[220] See Jami Al Ahkam AL Qur’an and Vol 3 of the Tafseer of Ibn Kathir

[221] Vol 1 of the Tafseer of Ibn Kathir

[222] Sahih Al Bukhari

[223] Dittot

[224] Vol 4 of the Tafseer of Ibn Kathir

[225] See Vol 1 of Sharh Saheeh Muslim By Imam Nawawi and Nayl Al Awtaar Vol 4 p 170

[226] Sahih Al Bukhari

[227] See Irshaad AL Fuhul p304-305

[228]It may be posed that this definition is a rational definition and has no basis in the Quran and sunnah. The answer to this is simple. For the scholar to do an ijtihaad he must first understand the reality. For example if he is presented with a drink, he first must examine the drink by the legal methods to see whether it is intoxicating or poisonous. The procedure to do this is by the understanding of the senses and the use of the mind, i.e. Fahaam AlWaqih as Ibn Qayyim called it. We cannot say that examining the drink is forbidden because it uses the mind, hence similarly we cannot say that the examination and the understanding of the society is forbidden when we want to derive a ruling that requires the change of this society. Ibn Qayyim said in his book Ilaam Al Mauqaayin Chapter 1/88-89 “ And the Mufti or Hakim will not be able to (produce) a fatwaa or ruling except if they have two understandings: One of them is the understanding of the reality (Fahaam Al Waqih) and the knowledge regarding it, with the extraction of the knowledge of this reality by external indications or signs…. until one has knowledge regarding the topic he is addressing and the second type: is the understanding of the Islamic duty regarding this reality and that is the understanding of Allah’s Law that he has authorised in his book, or on the tongue of his prophet for this reality. He then i.e. the Mufti establishes theruling on this reality.”

[229] See Mauqiff Ibn Taymiaah Min Al Ashaira Vol 1&2, See Also Mabaith….by Dr Aql p 63. Also see Irshaad Al Fuhuul to see Imam Shokani’s view on Allah’s attributes which are similar to Ibn Burhan’s (the student of Imam Ghazzali) p299, and also see Tahkriij Al Furua ala Al Usul by Imam Zanjani

[230] The Ashari school of thought is the one which is attributed to Abul-Hassan al-Ash’aree 260/873-324/935. It is claimed that he changed to the position of Ibn Taymiaah in his Ibannah ( see footnote 78 of the Introduction to the principles of tafseer by Ibn Taymiaah, translated by Muhammad Al Ansari p36). The correct position though is that he did not. For if we examine his position on divine fate and destiny, his taw’il of the attribute of anger, that justice and evil can only be defined by Allah, and his position on the proof of the exisistance of Allah, we find it different to the position of Ibn Taymiaah. See Vol 1 Of Mauqif Ibn Taymiaah Min Al Ashaira by Dr Abd-Al-Rahman Al Mahmood.

[231] See the first section “Fighting to establish the Islamic state”

[232] Surah Al Noor ayah 55

[233]See Jihad Wal Qitaal Vol 3 1538-1560